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This volume is dedicated to Mr. Wendell Gunn and the late Dr. Larry Nelson

The image on the front cover is Mr. Gunn descending the steps of Bibb-Graves Hall with Dr. E.B. Norton.

More information?

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WORLD HISTORY

Alan Turing's Electronic Nightmare: The Struggle to Build the ACE Computer

J. Michael Beaver

*"Everything faded into mist. The past was erased,
the erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth."¹*

Alan Turing's role in the creation of the modern computer is peculiar because his work during the Second World War was shrouded in secrecy and his association with the Hungarian-American computing pioneer John von Neumann muddied his pioneering work immediately after the war. Turing's post-war Automatic Computing Engine (ACE) project at the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) in London was one of his more significant contributions to the development of the modern computer. However, the story of the ACE computer seems to be particularly lost in popular history. For instance, the Encyclopedia Britannica entry for "computer" features an omission of Turing's ACE project, though it discusses Turing's other work.² Turing's ACE project did not see a considerable amount of success until after his untimely death. John von Neumann's work on computer design is best known for the eponymous "von Neumann architecture," and he saw

1 George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Part I, Chapter 7.

2 Paul A. Freiberger, David Hemmendinger, William Morton Pottenger, and Michael R. Swaine, "Computer," in Encyclopedia Britannica, last modified July 5, 2012, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/130429/computer>.

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considerable success in his lifetime. Turing's ACE featured a novel design that rivaled von Neumann's design, but its story has been partially lost in history. If Turing's ACE had the same successful influence as von Neumann's design, there would exist the "Turing architecture" and the "von Neumann architecture"; however, there is only the latter.³ The commercial and practical failure of Turing's ACE computing project can be attributed to the confluence of several counter-productive influences. Conflicting goals, poor relationships, and exceedingly poor administration ultimately led to the failure of Turing's ACE project.

After the Second World War, Britain needed desperately to reassert its presence on the international stage. The shift to a Labour government in 1945 spawned an interest to exploit the new field of computational research as one method to reassert Britain's dominance. Sir Charles G. Darwin, director of the NPL and grandson of naturalist Charles Darwin, sought to participate in this initiative by establishing a national computer project at the NPL. Darwin charged John R. Womersley, supervisor of the NPL

³ This is not to say that Turing has not had lasting impacts on computer science as a discipline. He contributed the founding theories of artificial intelligence, programming, and architectural design. We are concerned with the development of a practical modern computing machine, not one of his theoretical projects.

Mathematics Division, with the construction of the machine.⁴ Womersley's proposed national computer was a machine that could solve all of Britain's computational needs for the future.⁵ On the international stage, as David Leavitt reports, the United States was quickly surpassing Britain in the field of computational research, which pressured the NPL to engage in serious computational research.⁶ The increase in pressure provided Womersley with initiative to start the research program as soon as possible.

As part of his national computer initiative, Womersley recruited Alan Turing in 1945.⁷ Womersley was aware of Turing's 1936 paper "On Computable Numbers, With an Application to the *Entscheidungsproblem*," which would become the genesis of the Turing Machine. Womersley's ingenious idea was to have Turing design and construct the new national computer: the Automatic Computing Engine.⁸ However, there was a conflict of interests as Darwin and Womersley were interested in a machine that could service

4 John Hendry, *Innovating for Failure: Government Policy and the Early British Computer Industry* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1989), 34. Up until 1945, most computing machines were complex electromechanical contraptions conceived to perform one specialized task exceptionally well. The Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator (ENIAC), designed by J. Presper Eckert and John Mauchly, is a notable example. The ENIAC featured a complex, convoluted design, and it was frustrating to operate. After von Neumann joined the ENIAC team as an adviser, he produced the "First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC," which proposed the "von Neumann architecture," as it is known today. For more information, see William Aspray, *John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 34-9.

5 Andrew Hodges, *Alan Turing: The Enigma* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 306.

6 David Leavitt, *The Man Who Knew Too Much: Alan Turing and the Invention of the Computer* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006), 199.

7 Simon Lavington, "ACES and DEUCES," in *Alan Turing and His Contemporaries: Building the World's First Computers*, ed. Simon Lavington (Swindon, UK: BCS, 2012), 11-2.

8 *Ibid.* Turing was fond of remarking that Womersley's greatest contribution to the ACE project was its name. Womersley's idea, the word "engine" was a "deliberate reference to Charles Babbage's unfinished" 1837 Analytical Engine. For more information, see Hodges, 317 and Lavington, "ACES and DEUCES," 13.

the entire country and solve its mathematical problems.⁹ Turing, on the other hand, saw the ACE as an opportunity to realize his 1936 concept of a Universal Turing Machine.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Turing drafted a design for the machine, and his proposal was finished at the end of 1945. The NPL's Executive Committee approved the project, and construction officially began on August 18, 1947.¹¹

Darwin and Womersley's desire for a glorified calculator to solve the country's numerical problems was not entirely consistent with Turing's view.¹² While Turing understood the importance of national numerical work,¹³ he saw the ACE as an opportunity to do so much more. During his wartime codebreaking work at Bletchley Park, Turing worked with non-numerical logic problems, and he understood the significance of such problems.¹⁴ Turing's vision surpassed the short-term goal of number crunching; his ultimate goal was a machine that was universal, or general in purpose. The ACE, Turing hoped, would be able to handle any problem, numerical or non-numerical.¹⁵ What is more,

9 Simon Lavington, *Early British Computers: The Story of Vintage Computers and the People Who Built Them* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980), 23-4.

10 Hodges, 318.

11 It is worth noting that development on the ACE had begun in late 1945 and persisted throughout 1946. The actual ACE—or, rather, the Pilot ACE—began on this date. See also Hendry, 34 and Hodges, 367.

12 Lavington, *Early British Computers*, 23-4.

13 Turing apparently entertained the idea of nationalized computer stations. In fact, in a lecture to the London Mathematical Society on February 20, 1947, he mused that a distant computer could be operated by use of a special telephone line. Perhaps this was Turing's naïve conception of a primitive computer network. He optimistically concluded that the cost would be no more than a few hundred pounds. See also A. M. Turing, "Lecture to L.M.S. Feb. 20 1947." Lecture to the London Mathematical Society, London, UK, February 20, 1947.

14 Hodges, 365.

15 Teresa Numerico, "From Turing machine to 'electronic brain,'" in *Alan Turing's Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker's Struggle to Build the Modern Computer*, ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 181.

Turing saw the ACE as an opportunity to capitalize on his computer-brain metaphor: a computing machine can emulate the human brain.¹⁶ The ACE would embody the philosophy of the Universal Turing Machine: a machine that could be programmed to perform the tasks of any other machine.¹⁷ If the ACE could be programmed to perform any task, then it could theoretically be programmed to mimic a sort of primitive artificial intelligence, which was Turing's goal.

John von Neumann's "First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC"¹⁸ served as the initial inspiration for Turing's ACE proposal. Von Neumann's EDVAC Report was a high-level abstract amalgamation of the various ideas that resulted from various conversations with his colleagues.¹⁹ In principle, the EDVAC Report was a conceptual framework from which a group could consult while building a machine. John Hendry, Fellow of Girton College, University of Cambridge, notes most British researchers were "content to follow the well-disseminated and authoritative work of von Neumann, [which was] encapsulated in the EDVAC report."²⁰ Womersley obtained a copy of it and gave it to Turing, who accepted the legitimacy of von Neumann's work, but was "keen" to implement his own ideas about computing machines.²¹

While Turing's ACE design drew upon the EDVAC

16 Hodges, 293-4.

17 William Aspray, *John von Neumann and the Origins of Modern Computing* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 176.

18 Electronic Discrete Variable Automatic Computer, or EDVAC.

19 Jon Agar, *Turing and the Universal Machine: The Making of the Modern Computer* (Cambridge, UK: Icon, 2001), 115-6.

20 Hendry, 34.

21 Hodges, 306.

Report, his actual proposal was a much more detailed realization of the abstract EDVAC machine.²² Turing specified that his ACE proposal should be read in conjunction with von Neumann's EDVAC Report.²³ The proposal had been described as the first complete, detailed description of electronic stored-program digital computer.²⁴ Indeed, Turing's ACE proposal was the first *detailed* plan for constructing a Universal Turing Machine.²⁵ However, it is intriguing that Turing's ACE proposal draws more upon von Neumann's work than his own; the ACE proposal is much more heavily influenced by the EDVAC Report than Turing's own 1936 paper.²⁶ It is worth noting that von Neumann's EDVAC Report makes implicit, indirect use of Turing Machines, though he does not make explicit references to Turing's 1936 paper.²⁷ Although von Neumann indirectly used Turing's ideas, his EDVAC design differed greatly from Turing's ACE design.

Presumably Womersley wanted Turing to build an EDVAC-type machine but give it a twist to make it distinctly

British. Turing's design was a radical departure from von

22 Numerico, 181.

23 Hodges, 318.

24 B. E. Carpenter and R. W. Doran, "The Other Turing Machine," in *The Computer Journal* 20, no. 3 (1977), 269.

25 B. Jack Copeland and Diane Proudfoot, "What Turing Did after He Invented the Universal Turing Machine," *Journal of Logic, Language, and Information* 9, no. 4 (2000): 491.

26 Martin Campbell-Kelly, "The ACE and the shaping of British computing," in *Alan Turing's Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker's Struggle to Build the Modern Computer*, ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 156-7.

27 Leavitt, 201. Von Neumann's EDVAC Report only made explicit reference to a biophysics article by McCulloch and Pitts. In their article, McCulloch and Pitts used Turing Machines to describe neural nets. For further discussion, see B. Jack Copeland and Diane Proudfoot, "Turing and the computer," in *Alan Turing's Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker's Struggle to Build the Modern Computer*, ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 113.

Neumann's original design. As a logician, Turing took great pains to improve on the EDVAC's logical structure. Turing's priorities were a "simple as possible" hardware system and a large, fast memory for storage.²⁸ For example, in the EDVAC design, arithmetical operations, such as addition and multiplication, were accomplished using adder and multiplier hardware units. In the EDVAC design, the central accumulator performed all arithmetic; however, shoving large amounts of data down one avenue could present a formidable bottleneck for programs. Turing countered this by distributing arithmetical operations across several memory locations in an "ingenious way."²⁹ The larger adder and multiplier units, while included in the ACE design, were broken into smaller logical units. These improvements allowed Turing to economize on the hardware to allow more program instructions. For Turing, user convenience was not a top priority; in fact, he believed that user convenience could be achieved by thought and planning, not by more machine hardware.³⁰ The ACE machine was all about speed and efficiency.

As for software execution, the EDVAC and ACE designs were completely opposite. Von Neumann enforced strict serial execution of program instructions, yet Turing allowed for programs to modify their own instructions.³¹ Turing's ACE design also incorporated a unique concept:

28 Hodges, 320.

29 Ibid., 323.

30 Ibid., 320.

31 Ibid., 324-6.

optimum coding.³² Simply put, optimum coding “enabled more computing to the pound-sterling, as it were,” but this greater efficiency came at the cost of difficult, complex, and often frustrating programming.³³ However, optimum coding allowed users to achieve up to four times greater speed over conventional contemporary machines.³⁴ Despite making extensive use of von Neumann’s notation and figures,³⁵ Turing’s design distinctly improved upon von Neumann’s framework. In fact, Turing completed his ACE proposal in just three months, a much shorter time than that of von Neumann and his colleagues. By the end of 1945, Turing had a complete design from which to work.³⁶ Enthusiasm aside, Turing’s personality and work ethic may have influenced the great speed with which he completed his ACE proposal.

Since his days at Sherborne School, Turing was known for his “self-contained” and “solitary” working style, “chaotic” mind and difficulty expressing himself, and potential for becoming a brilliant mathematician.³⁷ He carried these traits with him to King’s College Cambridge. For instance, Turing worked completely in solitude when developing his 1936 paper. In fact, he was so engrossed in his work he was not aware that an American, Alonzo

32 David M. Yates, *Turing’s Legacy: A History of Computing at the National Physical Laboratory 1945-1995* (London: National Museum of Science and Industry, 1997), 33-4. It is worth noting that Turing did not use the term “optimum coding.”

33 Campbell-Kelly, 160.

34 Lavington, *Early British Computers*, 115-6.

35 Hodges, 328-9.

36 Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 12.

37 Sherborne School, “Grade Report from Sherborne School, Summer Term, 1926.”; Sherborne School, “Grade Report from Sherborne School, Lent Term, 1928.”; Sherborne School, “Grade Report from Sherborne School, Michaelmas Term, 1927.”

Church of Princeton, had published his solution to the *Entscheidungsproblem* just months before Turing finished his paper.³⁸ Turing also carried his solitary habits into his work at Bletchley Park during the Second World War. For example, Turing managed “to break into five days’ worth of Enigma material” completely independently of the main codebreaking efforts; however, the material was mostly trivial pre-war intelligence and of little consequence.³⁹ Evidence suggests that Turing was driven to solve problems that his colleagues ignored; indeed, he took on new projects so he could have them to himself.⁴⁰ This indicates that Turing was strongly self-driven and self-motivated.

Working with Turing could be challenging, particularly due to his personality. His colleagues at Bletchley Park found him to be an incapable administrator because he was more focused on his codebreaking work and private research projects.⁴¹ Turing was quite a disorganized administrator, and he eventually lost his administrative role in Hut 8 at Bletchley Park.⁴² He also had a bad habit of micromanaging his colleagues, which often resulted in mutual annoyance.⁴³ Turing’s initial supervisor, the Cambridge classicist and code breaker Dillwyn Knox, found it difficult to manage Turing.⁴⁴

Knox remarked that Turing was “very difficult to anchor

38 Yates, 15.

39 Sinclair McKay, *The Secret Life of Bletchley Park: The History of the Wartime Codebreaking Centre and the Men and Women Who Were There* (London: Aurum, 2010), 47.

40 Ibid., 134.

41 Christopher Grey, *Decoding Organization: Bletchley Park, Codebreaking and Organization Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 210.

42 McKay, 191. See also Grey, 210.

43 Hodges, 376.

44 McKay, 54-5.

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down,” but his authority was just enough to keep Turing at least partially under control.⁴⁵ Turing was notoriously rambunctious, his codebreaking work at Bletchley Park was essential to the Allies’ success in the Second World War.

Turing was also well known for his eccentric behavior, such as chaining his coffee mug to a radiator to discourage theft. Also, Turing tended to fall into silences for extended periods and to stare off into the distance, often staring past the people to whom he was engaged in conversation.⁴⁶ Conversations with Turing were often hampered by his characteristic “hesitating stammer”⁴⁷ and his unusually high voice, which could make his speech difficult to comprehend. Turing also had the bad habit of dressing like a hapless tramp.⁴⁸ Indeed, most of Turing’s colleagues at Bletchley Park considered him to be a worried “weirdo.”⁴⁹ What is more, Turing became accustomed to a certain level of wartime priority. He and a few colleagues wrote directly to Winston Churchill to appeal for much-needed supplies and personnel. Surprisingly, Churchill granted the request and gave high priority to the Bletchley Park staff.⁵⁰ Ultimately, the idiosyncrasies of Turing’s character would contribute to the downfall of his ACE project.

Turing’s ACE project stalled and nearly failed due to a combination of inadequate organizational structure, poor

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Marion Hill, *Bletchley Park People: Churchill's Geese That Never Cackled* (Phoenix Mill, UK: Sutton Publishing, 2004): 68-9.

⁴⁷ McKay, 17.

⁴⁸ Hill, 68.

⁴⁹ McKay, 17.

⁵⁰ Hodges, 376.

administration, and a lack of resources. From the outset, the National Physical Laboratory very much adhered to the bureaucratic standards expected of government institutions. It was composed of a rigid management structure and a strict division of labor; however, the NPL lacked a reputation for innovation.⁵¹ The ACE was a chance to turn that reputation around. Under Darwin, Womersley led and directed the daily research operations of the Mathematics Division and the ACE project. Indeed, Turing would begrudgingly refer to Womersley as “my boss.”⁵² Turing was accustomed to the managerial structure of Bletchley Park, and Womersley’s managerial style was incongruent with that structure. Whereas Turing was interested in solving problems and developing computers, Womersley was concerned with bureaucracy and results.

The NPL’s very literal division of labor proved detrimental to the progress of the development of Turing’s ACE computer. As part of its organizational structure, the NPL was divided into different Divisions, such as the Mathematics Division or the Radio Division. The construction of a computer was a mathematical and logical task in theory and design, but the actual device had to be constructed by engineers. Turing was allowed his own small team of mathematicians and engineers.⁵³ However, the NPL’s organizational structure “drew a firm line between brain

51 Ibid., 339.

52 Ibid., 317.

53 Yates, 24.

and hand;”⁵⁴ hence, ignorance of the developments of each Division would develop.⁵⁵ Steady progress would have been difficult to maintain at the NPL without a fluid, cohesive organizational structure. This would become especially evident later when Darwin established the Electronics Section as part of the Radio Division.⁵⁶ The Electronics Section became the primary roadblock in the development of the ACE.

Turing originally proposed the establishment of an in-house electronics section in February 1947 to alleviate the pressure on the Mathematics Division.⁵⁷ After a trip between 1946 and 1947 to survey the numerous American computer projects, Turing expressed his concern that the NPL’s organizational structure was inadequate. As Turing remarked in a letter,

One point concerning the form of organisation struck me very strongly. The engineering work was in every case being done in the same building with the more mathematical work. I am convinced that this is the right approach. It is not possible for the two parts of the organisation to keep in sufficiently close touch otherwise. They are too deeply interdependent. We are frequently finding that we are held up due to ignorance of some point which could be cleared up by the engineers, and the Post Office find similar difficulty; a telephone conversation is seldom effective because we cannot use diagrams.⁵⁸

54 Hodges, 339.

55 Ibid., 356.

56 Ibid., 366.

57 B. Jack Copeland, “The Origins and Development of the ACE Project,” in *Alan Turing’s Automatic Computing Engine: The Master Codebreaker’s Struggle to Build the Modern Computer*, ed. B. Jack Copeland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 69-70.

58 Hodges, 356.

Turing sought to establish a more cohesive work environment. In effect, Turing was betraying his own work ethic; his characteristic style was that of a self-driven loner. However, a more cohesive unit would establish a sense of stability and concentrated effort. In fact, in the same letter, Turing explained that the sheer number of American computer projects was counterproductive because it stretched thin the available resources. In contrast, Turing believed that a concentrated effort on one machine in Britain—namely, the ACE at the NPL—would prove more fruitful than the American efforts. Turing also realized, however, that the British effort was “puny” in comparison to the larger American projects.⁵⁹ By 1947, Turing’s ACE project entered its second year, and the NPL had little to show for it. Hence, progress needed to be stimulated quickly; a cohesive organizational structure would expedite this process.

Darwin established the Electronics Section of the Radio Division in summer 1947, and Horace A. Thomas was appointed as its supervisor.⁶⁰ The new Electronics Section took several months to install due to poor administration, whereas it could have been installed in a matter of weeks. Unlike Turing and the ACE group, Thomas was primarily interested in the industrial applications of electronics, not computing machines.⁶¹ For some reason, however, Darwin decided that all engineers, including the ACE engineers, should fall under the purview of Thomas’s Electronics

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 366.

⁶¹ Copeland, 66.

Section.⁶² Turing lost his control of his engineers and Thomas almost singlehandedly stalled all development. Indeed, the ignorant engineers of Thomas's section replaced the capable engineers of the ACE group. Thomas also petitioned Darwin to "curtail the construction work in the ACE Section."⁶³

Worse yet, after several months of stonewall administration, Thomas left the NPL for Unilever Ltd, which led Womersley to remark that development was "probably as far advanced [as] 18 months ago."⁶⁴ While Thomas's Electronics Section was an unfortunate detour on the road to building the ACE, the concept of an Electronics Section was not inherently bad. Turing recognized the potential benefit of and argued for an in-house electronics section,⁶⁵ but Darwin's implementation of the section was poorly administered. The establishment of the Electronics Section should have benefited the ACE project, but the relationship between the Mathematics Division and the Electronics Section was not as prosperous as desired.

Evidence suggests that the NPL leadership and Turing were often at odds with one another, especially when Turing's authority began to be undermined. In 1947, American Harry D. Huskey joined the NPL to spend a one-year sabbatical working on the ACE project.⁶⁶ By the time of Huskey's arrival, Turing had completed Version VII of his revised ACE design, and progress on the project was at a near

62 Hendry, 35.

63 Ibid., 69-70.

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Hendry, 34-5.

standstill.⁶⁷ Huskey proposed to construct a miniature, pilot model of the ACE based on Version V of Turing's design; the pilot model was known as the "Test Assembly." Importantly, Huskey revised and made significant changes to Turing's design by stripping Turing's design of its logical components; Huskey believed the machine merely needed to perform numerical calculations.⁶⁸ While this view was consistent with Darwin and Womersley's goals, it was totally incongruous with Turing's vision. Interestingly, B. Jack Copeland speculates that a machine such as the Test Assembly, "given better management at the NPL," could have been completed in 1948.⁶⁹ However, Thomas's Electronics Section was established shortly after Huskey introduced his Test Assembly. Although Womersley had urged for cooperation between Thomas and the ACE group, Thomas's stonewalling of the ACE project nearly killed Huskey's Test Assembly project.⁷⁰ The Test Assembly could not be completed by 1948 due to departmental infighting.

Understandably, Turing did not appreciate Huskey's Test Assembly side project, but he did not actively protest it. Turing simply could not understand why anyone would want to waste time on a pilot model version of the ACE. Indeed, as Teresa Numerico notes, Turing was simply unable "to perceive its urgency and strategic importance."⁷¹ For

67 Copeland, 57.

68 Hodges, 365.

69 Copeland, 69-70.

70 Ibid., 69.

71 Numerico, 187.

Turing, the ultimate goal was the “grand ACE installation”;⁷² on the other hand, the NPL management wanted a proof-of-concept machine to attract investors and partners.⁷³ While Turing never publicly expressed his disdain for the “Test Assembly,” Huskey’s side project was a blatant undermining of his authority. Huskey took control of the ACE group, and all focus was concentrated on the Test Assembly side project.⁷⁴ The effort to construct the ACE was further divided as valuable resources were diverted to the Test Assembly project. In fact, the splintering of Huskey’s group from the main ACE group ran counter to Turing’s wish for a cohesive working unit, as he outlined in his aforementioned letter. Furthermore, Thomas’s Electronics Section policies ensured the limited progress of Huskey’s Test Assembly machine. In fact, Thomas persuaded Darwin to cease operations on the side project;⁷⁵ in response, Huskey remarked, “Morale in the Mathematics Division collapsed.”⁷⁶ Thomas had effectively demoralized the ACE personnel. After his departure, Huskey’s Test Assembly evolved into the Pilot ACE, which also deviated from Turing’s original design.

As a sign of the deteriorating social atmosphere at the NPL, Turing and Womersley exhibited rather passive aggressive behavior toward one another. Turing perceived Womersley as the epitome of “bogus,”⁷⁷ and Womersley

⁷² Hodges, 365.

⁷³ Numerico, 187.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Hodges, 372.

⁷⁶ Copeland, 64.

⁷⁷ Hodges, 317.

probably saw Turing as an overly eccentric genius. Womersley and Turing purposely avoided contact with another. Andrew Hodges recounts in his biography of Turing:

Womersley's gifts of management: a mastery of name-dropping, a genial enthusiasm, a pleasant office manner to important visitors, a diplomatic sense of what to report, were not skills that Alan Turing ranked highly; not just because he lacked them himself, but because he still could not understand why anyone should need weapons other than rational argument. Before long, Alan [Turing] was openly rude to Womersley in the office, saying 'What do *you* want?' and turning his back if Womersley dared to intrude upon some discussion. . . . Conversely, Womersley would show visitors round Cromer House, pointing at the Turing office from afar with exaggerated awe, and saying 'Ah, that's Turing, we mustn't disturb *him*,' as of some rare zoological exhibit.⁷⁸

Turing and Womersley's managerial styles were utterly incompatible. On one hand, Womersley was a stereotypical "yes-man" administrator with hardly a mind of his own.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Turing lacked all managerial qualities because he did not desire to be a manager.⁸⁰ The mutual juvenility in which Womersley and Turing acted toward one another is of interest; however, juvenility is hardly a professional trait, and it would not be expected from someone of Womersley's status and position. Then again, the same may be said for Turing, though he had a history of disregarding conventional standards and expectations. Furthermore, conflicts between Turing and Womersley could have scarcely benefited morale.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 376.

The ACE project lacked the camaraderie to which Turing grew accustomed at Bletchley Park.⁸¹ If Womersley and Turing were at odds with one another on a regular basis, the friction and tension would have negatively impacted morale. Conflicts in management ran counter to Turing's wish for a cohesive working unit, so it is perplexing that he would act compromisingly. Perhaps the frustration of slow progress was putting an end to his resolve. As may be inferred from Hodges's anecdote, visitors may have assumed negative impressions of the NPL based on Womersley and Turing's actions. These negative impressions further complicated the production of the ACE, especially considering these visitors were financiers or potential contractors.

The NPL desperately required financial support, but it would be difficult to obtain. Turing's original ACE proposal featured a rather optimistic projected budget of £11,200,⁸² but Womersley recommended increasing the projected cost to about £50,000 or £60,000 to make it more realistic.⁸³ However, by late 1946, the ACE project was estimated to cost up to £125,000.⁸⁴ The NPL needed the help of the Treasury to fund the ACE project.⁸⁵ Darwin and Womersley proposed a small "pilot" machine project, the Pilot ACE, to the Treasury and Ministry of Supply. As Hodges reports, the Treasury granted £10,000 for the "small-machine," but this was just an initial

81 Ibid., 343.

82 Lavington, "ACES and DEUCES," 12.

83 Yates, 22-3.

84 "Britain to Make a Radio Brain: 'Ace' Superior to U.S. Model," *The Daily Telegraph*, November 7, 1946.

85 Hodges, 337.

installment. The hope was that a more substantial sum of up to £100,000 would be made available for a larger, full-scale machine. The Treasury made no guarantees of this larger amount.⁸⁶ In a sense, the Treasury's small investment was an attempt to insure itself in case Turing's project failed. However, the lack of a guarantee for the full amount put unnecessary strain on the NPL administration.

It is worth noting that Max Newman's Manchester University computer project⁸⁷ was able to avoid the financial woes the NPL faced. In 1946, Newman applied to the Royal Society for funding. Interestingly, Darwin was a member of the Royal Society committee that reviewed Newman's application. Naturally, he attempted to reject the application "on the grounds that the ACE was to serve the needs of the country."⁸⁸ Darwin was overruled, and Newman was granted £35,000, a much larger grant than the NPL received from the Treasury.⁸⁹ Newman's Manchester project would produce the Manchester "Baby," which became the first stored-program computer to run a program on June 21, 1948.⁹⁰ By then, the NPL's Pilot ACE had yet to be built; Darwin's dream of a national computer at the NPL was effectively crushed by Newman's Manchester project.⁹¹

Ultimately, the ACE project was meant to produce a

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Max Newman established a computer laboratory at Manchester in late 1945. Newman was the first reader of Turing's 1936 paper, and he understood its significance. Newman also worked with Turing at Bletchley Park. For more information, see Lavington, *Early British Computers*, 23-4. See also Hodges 341.

⁸⁸ Hodges, 341-2.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Yates, 35.

⁹¹ Hodges, 366.

real, working machine. The NPL lacked engineers capable of appreciating Turing's design⁹² and the space to accommodate the construction of a large computing machine.⁹³ Thus, outside contractors were needed to supply manpower and materials for construction of the ACE. The NPL made at least three efforts to obtain contracts with outside organizations. The first attempt was a concerted effort to forge a contract with the Post Office Research Station at Dollis Hill. Engineers at the Post Office had made great strides in mercury delay line storage technology during the Second World War. Turing's ACE design called for the use of electroacoustic mercury delay lines as its storage medium.⁹⁴ Unfortunately, the Post Office's Dollis Hill facilities were hopelessly inadequate for construction of the ACE.⁹⁵ The Post Office also had an extensive backlog of projects of its own to complete, let alone a new project from the NPL.⁹⁶ The NPL was unable to secure a contract with the Post Office, but it persisted in trying to farm out contracts to other organizations.⁹⁷

After the Post Office contract foundered, the NPL tried to establish a contract with the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE) at Malvern. The TRE was attractive even more so than the Post Office because it had the experienced engineers that the NPL group desperately needed, particularly F. C. Williams. At the TRE, Williams

92 *Ibid.*, 338.

93 Hendry, 34.

94 *Ibid.*

95 Numerico, 181.

96 Hodges, 340.

97 Copeland, 61.

was experimenting with applications of cathode ray tubes.⁹⁸ Turing saw cathode ray tubes as a possible alternative to mercury delay lines for the ACE's storage medium, but this suggestion was not well received.⁹⁹ The NPL simply could not afford another major delay. Moreover, most of the able technicians the TRE could spare had been transferred to the Department of Atomic Energy. Also, attempts to recruit Williams soured because he was more interested in building *his* computer, rather than the NPL's computer, Newman recruited Williams to join the Manchester computer project. The TRE could only offer a small staff to be directed under Williams at Manchester;¹⁰⁰ thus, the TRE's attractiveness waned. Unfortunately for Turing and the NPL, the TRE contract foundered.¹⁰¹

After the failures with the Post Office and the TRE, Darwin eventually turned to the English Electric Company in late 1948.¹⁰² Sir George Nelson was the Chairman of English Electric; also, he was a member of the NPL Executive Committee.¹⁰³ Despite being rather incestuous, the partnership was a much-needed break. English Electric loaned NPL a small staff of engineers, which finally built the Pilot ACE machine from January 1949 until completion in May 1950.¹⁰⁴ Unlike its governmental contemporaries, however, English Electric was only interested in the Pilot ACE for the purpose

98 Yates, 24.

99 Hodges, 340.

100 Ibid., 349-50.

101 Copeland, 61.

102 Ibid., 74-5.

103 Lavington, "ACES and DEUCES," 17.

104 Hendry, 35.

of commercial production.¹⁰⁵

Even after the NPL's Pilot ACE was completed in 1950, English Electric still did not have a concrete design for a commercial version. Indeed, as John Hendry notes, English Electric was uninterested in "the commercial exploitation of computers."¹⁰⁶ English Electric's attitude is perplexing because the company's sole purpose in aiding the NPL was to commercially exploit the Pilot ACE design. However, for some reason, the company did not want to commercialize computers. Nevertheless, English Electric's efforts to commercialize the Pilot ACE were too late to make a significant difference in the world of commercialized computers.

English Electric waited until the autumn of 1954, a few months after Turing's untimely death, to begin developing a "fully engineered version of the Pilot ACE to be called the DEUCE;" English Electric had no intentions at this point of marketing the DEUCE.¹⁰⁷ Eventually, between 1955 and 1957, English Electric began manufacturing the DEUCE, but the company still made no active efforts to market the machine.¹⁰⁸ By the time the DEUCE was made commercially available in 1955,¹⁰⁹ it was already on the verge of obsolescence. For instance, the British Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) ordered a DEUCE machine, but, by early 1956, the

105 Ibid., 43.

106 Ibid., 69.

107 Ibid., 105.

108 Ibid., 119.

109 Lavington, "ACES and DEUCES," 19.

DEUCE was unable to keep up with the AWRE's demands.¹¹⁰ In the end, English Electric only produced 33 DEUCE units, of which 12 units remained with the company.¹¹¹ Although over half of the manufactured DEUCE units were sold, the DEUCE was woefully inadequate for practical operation and research, and was a veritable flop.

The situation at the NPL continued to worsen, culminating in Turing's resignation on May 28, 1948¹¹² and Darwin's resignation in 1949.¹¹³ Darwin and Womersley grew tired of Turing as progress on the ACE project stagnated. Indeed, conditions were so poor that Darwin and Womersley suggested that Turing should "go off for a spell" to Cambridge, with the understanding that Turing would return to the NPL.¹¹⁴ Turing agreed to take the sabbatical, but he would return to neither the ACE project nor the NPL. During his sabbatical, Turing came back under the influence of his old colleague Max Newman. At Newman's behest, Turing joined the Manchester computer project,¹¹⁵ but was too late to make any substantial contributions to the project before the "Baby" ran its first programs in June 1948.¹¹⁶ Although Turing had no legal obligation to return to the NPL, Darwin was frustrated with him for joining a "rival" computer project.¹¹⁷ While work on the ACE continued in Turing's absence, it was as

¹¹⁰ Hendry, 120.

¹¹¹ Lavington, "ACES and DEUCES," 19.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 17.

¹¹³ Hodges, 407.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 367.

¹¹⁵ Agar, 121.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 113.

¹¹⁷ There was not necessarily a competitive rivalry between the British computer projects. Rather, the competition was with the American projects. See Hodges, 342.

painfully slow as when Turing was present. In fact, when Jim Wilkinson—an ACE engineer—visited Turing in Cambridge, he brought news of “cuts, crises, and an ever-narrowing vision” at the NPL.¹¹⁸ Wilkinson’s account is strong evidence that Turing may not have been the only reason for the ACE project’s slow progress, as Darwin and Womersley may have suspected. Nevertheless, the Pilot ACE machine survived to completion and ran its first program on May 10, 1950.¹¹⁹

However, by 1950, the Pilot ACE was no longer Turing’s machine.¹²⁰ The Pilot ACE was more Huskey’s machine since it evolved from the Test Assembly. After its successful 1950 demonstrations, the Pilot ACE was transformed into the English Electric DEUCE, which saw an extremely limited commercial success.¹²¹ Finally, in 1957, a full-scale version of the ACE was completed,¹²² and it was a much more complete realization of Turing’s dream to build a Universal Turing Machine.¹²³ Turing’s ACE project at the NPL was a veritable disaster; indeed, he would rarely speak of it after he resigned.¹²⁴

Turing had left the NPL for Manchester before the Pilot ACE—or the full ACE, for that matter—reached completion. The Pilot ACE machine of 1950 was derived from Turing’s

118 Hodges, 372.

119 Lavington, *Early British Computers*, 29.

120 Hodges, 368.

121 Lavington, “ACES and DEUCES,” 19. The DEUCE was an inferior machine compared to its American counterparts. For example, the IBM 704 was whole orders of magnitude superior to the DEUCE. For a more extensive comparison, see Hendry, 120.

122 Lavington, *Early British Computers*, 46.

123 *Ibid.*, 116.

124 Hodges, 376-7.

designs, but it strayed from his philosophy and goal.¹²⁵ The full ACE machine was finally completed in 1957, at which time A. M. Uttley of the NPL remarked, “Today Turing’s dream has come true.”¹²⁶ However, by 1957, it was too little too late. The ACE design, relatively revolutionary in 1945 and 1946, was on the verge of obsolescence in 1957. It could be concluded, perhaps, that the nightmarish process of constructing the ACE had little benefit, except for serving as a step toward Turing’s later advances in computer science, particularly in artificial intelligence at Manchester.¹²⁷

While Turing and von Neumann may have been working independently on different computing projects, they were hardly without mutual influence. Indeed, von Neumann’s EDVAC Report heavily influenced Turing’s ACE proposal, and von Neumann relied heavily upon the theoretical Turing machine. However, von Neumann’s abstract EDVAC design has garnered a considerable influence in computer science. Turing was much less fortunate in that his ACE machine fell almost completely into obscurity. While both men may be considered “fathers” of the modern computer, both men did not come about their titles in the same way. Both men took different approaches to the

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 368.

¹²⁶ Lavington, *Early British Computers*, 116.

¹²⁷ Although Turing’s short time at the NPL was marked by unnecessary frustration, he made great strides in theoretical computer science. For instance, Turing explored the question of artificial intelligence in his NPL report, “Intelligent Machinery.” For more on “Intelligent Machinery,” see Hodges, 377. In his 1950 article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” in *Mind*, Turing expounded on his ideas of artificial intelligence and introduced the basic form of what has become known as the Turing Test for machine intelligence. For more on the Turing Test, see Charles Petzold, *The Annotated Turing: A Guided Tour through Alan Turing’s Historic Paper on Computability and the Turing Machine* (Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Publishing, 2008), 346.

same problem, encountered different situations, but von Neumann's abstract EDVAC design boasts a much more successful legacy than Turing's real ACE machine.

As per its original initiative, Britain successfully exploited the new field of computing research. However, that successful exploitation came in the form of Newman's Manchester computer project. While Britain again shared the international stage with United States, it was not Turing's doing. Indeed, Turing's ACE was constructed too late to significantly influence computer architecture design. Turing's ACE ultimately failed to meet its original purpose of being the national computer of Britain. Thus, it would appear that Turing and his colleagues wasted much of their time and energy for an impractical and unmarketable computer.

Symbols of the French Revolution: Colors of Cockades, Fabric and Their Importance in Politics of 1789

Constance Wallace

In any culture, fabric and color are very important in representing the identity of an individual or group. Examples of this can be seen in the woven material of the Scottish clans and their tartans, or in the case of those who participated in the Revolution of 1789 in France, the cockades and colors of white, blue, and red. But where did the cultural obsession first arise in relation to fabric and color? Each culture finds something tangible in material artifacts for emphasizing individual taste or affiliation with a particular class. In the case of those who participated in the French Revolution, a choice of color was imbued with political symbolism. How did fabric and color become so important to the politics of people, or a country? Why did the small pieces of the tri-colored cockade carry so much importance to the identity of the French people during the Revolution? By analyzing the emergence of the cockade in fashion, this essay shall examine the importance of these emblems in the French Revolution of 1789 and reasons why these everyday things became so vital by analyzing the styles, textures, and use of color in fabric before, during, and after the Revolution.

The transformation of these materials is understood in the confines of how fabric and color are used within

society. Designed, textured and dyed, fabric in its woven form can be either coarse or delicate. Fabric itself signifies class separation and even political distinction by the method of its manufacturing or construction, and by its value and refinement. In the golden years at Versailles during the reign of King Louis XIV and King Louis XV, the clothing worn by the royal family, and those nobles who were privileged enough to be housed at the great palace, embodied the decadence with which they enveloped themselves in. Beautiful silks, elaborate laces and ribbons, colorful feathers, and bows were all used by those of privilege. It was not until the eve of the Revolution in 1789 that the superb fashion of the courtiers under King Louis XIV and XV faded away and was replaced with something simpler: a style of clothing which tied itself to the values of what the Revolution upheld. The fabric of clothing then transformed and became more of a symbolic statement than a fashion statement.

The people of France needed to step away from the old relics of the monarchy and, along with the discarded government principles of the absolute monarchy, redefine themselves. The extravagant styles of the King and his nobles were also discredited, as the citizens of France viewed fashion as an outlet for the monarchy to institute repression. Why was this change so important to them? Perhaps the answer can best be explained in the words of author and historian, Leora Auslander: “Clothing and furniture are commodities with great symbolic potential; both were, in fact, used by the

crown and court in the *ancien régime* to augment their power.”¹ Changing the fashion of the country alongside the politics was a way for the revolutionaries to completely reinvent the French people. It was also a way for them to dissolve the visual emblems of the *ancien régime*, so that they may reinvent themselves with styles that enhanced their principles and beliefs. In this case, fabric was utilized to do this.

In order to understand this transition, one must first recognize the importance of clothing to the French people. It was always understood that fashion was directly linked to the status and importance of individuals within the division of the three estates. Auslander points out that clothing style from the medieval to the early modern period was in great length used to indicate the wearer’s social and political affiliation.² Not only was fabric used as a weapon of power, the distinct dress of the three estates was strictly adhered to because it also allowed the nobles and the clergy a way of identifying those who did not belong to their Estate.

Attempting to restrict the Third Estate within their class, those of the first two Estates hoped to limit them from dressing in certain fabrics and accessories enjoyed by the wealthy. According to Colin Jones in *Paris: The Biography of a City*, there was already a fashion revolution occurring within the three Estates before the Revolution, as typical clothing worn by each Estate was now being picked up in second hand clothing stores. Nobility wore the garb of the

1 Leora Auslander, “Regeneration through the Everyday? Clothing, Architecture and Furniture in Revolutionary Paris,” *Art History* 28 (2005), 229.

2 *Ibid.*, 231.

peasant and chambermaids adopted the forms of dress which included “silk stockings, light colourful dresses, jewels and trinkets.”³ Disconcerting to many nobles, this interchange of fashion before the revolution perhaps played a hand in the decision to incorporate a distinct separation impressed upon the three estates during their first initial meeting at the eve of the Revolution. The “deputies of Third Estate, the peasant classes, were to wear somber black, while the nobles wore gold braiding, white hose, lace cravats, and gracious white plumes in their hats.”⁴ This dictation in dress offended those in the Third Estate, as they saw this restriction of the nobles a symbolic way of making sure they were continually repressed, and denied even the pleasure to dress up. It was unfair to them, and it was at this time that fashion took a detour.

Pictures and portraits as primary sources can be a way to visually see how fabric in clothing was used as a separating instrument of the classes. According to Peter Burke in his book *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence*, visual sources are important as non-verbal traces of the past; the images “record acts of eyewitnessing.”⁵ Burke further reflects upon the use of images as primary resources by asserting that these images reveal the material culture which incorporates details that the contemporaries “would have

3 Colin Jones, Paris: *The Biography of a City* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 194-95.

4 Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 75.

5 Peter Burke, *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 95.

taken for the granted and ... failed to mention in the texts."⁶ Many portraits of those at Versailles before 1789 display the over use of expense fabrics, adorned with layers and layers of lace and bows and topped with colorful feathers or jewels. When analyzing the images of the Revolution and those afterwards, there existed within these primary sources a noticeable change. Elaborate gowns were now gone and replaced with simple styles, fabric colors were muted in tone, made of cottons and linens, and most new fashions did not include the lace, jewels, metals or fancy feathers which adorned the gowns and dress of the elite prior to 1789.⁷

Embodying ideas of the Revolution itself, the clothing of the French people became "invested with political significance," and was recreated and stripped of the symbols of the oppressive nature of the noble dress.⁸ What now transpired was a simpler form of attire that was considered a sign of patriotism. Dressing in the rich fabrics and precious metals created labels of counter-revolutionary to be attached to anyone who wore something of the nobles' elaborate styles. "Graceful white muslin vied with brocaded silks, natural hair and straw hats" appeared on women.⁹ Political men were dressing down, and their outfits may only have had a tricolor scarf or cockade to embellish them. Even with the simplest of things, a policy of excess was viewed with contempt. A

6 Ibid., 99-100.

7 Please see "Portrait of Madame Tallien" (1806) painted by Jean-Bernaard Duvivier at the Brooklyn Museum's web page. <http://archive.org/details/brooklynmuseum-o4885-portrait-of-madame-tallien>.

8 Hunt, 75.

9 Jennifer M. Jones, "Repackaging Rousseau: Femininity and Fashion in Old Regime France," in *French Historical Studies* 18, no. 4 (Fall 1994), 945-46.

clear example of this would be the cockades, the new badge of the Revolution, which were to be made of wool and not of silk, most hand-woven, knitted or simply sewn. The more expensive fabric cockade, which could distinguish the wearer with social hierarchy instead of equality because it showed off wealth and prestige, would be considered out of taste.¹⁰ Simplicity was now the fashion *la mode*, and all clothing was to be adjusted to remove any material means, which would stimulate a fear of inequality.

What took place within this fashion revolution was that the dress of the common man was brought forward as a reference point for all classes. No longer did individuals look to the court of Versailles as a focal point for what was in style. Magazines of that time stated that fashion was *pour toutes les classes* and clothing switched from being a tool for class distinction to a symbolic force of the Revolution.¹¹ This symbol was seen in the dress of the Sans-Culotte.¹² Many men eventually adopted the attire of *le bon sans Culotte*, especially after 1792. Seen as a form of dress which could exhibit a social equality, politicians also began to wear “the short jacket, long trousers, and even the clogs of the sans-culottes.”¹³ While simple clothing was adopted as the new badge of good revolutionary comrades, there were

10 Hunt, 75.

11 Jones, “Repackaging Rousseau,” 951.

12 Please see the etching entitled “The Good Sans-Cullote,” which is part of the primary sources on the “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution” web site of George Mason University. “Male and Female *sans-culottes* were supposed to embody frugality, thrift, hard work, and above all, honest devotion - whether to pets, the nation, or fellow comrades.” Source: mfr 88.180. <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/73/>

13 Hunt, 75.

individuals who were against the unadorned fashion of the peasantry. David, a famous painter of the time, believed that the clothing of such militant factions would not do the Revolution any good, and instead of dressing down to the worn-out, threadbare *le bon sans Culotte*, a “suitable high-minded fashion” was more appropriate.¹⁴ His approach concentrated on the bourgeois element of his upbringing and the need to uphold a small division of classes.

Hoping to inspire his countrymen, David took such great pains to illustrate an appropriate replacement for the simple dress of the *sans-culotte* which was held in such high regard by the revolutionaries. David drew upon his desire to see a more civil costume for those in the new government. Not wanting to completely throw out the search for suitable clothing to depict the ideas of the Revolution, David believed that there should “appropriate revolutionary costume” which incorporates “all the ambiguities of revolutionary politics.”¹⁵ What he envisioned was a style of clothing for the officials, which would mark them from the other individuals of society.¹⁶

David’s dream for a civil dress died with the death of Robespierre and the collapse of the Terror. Legislation was already put in place concerning the wearing of the tricolored cockade on the clothing of citizens, and more recommendations were in the midst of the politicians to

¹⁴ Ibid, 76.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Please see the etching “Study for the Costume of a Civil Official,” which is David’s rendering of a government worker, rather than an aristocrat, Minneapolis Institute of Art web site, Accession #65.43.1. <http://artsmia.org/viewer/detail.php?v=12&id=9326>.

adopt ways to “demonstrate one’s adherence to the nation through one’s clothing.”¹⁷ In 1795, abbé Grégoire, the first priest to take the oath under the new Civil Constitution of the Clergy, suggested that wearing uniforms for civil office would only enhance the dignity of the office itself and remind those who held the office of their duty.¹⁸ As the Convention came to an end in October, it passed a law concerning the clothing for these officials. Even in this particular act, the style of simplicity was adopted and most all officials were to wear the same type of clothing: “a ‘French’ coat of ‘national blue,’ a tricolor belt, a scarlet cloak *a la grecque*, and velvet hat with tricolor aigrette.”¹⁹ Fashion was now established for those holding political office and by making the officials wear almost the same outfit, with the same type of fabric, the Revolution was laying a foundation for a different identity than that of the three estates, as the civil costumes were undemanding and conforming.

Men were not left alone in searching for a fashion identity during the Revolution either. Simplicity and restraint played a major role in establishing a new underpinning for the revolutionary female. Once again, clothing took inspiration from the peasant class.²⁰ According to the *Magasin des modes nouvelles* and *Journal de la mode*, magazines published in France during this period, the Revolution and

¹⁷ Auslander, 230.

¹⁸ Ibid, 231.

¹⁹ Hunt, 79.

²⁰ Please see the etching “Madame Sans-Culotte,” part of the primary sources on the “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Exploring the French Revolution” web site of George Mason University. Source: Museum of the French Revolution 88.17. <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/73/>

women were linked, as both were “in a state of continual flux,” and, as the writers of the magazines pointed out, women found their ideal environment in the chaos of the Revolution.²¹ Just as the revolutionary government changed ever so frequently, so too did the fashion of the women and the use of fabric and color. Yet, the fashion *a la mode* of the Revolution was not the exquisite fabric of taffeta or silk, heavily burdened with lace, jewels and feathers, instead the simplicity of *Madam sans Culotte* was used as a starting point for reinventing a revolutionary dress for women.

The simple cotton straight lines, the petite bonnet and little use of color were deemed a respectable attribute to clothing styles. Although the “colors, the form of clothing, bonnets, and hats” changed, most modifications contained this new identity of plainness and unpretentiousness, and were a symbol of being a true revolutionary.²² The sans-culotte appeared to embody the true nature of hard work and dedication, whether male or female, and this symbolic viewpoint is what the fabric of the Revolution tried to capture.

In analyzing text from Karin Baumgartner’s article “Through the Eyes of Fashion” as she talks about Caroline de la Motte Fouqué’s publication, *Geschichte der Moden, vom Jahre 1785 bis 1829: als Beytrag zur Geschichte der Zeit*, there is one sentence which could sum precisely why and how fabric and color changed so dramatically during the French Revolution.

21 Jones, “Repackaging Rousseau,” 961.

22 Ibid.

Under the *ancien régime*, clothes did not symbolize individual identity, but rather affiliation with a certain group or rank. It was the possession of courtly attire, not individual character, that made the aristocrat.²³

The French Revolution was about systemically removing everything that was a symbol of the monarchy. Changing the fashion of the time was the best way the French people could embody their desires to reinvent themselves and they did this through the use of fabric and color.

In the folds of small bit of colorful ribbon, the revolutionaries sought to bring together a new culture and a political platform. Cockades, which before 1789 were the sole emblems and badges of the military, became the binding element of the revolutionary movement. After the storming of the Bastille, these colorful emblems became a powerful tool in mobilizing the peoples of France towards political change. Cockades developed into a badge which gave its wearer a sense of belonging, and clout, allowing its owner to feel like a part of revolutionary uniformity, when before there was only a system in which inequality and separation were the norm. These pieces of fabric were a symbol chosen because the material showed no distinction to class, or dress, it was the same to all. *La cocarde nationale* became the sole ingredient which brought the French people together, both sexes, all classes, making each wearer equal to the other, replacing the distinct costumes and dress of the three estates, and

23 Karin Baumgartner, "Through the Eyes of Fashion: Political Aspects of Fashion in Caroline de la Motte Fouque's *Geschichte der Moden, vom Jahre 1785 bis 1829: als Beytrag zur Geschichte der Zeit*," in *The Germanic Review* (2001), 219.

converting the revolutionaries under its color to a new sense of political autonomy.

Scholars such as Pierre Nora in his works *Les Lieux de Mémoire* and Leora Auslander in her book *Taste and Power* emphasize the significance of material items in French culture for establishing their identity. Auslander states in her introduction: “The everyday is sensual, bodily, emotional, and intellectual. There is no escape from the everyday, no position outside of it, for either the subjects of history or its writers.”²⁴ A simple piece of fabric, used in everyday life, was transformed by creative hands into a cockade. Before the Revolution, this emblem was only an ordinary clothing accessory for the military, and did not hold any meaning except that of adornment or status within the ranks of the soldiers. Yet once it was captured by the everyday citizen as a means of identifying an allegiance to a cause, the cockade transformed, becoming equivalent to voice and an intellectual body of presence. It held an emotional link to a platform and stance of change and no one escaped its touch.

From the beginning, these cockades stood apart as a badge that represented the formation of a new system of collective belonging. They were symbols chosen by the people to mark their preference towards their political choices, and are a perfect example of reinvention, as their use in dress and clothing became vital to revolutionaries. The citizens of France utilized the small pieces of fabric as they strove to bond

²⁴ Leora Auslander, *Taste and Power: Furnishing Modern France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 3.

themselves under a new government. After effectively taking apart the *ancien régime* and its emblems, they wanted to do away with the old system of the monarchy and the cockades were a new symbol which afforded them a characteristic feature uniquely their own.

During the Revolution, four distinct colors of cockades surfaced; the green, the tri-color, the black and the white. What did these colors mean to those involved? Why were they chosen? Exploring the use of the cockades opens a new window into the diverging flow of the Revolution, as those who wanted to be out from under the constraints of the required dress of the Estates General and class division, turned to forcing these new emblems and colors upon those partaking in the movement, mimicking the "*ancien régime*" and their laws for costumes. More than ever, during this period, a war began in which wearing certain colors was considered anti-Revolutionary, and seeing a particular color could incite a crowd into instant disruption and chaos. Was the Revolution really one about equality and freedom, or was this Revolution entirely different? For the politics of the cockade, wearing a particular color of cockade became law during the Revolution, forcing its wearer to its will. This was seemingly a paradox for those who initiated this law, as they were the same revolutionaries seeking to distant themselves from required conformity.

The Revolution began its reinvention with the ousting of the distinctive three Estates and the costumes associated

with each. Rejecting the dress of the third Estate, because the function of its costumes was to fix people's identity, the revolutionaries wanted to do away with the subjection to the authority of the monarchy by way of fabric and clothing.²⁵ Recognizing that a new era was approaching; the Revolution itself paved way for the French people to abolish the apparatus of the "*ancien régime*," the extravagant dress of the court and the clergy, and to claim "a new generation of signs, badges and costumes" of their own.²⁶

The era of cockades was introduced by an episode which took place after the storming of the Bastille, concerning the death of Flesselles, a provost who worked under the governor de Launay. Flesselles was shot by an unknown person from the mob of civilians which gathered there. His death was the result of a rumor that he wrote a letter to de Launay, the Governor in charge of the Bastille, in which he stated: "Hold out, while I amuse the Parisians with cockades."²⁷ It would be an understatement to say that this particular phrase is not a summation of the chaotic events what transpired afterwards concerning the adoption of the cockade as an important new symbol of the new French government. The events at the Bastille in July 1789 were a momentous and symbolic political act, as the prison itself represented an oppressive and dark place to the people of France. Its downfall predictably affected the masses and

25 Richard Wrigley, *The Politics of Appearances* (Oxford: Berg, 2002), 59.

26 Ibid.

27 M.A. Thiers, *The History of the French Revolution* (Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1848), 69-70.

also impacted the fashion of the people of Paris.²⁸ Flesselles' remark to de Launay somehow foretold the course the cockade would take, as its importance took a darker turn, in which the colors of cockades determined if you lived or died, a non-amusing theatrical production which lasted many years.

When Camille Desmoulins introduced the first color of the Revolution, as he rallied those to a call to arms at the storming of the Bastille, the civilians who gathered around him followed his example of putting a green leaf in their caps and calling it a cockade as they marched forward in their attack.²⁹ Ribbon cockades, up to the time of the French Revolution, were associated with military headdresses, and the ornaments themselves held connotations of choosing sides or displaying allegiance to one group or another.³⁰ Desmoulins chose the leaf because it was a ready symbol that allowed individuals to declare themselves "a soldier for the *patrie*."³¹ Those who participated in this occasion did not know that they put in place, upon their hats, an emblem that would create a great political and social conflict.³²

Various tales surround the color green as associated with the leaf used by those at the Bastille. Why was this color chosen? Camille Desmoulins, in a letter to his father dated 16 July 1789, describing the charge on the Bastille, said, « *Prenons*

28 Nicola J. Shilliam, "'Cocardes Nationales and Bonnets Rouges': Symbolic Headdresses of the French Revolution," in *Journal of the Museum of Fine Arts* 5 (1993), 109-113.

29 Camille Desmoulins, *Oeuvres de Camille Desmoulins: Député à la Convention National* (New York, AMS Press, 1972), Volume 2, 22. Reprinted from the edition of 1838, Paris.

30 Shilliam, 110.

31 Wrigley, 98-104.

32 Hunt, 58.

tous des cocardes vertes, couleur de l'espérance »; “let us all take up green cockades, the color of hope.”³³ Further accounts and retelling of the event, such as reported in the *Revolutions de Paris*, indicate that the “adoption of green cockades” was “a sign of solidarity and popular mobilization.”³⁴ Whether it was a symbol for hope or solidarity, the people, hearing Desmoulins’ great speech at the Bastille, saw the color and emblem presented to them in the form of a green leaf mesmerizing. Here was a new national identity that all of them could rally under, and as one great body, attack the grotesque symbol of the monarchy, the Bastille, which stood for suppression and limitation.

Green cockades did not last though, as reinvention took hold once again. Pierre-Nicolas Chantreau, a French historian of that time, explained to others why green needed to be abandoned. He said it caused “political conflict,” as the color echoed submission, as green was tied to the uniforms of the Prince de Lambesc’s troops who attacked a group of civilians in the Tuileries gardens.³⁵ It was also argued that because green was the color of the livery of the Count Artois, the King’s younger brother, the people would not wear something so closely associated with the monarchy. According to the Duke of Dorset, the red and white were substituted for the green.³⁶ While the Duke contends that red and white were chosen because they were of the colors of the

33 Desmoulins, 22.

34 Wrigley, 98.

35 Ibid, 100.

36 Hunt, 57.

Duke of Orleans, most historical texts point to the fact that red and blue were chosen because they were the colors of Paris.³⁷ In Camille Desmoulins' letter to his father, he describes the march of the National Assembly towards the *Hôtel de Ville* and stated that they marched under the color of the flag, red and blue, red for the blood willingly spilled and blue for the constitution, and each deputy sported a cockade of the same colors. «*Ils marchèrent sous les drapeaux des gardes-françaises, ... les drapeaux de la nation, de la liberté.... Le rouge, pour montrer qu'on était prêt à verser son sang ; et le bleu, pour une constitution céleste. Les députés avoient aussi la cocarde.*»³⁸

The narration of the cockade goes further as it transformed into the full fledged national symbol, when Jean Sylvain Bailly, the mayor of Paris, presented the king with a tri-color cockade of blue, red and white, at the *Hôtel de Ville* 17 July 1789, upon Louis XVI's entry into the city.³⁹ The merging of the red and blue, the new colors associated with the Revolution, with the colors of the House of Bourbon, white, was an attempt at making a symbolic treaty for the sake of the French people and the monarchy. Lafayette wanted the merging of the red, blue and white to signify that an "accord" was reached with the King and all was well, and he supported the reforms.⁴⁰ The king's life rested upon his acceptance of the cockade from the mayor, as the crowds looked on in anticipation. The gracious act of taking the new colors and

37 Shilliam, 110.

38 Desmoulins, 27.

39 Wrigley, 99.

40 Shilliam, 111.

placing them upon his hat meant that the king accepted also the request for reforms for his people.

The *cocarde nationale*, or *cocarde tricolore*, was life giving from that point forward. Its simple form created joy in the people as they viewed it as a sign of change. The red, blue, and white, bound together, unified them with a new national sense of belonging. Citizens became extremely patriotic, obsessively. Any other color cockade was deemed anti-revolutionary, and those who were a part of the Revolution wanted to make sure the *corcarde nationale* was an everyday accessory, put on as part of everyday clothing, with as much fever and zeal as could be mustered.

Yet, there were those who viewed this new symbol with distaste. They refused to be seen with it on. Opposed to the upheaval the *cocarde nationale* embodied, they took to wearing black as a symbol of mourning.⁴¹ Black became a color of the anti-revolutionaries. It indicated political allegiance opposite the red, blue, and white. Those wearing the black cockade were often taunted, beaten, or even killed. Seen as an emblem and color which was pro-monarchy, those who wore black cockades became thought of as a force which would make the *corcarde nationale* irrelevant. Even as the *émigrés* returned under assumed names, they identified themselves by the wearing of a black velvet cape.

The extent of dispute over the colored cockades can be understood more clearly by events which happened during the march of the women on Versailles October 5, 1789. As

⁴¹ Auslander, 229.

these patriotic women were in route to the king and queen, they grew very suspicious of anyone wearing a black cockade, because they did not want to be blocked from their objective by those who anti-revolutionary. One witness, after he was forcibly made to march with them, reported to the authorities:

Past Viroflay they met a number of individuals on horseback who appeared to be bourgeois and wore black cockades in their hats. The women stopped them and made as if to commit violence against them, saying that they must die as punishment for having insulted, and for insulting, the national cockade; one they struck and pulled off his horse, tearing off his black cockade, which one of the women handed to him [the witness].⁴²

This episode conveys the fierceness in which the citizens felt towards their new symbol, and in protecting it, opened the doors for further violence, as the simple everyday cockade stirred the flames of civil war.

There is not a doubt that the women believed they were defending the revolutionary movement itself by protecting the tri-color cockade. While their march to Versailles intertwined itself with the concern on the lack of food and bread for their families, they were also mobilized because of a rumor, and the supposed insult paid to the *corcarde nationale*. In his history of the French Revolution, Thomas Carlyle described the occasion which ignited the women. He gives details of a great party held at Versailles days before the march on October 5, 1789. As the queen entered the room “her looks full of sorrow, yet of gratitude

⁴² Shilliam, 112.

and daring, with the hope of France upon her mother-bosom," a song was struck up by the band, the words "O Richard, O mon Roi, l'univers l'abandonne," instilling a sense of "loyal valor" and as "white Bourbon Cockades, handed them from fair fingers," are given to the young men in attendance, they pledge to the health of the queen and trample underfoot the *cocarde nationale*.⁴³ This story reaches those in Paris, and those women who found their cupboards bare were not tolerant of the monarchy's display of extravagance, or the fact that their beloved revolutionary symbol was treated with so much disrespect. The march to Versailles was to demand answers for both the lack of food and the insult to the tri-color cockade. On their way there, any cockade which was not the tri-color was "ruthlessly plucked off" and thrown away.⁴⁴ No exception was made. Many within the movement itself saw the trouble the colorful cockades instigated. In fact an article appeared in *Moniteur* regarding the march on Versailles by the women, and a warning to the public concerning the influence the colorful badges created, and what terrible implications would arise from its use. "Cockades of a single colour will be the signal for a civil war if they are allowed to multiply," it warned.⁴⁵ No one paid heed to this dire message and war of the *corcarde nationale* drew its second act.

During 1790 friction developed as other colors of the cockade were attacked. Suggestion was made that even

43 Thomas Carlyle Rhys, *History of the French Revolution* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons LTD., 1944), 198-200.

44 Ibid.

45 Wrigley, 101.

French military cockades, such as the *cocarde rouge*, awarded after twenty years of service, be replaced with the tri-color. Men of the military reacted unfavorably, stressing that the *cocarde nationale* “was nothing more than a ‘standard of revolt in the name of liberty,’” and refused to adhere to the request.⁴⁶ Other colors of cockades were worn within the city limits, those of neighboring countries. These colors were also looked upon unfavorably.

Disputes continued to escalate, especially with the women of Paris. There were many reports of women who on occasions battled in the streets because they found other women not wearing the colorful symbol. The new emblem, from the viewpoint of the upper class women, was seen as a badge which only prostitutes wore, and unless the Convention decreed for them to wear it, would not add the ribbon accessory to their clothes or hat.⁴⁷ Further violence over the inclusion of the *cocarde nationale* erupted after some insinuated that anti-revolutionary agents, who were supposedly ordered to create anarchy, perpetuated this female discord.

As the Revolution progressed, the French became uniquely pre-occupied with their new symbol and colors. The *cocarde nationale* replaced all other forms of patriotism, and its use in everyday life grew to such political importance that laws were considered for its compulsory wearing by men. Ringing similar to a time when those of the three

⁴⁶ Ibid, 102.

⁴⁷ Shilliam, 112.

estates required certain dress, the cockade took a new form of denotation. Any other color cockade was deemed to endorse “signs of rebellion” and citizens caught with anything other than the *cocarde nationale* were to be arrested and given a command to denounce their colors, or be punished with death.⁴⁸ The rally around the tri-color cockade influenced politics further, by creating a backlash among the female citizens, and the predicted civil war ensued.

In April, 1793, the Convention mandated that the tri-color cockade be worn by all men and women were, of course, excluded from this declaration. While it was not law for the female citizens, there were some militant women who believed it should be mandatory for them also, and when confronted by other women who did not wear the *cocarde nationale*, insults and accusations flew. Violence erupted between the two bickering factions, as to whether or not it was proper for females to wear the colors of the Revolution, or, as insinuated by many women, the cockade should be left out of their attire all together because modest women did not attach it to their wardrobe.

The Society of Revolutionary Republican Women petitioned the National Convention at the beginning of September 1793, urging them to “pass a decree punishing ‘the shrews who mistreated female citizens’” who wore the national cockade.⁴⁹ The society, acting on the fears of civil war, thought it best to force all women to wear the tri-

⁴⁸ Wrigley, 104.

⁴⁹ Dominique Godineau, *The Women of Paris and their French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 159-160.

color symbol, so that all women would be adored with the “sign of liberty.”⁵⁰ This petition was backed by episodes of altercations in the streets between loyal female citizens and those not wearing the cockade. Clashing on September 13 with “fishwives,” who refused to participate in the wearing of the amusing cockade, caused the street brawling to be multiplied. The women of the fish market were hostile to the accessory, saying “only whores and female Jacobins wear cockades” and women “should be concerned only with their households and not with current events.”⁵¹ The police backed the society’s proposal in hopes that this would eliminate the tussling in the streets. Finally on September 21, 1793, an order was directed to all women that the *cocarde nationale* was to be worn with their clothing. If they were found without it, severe punishments would be administered, and for those who persisted in the displays of violence towards other women, the offender could receive ten years of imprisonment.

Seen as a political win for the women who wished to be acknowledged as equals to men in the political sphere of cockades, the law itself seemed to create a reverse effect and only caused more bickering.⁵² Although the regulation directed everyone to wear it, it did not specify how it should

50 Ibid, 159.

51 Ibid, 160.

52 Shilliam, 113.

be worn, and women's focus went from inclusion to clothing, to where it should be placed or how fancy it should be, a small detail it would seem, but gave rise to fuel already heightened emotions. Flesselles' words certainly echoed true in the streets of Paris, as the public was further entertained with women and their war of the cockades.

The cockade does not find its conclusion here. Its legacy is felt through the many years after the National Convention and into the history of France, evolving into an artifact that represented the people's identity, even through the First World War. The Revolutionaries, while trying to eliminate the restrictive fashion of the three Estates, created for themselves their own restriction with an austere piece of fabric, the cockade. A simple yet profound piece of woven material, which collected to its colors the fierce revolutionary people of 1789, was the greatest artifact of the French Revolution, for not only did it assist its wearer in establishing a new sense of political freedom, but it also did not adhere to any elements of the old regime.

The Union of the Parliaments and Scottish Public Opinion

Michael Self

George Lockhart of Carnwath famously said, “The first of May 1707, a day never to be forgot by Scotland; a day in which the Scots were stripped of what their predecessors had gallantly maintained for many hundred years...the independency and sovereignty of the Kingdom.”¹ At the turn of the 18th Century, the Kingdom of Scotland was nearly bankrupt. Many different things contributed to this, including a failed attempt to create a colony in the Americas and lack of trade with the English, and made the union with England that occurred in May 1707 necessary. Despite this necessity, the majority of Scots were against the union. Why would most Scots oppose such a union when it was such an obviously needed measure for the Scottish Government to take? Some were opposed to the union with England because they feared that their religious beliefs would be threatened because of the differences between their two churches. Others were afraid of the potential loss of the sovereignty of their nation which many of their ancestors died trying to defend from countless English invasions over the last several centuries.

The Treaty of Union officially united the Kingdoms of Scotland and England into one Kingdom of Great Britain and officially created the Union Flag which combined the

1 Godfrey W. Iredell, *The Lyon Enchained: A Study of the 1707 Act of Union* (Glasgow: William MacLellan, 1960), 10.

Crosses of St. Andrew and St. George. The Treaty settled the succession issue, proclaiming Sophia of the House of Hannover to be Queen Anne's successor. It also effectively dissolved both the Scottish and English parliaments and created a new parliament of Great Britain; it also gave everyone on both sides of the border equal standing and access to trade.²

In 1695, the Scottish decided to take their economic fortunes into their own hands and founded the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies better known as the Scottish Darien Company. It was established by an act of Parliament and had a monopoly to trade with Africa, Asia, and America; as well as, the establishment of powers to make treaties, plant colonies, and raise capital in Scotland and England.³ Originally the Scottish Darien Company was to be a joint confederation involving Scottish, English, Dutch, and Hanseatic interests. It was reduced to a Scottish venture after King William withdrew his support. William was furious that the act that passed through one of his parliaments was so potentially damaging to the English commercial interests. However, English Parliamentary pressure applied in the interest of the East India Company forced any English investors to withdraw.⁴

 The major goal of the Scottish Darien Company was

² Lords Commissioners for the Union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland, *The Articles of the Union as they pass'd with amendments in the Parliament of Scotland, and ratify'd by the touch of the Royal Scepter at Edinburgh, January 16. 1707. By James, Duke of Queensberry, Her Majesty's High Commissioner for that Kingdom* (London: Andrew Bell, 1707).

³ When used without an identifier, Parliament refers to the Scottish parliament.

⁴ Jeffery Stephen, *Scottish Presbyterians and the Act of Union 1707* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 16-17.

to establish a trading colony on the Isthmus of Darien. Three expeditions were sent to do just that. As good as it might have looked on paper, it was a colossal failure. In two years the Company lost almost its entire fleet and two thousand lives and £200,000 sterling, a large percentage of the wealth of Scotland.⁵ The Darien colony was intended to revive Scotland's economic fortunes by providing the opportunity for economic growth, prosperity and modernization, as well as the chance to break free of their economic dependence upon England. Its failure meant that considerable national investment had been lost which exacerbated the current economic plight that they were trying to help and confirmed Scotland's dependence upon the English markets both domestic and colonial.⁶

Union of the two kingdoms was, by the majority of the government, seen as the most suitable solution to the succession issue, the problems highlighted by the Darien scheme, and the economic problems that followed it. Negotiations began in October 1702, only to be concluded without an agreement on 3 February 1703 because the Scottish insistence on compensation for Darien proved to be a major stumbling block. The elections in the autumn of 1702 changed the political balance of parliament. The Cavalier Party, consisting mainly of Jacobites and Episcopalians, was strengthened at the expense of both the Court and Country parties, making future union attempts more problematic.⁷

⁵ Iredell 12-14.

⁶ Stephen, 16-17.

⁷ Ibid.

The Scots, before and after Darien, ascribed their poverty primarily to England's refusal to allow them any share in her trade with the American colonies and the East. By 1703, after a new Scottish parliament had taken their seats, they were so furious that passed through parliament an act to separate the Scottish crown again unless they were granted equal access to the sources of England's prosperity.⁸ The retaliatory act to this "Act of Security" was passed by the English parliament in March 1705 and was called "An Act for the effectual securing the Kingdom of England from the apparent dangers which may arise from several Acts passed by the Parliament of Scotland." The Alien Act, as it came to be known told the Scots that if they had not accepted the House of Hanover as successors to Anne by Christmas 1705, the union would be suspended and all Scots setting foot in England would be treated as aliens unless they became naturalized Englishmen or joined the armed forces; no Scottish cattle, horses, linen, or coal would be allowed into England; no English wool would be exported to Scotland; and the navy would stop all trade between Scotland and France.⁹

While the Alien Act was being debated in England, tempers in Scotland rose perilously high. "Invade England Now" became the cry for Scots who knew what was in prospect for them. The Scottish Act of Security provided the arming of a national militia. As a result Presbyterians were

consorting with Jacobite Catholics and Episcopalians and

⁸ Charles Hendry Dand, *The Mighty Affair: How Scotland Lost Her Parliament* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1972), vii.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.

agreeing to forget their religious differences in a common determination “to have out with the English whatever grievance they had against life on the less fortunate side of the border.”¹⁰ The Scots were prepared to go to war because they were scared of what would happen to their religious independence from England. This was a big deal to Scottish Presbyterians because they viewed themselves as being the true Protestant religion. They believed they had become more reformed than any other church, especially the Church of England. This is evidenced by an address to Parliament by a “considerable body of people in the South and Western Shires” where they wrote, “We Incorporate with a Nation deeply Guilty of many National Abominations, who have openly Broke and Burnt their Covenant in the Year 1643. Are Sworn to the Maintenance of Abjured Prelacy, have their Public and Established Worship horridly Corrupted with Superstition and Idolatry; And their Doctrine dreadfully Leavened with *Socinianism* and *Arminianism*. Besides the most Gross and Deeply Lamentable Profaneness that abounds amongst them.”¹¹

In the General Commission of the Church of Scotland’s first address, they demanded that the security of the Church be a fundamental article and essential condition of any treaty. By doing this the commission was sending the Duke of Queensberry a clear warning that it would resist any union

¹⁰ Ibid., 78-79.

¹¹ *To His Grace, Her Majesties High Commissioner and Honourable Estates of Parliament, the Humble Address of a Considerable Body of People in the South and Western Shires*, (Edinburgh, 1706). Spelling corrected when possible; all other grammatical anomalies retained.

in which such an article and essential condition was absent. Their address raised no objections to an incorporating union, but it was a criticism of the treaty as it stood. The treaty made no provision for the security of the Church, and consequently posed an unacceptable threat to the Church. Only the removal of that threat could make it acceptable.¹²

The position of the Church of Scotland, or the Kirk, was one of the greatest concerns to the unionists and it was feared that unless the religious question was handled carefully there was the immediate prospect of a breach between the church and state that would prove detrimental to the treaty. It was reported that instructions from London urged the government to “take all possible means to satisfy the ministers.”¹³ The General Assembly was not the only group in the Kirk to address the parliament. Three presbyteries also wrote to their own addresses to the government; these were Lanark, Dunblane, and Hamilton. However, this was only three of the sixty-eight presbyteries addressed parliament which amounted to about five percent of the total. All three emphasized their approval of the work of the commission as expressing their covenanted principles. They acknowledged that in light of the addresses from the commission, it might have been unnecessary for them to petition parliament. The presbyteries stated in their addresses that they considered the union to contrary to their known principles and covenants and they could not enter into the

¹² Stephen, 46-47.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 47.

union without being guilty before God and incurring the guilt of national perjury. In addition to the addresses by the presbyteries, a small number of local parishes, mostly in the three afore mentioned presbyteries, also authored addresses to parliament.¹⁴ While the Kirk itself was not preaching against union some of the ministers were. According to the Earl of Mar, ministers preaching up the danger to the Kirk were the principal cause of the increased hostility to the union. Daniel Defoe, the famed author, also blamed ministers for the hostility to the union among the people. Mar insisted that not only were the ministers across the country preaching against the union, some were calling their people to arms.¹⁵

One of the most powerful arguments employed against union was that Scotland had been preserved by the providence of God for nearly two thousand years, during which time other nations greater than Scotland had disappeared and their memory rendered extinct. According to these addresses, no other nation had undergone such a comprehensive reformation as Scotland. Such blessings were surely evidence that Scotland had a special place in the purposes of God, and to give away their sovereignty and independence would be to resist that purpose and slight God's blessings.¹⁶ This is almost exactly what is said the address by "a considerable body of people in the South and Western Shires."¹⁷

14 Ibid., 109-10.

15 Ibid., 148-49.

16 Ibid., 115.

17 *South and Western Shires.*

Fear of losing their religious identity was not the only reason the Scots feared the union. They also feared that they would lose their national sovereignty which was in many ways linked with their national church, and sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between the two because of the lack of a separation of church and state. The Scots seemed to equate loss of sovereignty with a loss of their distinct cultural identity. The Scots also did not under any circumstances want to be governed by the English; they felt they had fought too many wars to maintain their independence from the English for that to happen.

In 1603, James VI of Scotland succeeded Elizabeth I to the throne of the Kingdom of England. Many Scots were pleased and excited that their “Jamie” was going to be king of England. They viewed it as a proper turning of the tables on the English for all of their bloody attempts to impose their kings on Scotland. The Scots were relieved that this was apparently to happen without more conflict and bloodshed and tried, with difficulty, to comprehend that the threat of English invasion might finally be over.¹⁸ The Union of the Crowns was the first union between the two nations that were historically bitter enemies; however the two kingdoms remained independent from one another.

In fact, nothing in either kingdom was constitutionally changed by the Union of the Crowns at all. Both Scotland and England retained their own separate Privy Councils, parliaments, courts, churches, and taxation. Neither Scots

¹⁸ Dand, 2.

nor English obtained any rights or privileges in each other's countries other than those posts or honors that might be given to them by the king. Trade in both countries continued to be protected against the other and it was a punishable offence for a Scot to try to trade with an English colony. Scots could, however, trade with France or any other country England might go to war with.¹⁹

James did try to create a closer union between the two nations. In his first address to the English parliament, James said, "What God hath conjoined let no man separate. I am the Husband and all the whole Isle is my lawful wife. I am the Head and it is my Body. I am a Christian King under the Gospel, should be a Polygamist and Husband to two Wives; that I, being the Head, should have a divided and monstrous Body... And as God hath made Scotland the one half of this Isle to enjoy my birth and the first and most imperfect half of my life, and you here to enjoy the perfect and the last half thereof, so can I not think that any would be so injurious to me as to cut asunder the one half of me from the other."²⁰ He proposed that he should be styled King of Great Britain and Ireland, there should be a flag combining the crosses of St. George and St. Andrew, trade should be free between the two countries, and all his subjects should enjoy equal citizenship rights on both sides of the border. The English parliament would have agreed on the first two, but James failed to persuade the English to agree to any Scottish share in their

¹⁹ Ibid., 15-16.

²⁰ Ibid.

much more profitable trade so the attempt at union failed.²¹

King William made one final attempt to begin negotiations in an address to the English parliament on 28 February 1702, just days before his death, and Queen Anne maintained his initiative. After William's death, elections for a new parliament in Scotland should have occurred, but James Douglas, 2nd Duke of Queensberry, persuaded Anne to reconvene the current parliament which had sat since the Glorious Revolution. Opposition led by James Douglas, 4th Duke of Hamilton, protested that this parliament was illegal and withdrew. Their walk-out helped force a general election, but, in the meantime, Queensberry took the opportunity to pass acts ratifying the Queen's succession, securing the Church of Scotland and Presbyterian church government, and nominating commissioners to negotiate a union.²²

Union was, by the majority of the government, seen as the most suitable solution to the succession issue, the problems highlighted by the Darien scheme, and the economic problems that followed it. Negotiations began in October 1702, only to be concluded without an agreement on 3 February 1703. The Scottish insistence on compensation for Darien proved to be a major stumbling block. Then the elections in the autumn of 1702 changed the political balance of parliament. The Cavalier Party, consisting mainly of Jacobites and Episcopalians, was strengthened at the expense of both the Court and Country parties, making future union

²¹ Ibid.

²² Stephen, 16-17.

attempts more problematic.²³

With Britannia teetering on the brink of war, progress was finally made on a union between the two kingdoms. In late 1705, delegations from both the Scottish and English parliaments met in London to compose a treaty of union. By late 1706, the acts were being debated in both parliaments. Nearly the entire Scottish parliament was present for these debates which consisted of over three hundred lords, barons, and burgesses. An average attendance in excess of two hundred appears even more remarkable when it is noted that of the peerage not attending there was someone else corresponding for the absence of at least seventy.²⁴ As undemocratic -- in the modern sense-- as the Parliament might have been, it is not unreasonable to consider that the Parliament gave a fairly reasonable picture of the amount of Unionists and anti-Unionists in the country, if the Highlands were disregarded.²⁵

During the debates on the articles of the Treaty of Union, there was ample evidence of opposition to the union outside of Parliament, which, according to George Lockhart of Carnwath, was being "crammed down Scotland's throat." Riots occurred in Glasgow and Edinburgh with the mob up to the doors of the Parliament House until guards were brought from Edinburgh Castle. The Articles were even burnt at the market-cross of Dumfries.²⁶ The Earl of Mar claimed that he,

23 Ibid.

24 Iredell, 18-19.

25 Ibid., 41.

26 Ibid., 40-41.

the Duke of Argyll and the Earls of Lothian and Loudon, all supporters of the union, expected an attack at any minute while at Loudon's lodgings in Edinburgh. In contrast, the Dukes of Hamilton and Atholl, both against union, were cheered all the way to their lodgings.²⁷ During the first half of 1707, there was so much unrest that the possibility of a Rising was investigated by the Irish adventurer, Colonel Nathaniel Hooke, who was acting directly for the French.²⁸

Inside Parliament, things were just as heated as what was happening outside. Many eloquent speeches were read by different members of Parliament. Most notable of these was the Lord Belhaven's speech to Parliament on the second of November 1706 where he said, "...But above all, my Lord, I think I see our ancient mother CALEDONIA, like Caesar sitting in the midst of our senate, ruefully looking about, covering herself with her royal garment, attending the fatal blow, and breathing out her last, with a *Et tu quoque mi fili Squadrone...*"²⁹ A country farmer who wrote a letter to his laird who was a member of parliament also uses this same type of logic as the group from the South and Western Shires.³⁰ However, he focuses more on the losing sovereignty and cultural identity, focusing less on religion. The farmer spends most of the letter speaking about how the union is

27 Stephens, 139.

28 Iredell, 56.

29 John Hamilton, 2nd Baron Belhaven, *The Lord Belhaven's speech in the Scotch Parliament, the second of November, on the subject-matter of an union betwixt the two kingdoms of Scotland and England* (Edinburgh: 1706) Translation: "And you, too, my son Squadrone." The Squadrone was a faction in the Scottish Parliament that was generally against Union but end up voting in favor of the Union.

30 A laird is a member of the Scottish gentry that ranks just below baron.

detrimental to Scotland because everything will have to change. He says, "It's sad you're going to put down our Parliaments, and make us on more a Kingdom, and give us up to beat the English reverence, to be ruled and guided in all things by them..."³¹ The farmer believed that since the English wronged the Scots in the past that it is very likely that this will happen again. The farmer does mention the Kirk, which is hard to separate from the cultural identity of Scotland, and begins to say that it would be a sin against God to enter into the union. He also said that he wished God may guide parliament and give them the grace and wit to be both a "true-hearted Scotsman and honest Presbyterians" and that he speaks for many of the people in the area.³²

It seems that despite the need to do something, which was apparent to a large number of Scots, they were still fearful of a union with England because they feared they would lose all of their national sovereignty and identity and their religious identity, neither of which can be completely removed from the other. Such public outcry from the Scottish people makes it surprising that a rebellion did not happen in Scotland in 1707 although the feelings about union probably did contribute to the Jacobite Rising of 1715. Since the Acts of Union went into effect on 1 May 1707, Scots have been pushing for independence from England with varying degrees of support, though never higher than those first

31 The farmer wrote in the Scots language which is similar to English and could be considered a dialect rather than a separate language; words translated to modern English, style kept as close as possible to the original.

32 *A Copy of a Letter from a Country Farmer to His Laird, a Member of Parliament, (1706).*

few years. Scotland may yet become independent nation, however, the day the Scottish parliament passed the Acts of Union was, as the Earl of Seafield put it, “the end of ane auld sang.”³³

33 Translation: “The end of an old song”

68 Articles

UNITED STATES HISTORY

The *Florence Gazette* and the Case for Secession in Florence and Lauderdale County

Kevin Bailey

In January 1861, Alabama became the fourth state to leave the Union in the wake of Abraham Lincoln's election to the presidency of the United States of America. The state would soon be joined by other slaveholding Southern states to form the Confederate States of America. However, the sentiment for disunion and the establishment of the new Southern Confederacy was not universally accepted by many Southerners. Though dissatisfied with result of the election of 1860 and apprehensive about the path of the nation, the Southerners against secession retained faith that the rule of law and the Constitution would be sufficient to carry them through what they saw as the perils of a free-soil president, fanatical abolitionists, and the inept and corrupt politicians who had led the country so far down the perceived path to ruin.

North Alabama was particularly apprehensive at the prospects of secession, both for practical and political reasons. Northern Alabamians viewed secession as a plot by political elites and slaveholding planters in the southern half of the states, to retain and bolster their political and economic strength by establishing a more formidable state

government in the wake of the state's secession.¹ Practically, if the state seceded from the Union and war was to break out, the fighting would enter North Alabama, and control of the Tennessee River would be a primary objective for Union forces.

Making the case for secession in Northwest Alabama was the *Florence Gazette* who, surprisingly, supported John C. Breckenridge for President in 1860. The *Gazette* became the focal point for disunion sentiment in Lauderdale County by publishing secessionists' articles and excitedly reporting on the departure of each state from the Union in the twilight of 1861. The *Gazette* featured what was considered a partisan position at the start of 1860, a radical opposition to the anti-slavery forces of the North so strident that talk of secession by Southern states was openly advocated in its pages even before Lincoln's election. What is important to note about the *Gazette's* secession campaign is the careful way in which it was conducted. North Alabama was not as dependent on large scale agriculture as the southern half of Alabama, and not necessarily as devoted to slavery the central pillar of Southern nationalism in slavery. Only eleven percent of white males in Lauderdale County owned slaves.² Therefore editors made certain to frame the argument for disunion around states' rights and only publishing the most outlandish remarks of the radical abolitionists and Republicans.

1 See Melvin Durward Long, *Alabama in the Formation of the Confederacy* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1959).

2 Margaret M. Storey, *Loyalty and Loss - Alabama's Unionists in the Civil War and Reconstruction* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), 257.

There are three distinct phases of The *Gazette's* case for southern nationalism from mid-1860 to January 1861. The first phase consisted of the campaign of 1860 during which the *Gazette* championed John C. Breckenridge over Stephen Douglas and John Bell, attacked Republicanism, and denounced abolitionism. The *Gazette* urged the people of Lauderdale County to vote for pro-slavery Democrats in order to stave off threats of Northern aggression, and railed against abolitionists who they believed controlled the free-soil Republican Party. The second phase began in the wake of the election of 1860. The *Gazette* published an article in November of 1860 summarizing Southern Democrat's exasperation with the American republic. As the paper read, "the argument is exhausted all hope of relief in the Union through the agency of committees, congressional legislation, or constitutional amendment, is extinguished and we trust the South will not be deceived by appearances, pretenses, or guarantees."³ The paper speculated wildly on the motives behind the new "black Republican" government in Washington, lambasting the Republicans and abolitionist they believed were driving the wedge between North and South. The final phase consists of active campaigning for Alabama's secession—a phase in which the rhetoric is completely unguarded. The paper ran excited reports on successful secession conventions from South Carolina to Mississippi, and urged its readers to vote for a slate of secessionist representatives for Alabama's own convention.

3 "To Our Constituents" *Florence Gazette*, December 26, 1860.

The Election of 1860 and the *Florence Gazette*

The election of 1860 began in the spring with a slate of Democratic and Republican candidates seeking the nomination for President of their respective parties. The *Gazette* began its coverage of the momentous election on March 14, by throwing its support behind Robert M. Hunter, a senator from Virginia for the Democratic nomination for President.⁴ The same issue chided the “Union-Savers” as being disloyal to the state and dismissed them as malcontents. The *Gazette* went on to praise the state government and a point was made that the State had, through acts of legislation, “provided for the military education of two poor young men from every County of the state,” and “appropriated money to clean out the Colbert shoals, in the Tennessee river, just below Florence.”⁵ The article illustrates the *Gazette’s* consistent support of the government in Montgomery, an opinion which was not widely held in the northern half of the state. In its effort to bolster support for state, the *Gazette* republished articles from Montgomery newspapers, like the *Montgomery Mail*⁶ and the *Montgomery Weekly Advertiser*.⁷ Both papers uncritically published the exploits of Alabama’s premier proponent of Southern nationalism, William Lowndes Yancey.

State politics aside, the *Gazette* attacked strengthening

4 “For President Robert M.T. Hunter of Virginia,” *Florence Gazette*, March 7, 1860.

5 “Covered Herself with Glory,” *Florence Gazette*, March 14, 1860.

6 Examples are “Thoughts for the Times” from the *Montgomery Mail* published in the *Florence Gazette* on December 26, 1860. Another example is “The Election of Lincoln is sufficient cause for Secession” from the *Montgomery Mail* in *Florence Gazette* on September 19, 1860.

7 “Mr. Yancey in Missouri, Maine, North Carolina and Virginia,” *Montgomery Advertiser*, quoted in *Florence Gazette*, September 19, 1860.

free-soil Republicans in the North, and published an article detailing William Seward's opinion on the slavery issue which the *Gazette* characterized as displaying "a cunning hate for the slaveholders."⁸ The paper rebuked Seward's insistence that the laws of Southern states only sought to protect the slaveholder, not the slaves. The paper denounced this accusation as a lie perpetuated by abolitionists and pointed to a section from the Code of Alabama which states that it is a crime punishable by a fine of 25 dollars to commit or prevent an act of cruelty upon a slave.⁹

By the summer of 1860, it became clear that upcoming election would be a referendum on slavery. The *Gazette* published articles such as, "Douglas and Seward on Slavery" and "The Republican Bible," a salacious example of abolitionist rhetoric that featured such alarming language as "SLAVEHOLDERS ARE MORE CRIMINAL THAN COMMON MURDERS" and "WE ARE DETERMINED TO ABOLISH SLAVERY AT ALL HAZARDS—IN DEFIANCE OF ALL OPPOSITION OF WHAT EVER NATURE WHICH IT IS POSSIBLE FOR SLAVEOCRATS TO BRING AGAINST US."¹⁰ J.L.M. Curry's eloquent and emphatic speech, "Slavery in the Territories," was carried in the *Gazette* as a two part piece in April. In the April 11 edition was an editorial further underlining the importance of the westward expansion of slavery. In this edition, the *Gazette's* editors make it clear

⁸ "The Presidency" *Montgomery Mail*, quoted in *Florence Gazette*, September 19, 1860.

⁹ Alabama State Legislature, "Excerpt from Code of Alabama, Section 3297, Alabama's 1852 Slave Code." Alabama Department of Archives and History. 1852. <http://www.archives.alabama.gov/cornerstone/slavecode1852/page09.html> (accessed April 22, 2013).

¹⁰ "The Republican Bible," *Florence Gazette*, October 3, 1860.

that the Supreme Court in the Dredd Scott case had fully reinforced the premise of states' rights and that "it is an 'out and out' decision in the favor of slaveholders."¹¹ A month later, editors John Kennedy and S.A.M. Wood decried that the constitutional rights of the citizens are in danger lest the people stand firm with their state against the onslaught of the other sections of the nation against the besieged South.¹²

While the *Gazette* defended the peculiar institution in its pages, the political infighting that would mark the election of 1860 had already begun. It was not an escalation of the ongoing intra-Democratic battle between Breckenridge and Douglas, but instead intra-regional sparring among the supporters Breckinridge, the presumptive nominee of the South, and John Bell, a Tennessee moderate representing the Constitutional Union Party. Bell had been appalled at the growing sectional strife in the Senate and led a third party movement wholly designed to throw the election to the House of Representatives. Bell's supporters hoped that since he was the least offensive of all the partisans that he would be made president.

The *Gazette's* publishers, staunch supporters of Breckenridge, took issue with Bell as a rival for the Southern vote. The *Gazette* ran a piece denying that Breckenridge supported disunion, and attacked Bell by presenting evidence in quotations from speeches that supported a policy of

secession and disunion. The editors published such salacious

¹¹ "Judge Douglas and the Dred Scott Decision" *Montgomery Advertiser*, quoted in *Florence Gazette*, April 11, 1860.

¹² *Ibid.*

quotes as “I say give me separation, give me disunion, give me anything in preference to a Union sustained only by power, by Constitutional ties without reciprocal trust and confidence.”¹³ The ire heaped on Bell, however, provided only a temporary reprieve for Stephen Douglas. The *Gazette* derisively called his plan for popular sovereignty “squatter democracy,” and published a plethora of speeches and columns from across the South condemning Douglas for his appeasement of abolitionists and challenge to Breckenridge. An article published in the October 31 edition of the *Gazette* proclaimed “Shame on Douglas” in its headline, and lambasts Douglas for perpetuating the split in the Democratic vote—even in the face of Republican majorities having been elected in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Indiana—and pining for unity in the Democratic field. The *Gazette* wrote,

Bell men, Douglas men, and Breckenridge men, all were weighed down by these heavy abolition majorities in the North, and turned from their suicidal strife at home, to that arch enemy of the South and the Constitution; the black Republican party... we all desired that this unfortunate campaign in the South [should] be concluded without further bitterness.¹⁴

Furthermore the article accuses him of slandering the South during his campaign speeches in Memphis and Huntsville and concluded by urging readers to “rise in your majesty, next Tuesday and rebuke this invader.”¹⁵

13 “Who is for Disunion? Breckinridge and Bell Side by Side,” *Florence Gazette*, September 19, 1860.

14 “Shame on Douglas,” *Florence Gazette*, October 31, 1860.

15 Ibid.

Despite the ardent campaign for Breckenridge and the warnings of the *Gazette*, its' readers did not throw their support behind the Southern Democratic candidate. As a result, Lauderdale County voted for Douglas but only by a scant eighty-four votes. The results of the election demonstrated that in more populated portions of the county and the larger towns, Douglas performed best winning Florence, Taylor's Springs, Lexington, Stutts, and Bluff Creek for a total of 790 votes. Breckenridge took Rogersville, Rawhide, Oakland, Mitchells, and Spains to garner 706 votes; and Bell took Blackburns and Waterloo for a total of 444 votes.¹⁶

Resistance

In September of 1860, the *Gazette* published an article from the *Huntsville Democrat* entitled "All for Secession." Merchants from Huntsville, returning fresh from a trip to the North, insisted that if Lincoln was to be elected president that the South should take a course of secession and resistance.¹⁷ Well before the election, Southern partisans determined that slavery and Southern culture could be easier preserved outside of the Union than within it. Now with the election of 1860 complete and Lincoln winning without the support of any Southern state, discussion turned to the prospects of a hostile Northern government and its implications for the South.

16 "Election Returns," *Florence Gazette*, November 2, 1860.

17 "All for Secession," *Florence Gazette*, October 3, 1860.

A week after the election, the *Gazette* published an article written by J.B. Campbell, a member of the Charleston Bar, outlining the general opinion of dejected Southern Democrats. “It is painfully true,” he wrote, “that the black Republican party have decided the establishment of a hostile government over the South—the weaker section and we have not the power to prevent it.”¹⁸ Campbell’s argument set the tone for the campaign of resistance to the new federal government across the region. Another correspondence republished from the *Tuscaloosa Observer* between two secessionist ministers, enumerated the grievances of the South,

For many years our section has indirectly borne the burdens of the general Government... a party of the North, avowedly bent on the destruction of our property—and with it our industry and our homes. ... I cannot doubt that it is the right and duty of the people of the slaveholding states to withdraw from this Union; and to form a government of their own, united to their wants.¹⁹

In a stirring declaration of intent, the *Gazette* discarded any pretense of objectivity in an editorial entitled “Our Position.” The paper described the rivalry between the sections as an insurmountable obstacle to the continuation of the Union,

The election of a President, of any party, is in itself a matter of but temporary importance, and affords, as we

¹⁸ “Our Federal Government changed, and Practically Dismembered,” *Florence Gazette*, November 14, 1860.

¹⁹ “Letters from Dr. Manly and Dr. Garland,” *Tuscaloosa Observer*, quoted in *Florence Gazette*, December 5, 1860.

have often said, no valid ground for the dissolution of the Government; but the fact once clearly established, that henceforth and forever the North and the South would be arrayed as hostile sections in a contest which could end only by the subjugation of one or the other, and in which the weaker would rapidly become still weaker and the stronger gain strength—this fact once clearly established, as it has been by the last Presidential election, proves that the Union between those two sections has practically ceased to exist, and that its mere forms are but as the chain binding together deadly enemies sharing a common doom.²⁰

Though the editors assured the readers that every effort at reconciliation should be made, and a new Southern government should be established should a compromise fail. They called upon the people of Alabama to make “known that the powers granted under the federal Constitution, being derived from the people of the United States, shall be resumed by them, the same having been perverted to our injury and, oppression,” and that “Alabama shall declare herself a free and independent State.”²¹ Furthermore they insisted a convention should be called to create a Union among Southern states to create a nation that Alabama should join and then seek recognition from the other nations of the world, should the people permit it.²²

In this open campaigning inaugurated the last phase of rallying Lauderdale County to the cause of secession, the editors of the *Gazette* sought to unite the three political factions that had contested the election. In impassioned

20 “Our Position,” *Florence Gazette*, November 28, 1860.

21 *Ibid.*

22 *Ibid.*

articles such as, “A sober appeal to men of all parties”, the *Gazette* urged its readers to put aside the partisan infighting that had given the reins of power over to Lincoln and the “black Republicans,” and to “select as delegates the most ablest, the wisest, the best, the truest men that can be found.”²³ The men elected to serve in Alabama’s secession convention were “to provide the means necessary to protect us against any attempt at coercion from the Lincoln administration,” and the editors urged their readers to elect men of wisdom and statesmanship to represent them.²⁴ The paper also worked to correct some popular misconceptions about the convention. Rumors had spread that the convention was elected “for no other purpose ... than simply to declare Alabama out of the Union and then adjourn.”²⁵ The article assured the public that the purpose of the convention was to decide whether to declare Alabama’s secession. Additionally, to assuage fears of a coup by influential members of the Alabama legislature retained by oath in the newly established independent state government, all the public officials would be elected by the people of the state.²⁶ As discontent over the result of the election and fear of a hostile government in Washington grew, the fractured political arms of Lauderdale County began to mend and coalesce around advocating secession at the state convention to be held in January. The state Senator from Lauderdale County, Robert Patton, declared at a public

23 “A Sober Appeal to men of all Parties,” *Florence Gazette*, December 5, 1860.

24 *Ibid.*

25 *Ibid.*

26 “The Powers and Functions of the Convention,” *Florence Gazette*, December 5, 1860.

meeting that “it is the right of any state to secede, from the confederacy, whenever in her own judgment a step is demanded by honor, interests, and safety of her people.”²⁷

An article in the same issue laid out the justification for secession as a right given to the people in the Declaration of Independence, “Call it what you may, secession, or revolution, the right, peaceably, to alter, or abolish a form of government exists.”²⁸

However, the *Gazette* published an essay that urged Alabamians to reject secession and warned secessionists to consider the consequences of declaring a rebellion against the government for independence. The paper read,

Are you prepared to precipitate your state into rebellion and civil war against the best government ever framed by the wisdom of man, and in its destruction destroy the hopes of all lovers of liberty throughout the world? Secession will entail on you a load of debt and exorbitant Taxes for the support of our Army and Navy, and splendid Government such as the pride and extravagance of our Aristocracy will require.²⁹

However impassioned or reasonable, opposition to secession was quickly brushed aside after the *Gazette* reported “South Carolina out of the Union” and published a series of articles written for the *Montgomery Mail* further exhorting the virtues of secession and calling on citizens to be loyal to their state

27 “Bell Douglas and Breckenridge parties coming rapidly together,” *Florence Gazette*, December 12, 1860.

28 “SECESSION,” *Florence Gazette*, December 12, 1860.

29 “A Letter From A Citizen,” *Florence Gazette*, December 12, 1860.

rather than the nation.³⁰ On January 11, 1860, the Alabama Secession Convention declared the state to be an independent republic by a vote of sixty-one to thirty-nine. In a letter by Robert Patton—who had earlier advocated for secession as a principle—sent to the *Huntsville Democrat*; the senator lamented,

Our will has been overruled by this decided majority, and now to withhold our acquiescence and take a position adverse to the Convention, could but distract the public mind, and ultimately result in civil discord and disaffection among the people of our beloved state. Above all things let us be united as one man in our future action. ... Let us feel that we are right, and trust in the interposition of a kind Providence.³¹

With Alabama now an independent republic and soon to be a member of the Confederate States of America, the *Gazette* had lost its battle but won the war.

Just as Lauderdale County had voted for Douglas rather than Breckenridge, the representatives to the secession convention had voted against secession.³² Although Florence reluctantly left the Union along with the state, the people of Lauderdale County believed a fractious and aristocratic Southern government would be preferable to what they perceived as a belligerent abolitionist Republican regime in Washington. Speaking to Georgians and the entire South, the *Gazette* reprinted a speech from Georgia Governor Joseph E.

³⁰ "Thoughts for the Times," *Florence Gazette*, December 26, 1860.

³¹ "Letter From Robert M. Patton to the Huntsville Democrat," *Florence Gazette*, January 16, 1861.

³² Donald Bradford Dodd, *Unionism in Confederate Alabama* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms Inc., 1969), 113.

Brown, in which he declared, “We are no longer a divided people. We are one in sentiment in interest and in feeling, and will enlist under one banner for the South.”³³ Jeremy Clemens—speaking for pro-Union southerners who feared for the safety of their homes, their friends, and their families—put the situation into more sober and consigned terms, “The majority is against us—we must go with the State, or create civil disturbances of the most dreadful character at home. Tell them too not be deceived about the possibility of a peaceful solution of our difficulties. We shall have war, and that soon. ... Let our citizens therefore begin the work of preparation.”³⁴ Secession had come for North Alabama with or without the support of its citizens, and the region would be embattled time and time again in the great struggle over the future of the country.

33 “Good Feeling in Georgia,” *Columbus Times*, quoted in *Florence Gazette*, January 30, 1861.

34 “Letter from Jeremy Clemens to W.B. Figures, Esq.,” *Florence Gazette*, January 16, 1861.

Militaristic Nationalism and Pseudo-Religion: A Material Culture Analysis of a 1911 Ulysses S. Grant Tobacco Card

Gracjan Kraszewski

Material culture, the study of man-made objects, allows scholars to construct a more complete and thorough understanding of the past.¹ However, documents only go so far. They are often biased, their human authors intentionally exaggerating points while simultaneously omitting crucial evidence. The rawness of objects helps historians remedy such problems. While objects, like documents, are human products built within cultural constructs and loaded with meaning, material goods stand apart. They can be intrinsically analyzed, producing historical cohesion and nuance. It must be noted that objects do not always challenge documents; at times they reinforce the written record, showing, ubiquitously, how deeply entrenched some historical claims are.

This essay focuses on a Ulysses S. Grant 1911 *Royal Bengals Little Cigars* tobacco card.² The card, tiny enough to forgetfully lose in a coat pocket, brims with deeper meaning

1 Henry Glassie, *Pattern in the Material Folk Culture of the Eastern United States* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), 2.

2 Ulysses S. Grant Tobacco Card, *Royal Bengals Little Cigars, "Heroes of History" Series, 1911*. Card on file at the Ulysses S. Grant Presidential Library, Ulysses S. Grant Association, Mississippi State University Libraries, Starkville, MS. Henceforth, the card, textual and material, will not be footnoted.

about Grant's era and the object's time of production. Dual temporal analysis is a singular strength of material culture. A scholar can learn about an object's time of production as well as the object's historical person/theme. Grant's card is a "lived reburial;" restoration of reputation, according to Michael Kammen, is the prime reason behind the reburial of a person.³ Grant's tobacco card, conspicuous and mass produced, easy to buy and hold onto, is a lived reburial for two reasons. Primarily, Grant is portrayed only favorably; any signs of war weariness or the effects of alcohol are absent. Grant looks good, powerful and vital. The second reason is that by the time of the card's production in 1911, actual Civil War memories had disappeared. Tobacco cards, and other paraphernalia, replaced real memory within public imagination. The tobacco card presents a resplendent Grant; since card purchasers didn't actually experience the Civil War, or have any recollection of the real man, his reputation carries on without blemish. His lived reburial is a whitewashed one, forsaking realism in favor of lionization, presenting and passing along a shored up version of the truth.

The card presents Grant as a conquering military hero, the victor in a nationalistic war that brings peace and unity to America. Bernard L. Herman has shown how souvenirs serve as a conversation piece, a touchstone for first encounters or simply something to discuss.⁴ So it was with

3 Michael Kammen, *Digging up the Dead: A History of Notable American Reburials* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 7.

4 Bernard L. Herman, *Town House: Architecture and Material Life in the Early American City, 1780-1830* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 259.

the Grant card. The accessibility of the tobacco card meant that ordinary Americans had constant contact with Grant's military hero legend; emphasizing American militarism and a culture of nationalistic imperialism. The Grant card created, to paraphrase Benedict Anderson, an "imagined community" of Americans willingly bound by the portrait's fictitious claims of unity. The card was meant to call Americans to a glorious—if not fully veritable—recollection of the past and inspiring citizens of the then present to take up Grant's mantle of noble conquest and national achievement; which they did, largely, as evidenced by interventions in Hawaii, the Caribbean, the Pacific, and in Central America, i.e. construction of the Panama Canal.⁵

The wide accessibility of the card proved fertile ground for the budding of a "secular faith;" a pseudo-religious attachment to Grant in the vein of a hero's cult.⁶ In this way it was not enough to view the card as representative of America's glorious past, to affirm Grant's central role in that story, or to feel kinship with the multitude of Americans who saw and possessed the object. The card's saint like replica of Grant compelled Americans to view him, and their history, on a higher plane; a dynamic narrative demanding action, a missionary impulse to take Grant's brand of American exceptionalism to the world. As Walter McDougall has argued, Americans did just that: post-Civil War unity

⁵ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).

⁶ Kammen, *Digging up the Dead*, 31. See also Michael Burleigh, *Earth Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe, from the French Revolution to the Great War* (New York: Harper, 2006); Michael Burleigh, *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008).

spread Winthrop's "city on a hill" globally via imperialism, the (failed) League of Nations, United Nations, Cold War containment, and the global meliorism inherent in the Korean and Vietnamese Wars.⁷

Militaristic nationalism is the primary theme of the Grant tobacco card. On the front, he is pictured in full uniform, the caption at the top reading "GEN U.S. Grant." The card's back text, a miniature biography, goes into great detail illuminating Grant's military accomplishments. Little is mentioned of his presidency and even less, nothing in fact, about the Reconstruction Era. The sole line dedicated to his time in Washington reads "Was president of the United States from 1869 to 1877." Militaristic nationalism is a product of both the post-Civil War era as well as America's turn of the century imperialism. Strength, martial vigor, and unity were paramount to the American image in both the 1860s and the 1910s.⁸ A slew of historians have written on the Civil War's direct impact upon creating rampant American nationalism and recent scholarship has confirmed this belief. Susan-Mary Grant, writing in 2000, claimed that only after the Civil War did America become an ideologically / identifiably unified country.⁹ Louis Menand, writing in 2002, concurred with an argument made by historian Carl Degler in the 1970s that the Civil War substituted the nation for previous sectionalism,

7 See Walter McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776* (Boston: Mariner Books, 1998).

8 One can justifiably argue that these themes have been present, conspicuously so, throughout the duration of American history; common to all Americans since the Revolution.

9 Susan-Mary Grant, *North Over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the Antebellum Era* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), 172.

eliminating the possibility of a return to factionalism.¹⁰ And Stephen Mihm, in his 2009 book *A Nation of Counterfeiters*, extends nationalism to economics, arguing that the Civil War enabled “country and currency” to move forward united as one.¹¹

The above scholarship’s reasoning leads to this conclusion: righteous war brings peace which then brings the nation. Grant, therefore, in his role as the Federal Commander who defeated the Confederacy, is the embodiment of this belief. The card portrays his accomplishment as singular; the man who waged the good war to bring about peace that formed the American nation. But while peace and nation are heralded, Grant’s military uniform reminds the beholder that both come at a price, one settled on a battlefield.

Post-Civil War militaristic nationalism works in tandem with American imperialism because the same themes of physical virility, and unified American righteousness, run through both. It is no wonder that turn of the century America, having annexed Hawaii, won vast international territories in the Spanish-American War, and begun to probe “Open Door” economics in China, would produce a tobacco card of Grant highlighting his masculine, conqueror-like qualities; connective themes between the 1860s and 1910s and, as Gail Bederman has shown, particular points of

10 Louis Menand, *The Metaphysical Club* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 67. See also Stanley Coben and Lorman Ratner, eds. *The Development of American Culture* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), 106-70.

11 Stephen Mihm, *Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men, and the Making of the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 308.

emphasis in an hyper-masculine American culture.¹² After giving a detailed description of the card, from basic size and texture facets to textual and pictorial analysis, larger implications will be discussed; why the card is so militarily nationalistic and how this fit perfectly with the masculine culture of 1911. The card also creates an imagined American kinship, or secular faith, around a simultaneously blanched and camouflaged version of the past, and raises further questions about how the American culture of militaristic nationalism drove American exceptionalism policies into the twentieth century and beyond. Seemingly cold and lifeless objects have a vitality of their own, even those objects as diminutive as a tobacco card.

Tobacco cards are a nineteenth century product, a time when Americans, according to material culture scholars Ken Ames and David Jaffee, partook of an “artificial culture, obsessed with appearances and material goods.”¹³ The cards debuted in the 1870s and 1880s featuring, in addition to military men, athletes, movie stars and other cultural luminaries.¹⁴ They were easy to attain because in an affordable—a few dollars—cigar box, a set could include upwards of fifty cards.¹⁵ The London Cigarette Company

explains that the cards featured people that would appeal to

12 See Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

13 Ken Ames, *Death in the Dining Room and other Tales of Victorian Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 236, 23. See also David Jaffee, *A New Nation of Goods: The Material Culture of Early America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), ix.

14 “Allen and Ginter’s Champions”, sourced from: http://web.archive.org/web/20060405192229/http://www.wclynx.com/burntofferings/adsallen_and_ginter.html.

15 “Card History-London Cigarette Card Company,” sourced from: <http://www.londoncigcard.co.uk/cardhistory.php>.

male interests in order to drive a male dominated market.¹⁶ Although ephemeral construction made up the majority of cards, some included a silk print pressed onto the cardboard backing.¹⁷ Regardless of material, century old cards can still be found in good condition today thanks to owner diligence. In 2007, the famous T-206 1909 Honus Wagner card fetched \$2.35 million only to be turned around later in the year for a \$2.8 million profit.¹⁸ The Grant tobacco card's militaristic nationalism was widely disseminated and accepted due to its affordability, accessibility, and popular interest.

The card is 3.5 inches tall and 2.25 inches wide. It is razor thin, pliable, and coarse in texture; one can run a finger along the smooth glossy sides, and then flip the card over to feel cardboard like roughness. The workmanship is very thorough, magnificent when one considers an entire detailed Grant portrait has been sized down onto a 3.5-2.25 inch canvass.

On the front, a slim white border lines the outside of the card. Grant is in his blue military uniform—gold buttons and a white collar, centered against an orange, sunset-like background. Grant's face is serious, but he does not appear to be tired. His grey beard is perfectly trimmed, his grey hair combed, and confident assurance radiates from his face. Three objects, placed over Grant's chest, complete the picture. A red

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ "Tobacco Card Collection," 1861. *UNCW Archives and Special Collections Online Database*. By Lana Donaldson Taylor and Deborah A. Edwards, sourced from: <http://randall3.uncw.edu/ascod/?p=collections/findingaid&id=437&q=>.

¹⁸ "Card History-London Cigarette Company," sourced from: <http://www.londoncigcard.co.uk/cardhistory.php>.

and gold handled sword, its point not visible, lies on top of a white scroll inscribed with "Let us have peace U.S. Grant" in fine, black script; the scroll is on top of a red berry laden green laurel. At the top of the card, in capital letters, "GEN. U.S. GRANT" is written.

The back of the card is manila in color, a coffee hue. The back contains Grant's biography and company information. The script is black. At the top, it reads "GENERAL GRANT". Below that, Grant's biographical information is provided in one paragraph. It reads:

Ulysses Simpson (originally Hiram Ulysses) Grant was born a poor boy at Point Pleasant, Ohio, April 27, 1822, and was graduated at West Point in 1843, afterward serving through the Mexican War. He left the army in 1854. When living at Galena, Ill., he was made a colonel, June 17, 1861, and brigadier general on August 7, and after capturing Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862, was made major general of volunteers. Won the battles of Shiloh, Iuka, Fort Gibson, etc., and after winning at Vicksburg was made major general in the regular army. Gained the battle of Chattanooga, and was then made lieutenant general and given command of all the American armies in March, 1864. Received the surrender of Lee, then was given the title of general. Was president of the United States from 1869 to 1877. He died at Mount McGregor, near Saratoga, N.Y. July 23, 1885.

Beneath the biographical information there is a big, cursive letter "M". Underneath the "M" is, in small script, "FACTORY NO. 2 DIST. N.J."; below that it says:

HEROES of HISTORY
SERIES
FREE WITH
**ROYAL BENGALS
LITTLE CIGARS**
Their Quality, Convenience, Size
and Price Satisfy Cigar Smokers.

The London Cigarette Company's website claims that "this [the turn of the century] was before the days of cinema, radio or TV... newspapers carried few illustrations. ... For most smokers ... the cards ... were their window on the world, serving to educate."¹⁹ This paper agrees with this statement. The Grant tobacco card was an educational tool; a widely accessible propaganda piece easily proliferated amongst common society. Having provided textual and pictorial description, it is time to investigate how the Grant card embodies a masculine militaristic nationalism; and how this theme, in the vein of a lived reburial and hero's cult, facilitated a whitewashed secular faith that glorified a martial past in order to drive imperialistic efforts and set the tone for twentieth century American exceptionalism and global interventionism.

Militaristic nationalism is omnipresent. Most obviously, Grant is dressed in his military uniform. The man was also president of the United States; a more important title, it can be argued. Yet Grant as the hero of the Civil War makes up his most enduring legacy. Grant historiography confirms the

¹⁹ "Card History-London Cigarette Company", sourced from: <http://www.londoncigcard.co.uk/cardhistory.php>.

militaristic preoccupation of scholars; a point highlighted by Robin Neillands in the introduction of his 2004 book *Grant: The Man Who Won the Civil War*.²⁰ Richard Goldhurst, writing thirty years before Neillands, called Grant the “General who won the war”.²¹ Goldhurst claimed that Grant’s war record—more than any other factor—made him “the most famous man in America” until his death.²² Bruce Catton said Grant was “among the few who had seen the path clearly during the war...a great general”.²³ Neillands argues that Grant and the Civil war are inseparable, it “made him” and while he “failed in many things” during his life he was a “very great general.”²⁴

The biography on the back of the card confirms, if not exaggerates, infatuation with Grant’s militarism. As previously mentioned in the paper, only one line is dedicated to his time in office, just before the line announcing his death. Grant’s militarism is so exalted that more space—three lines total—is given to his Mexican war service, his leaving the army, and his time in Galena, Illinois than the one total given to his presidency and Reconstruction; the latter of which gets no mention at all.

Grant personage, his well-manicured appearance and confident look, shows the make-up of militaristic nationalism.

Even more telling are the objects placed over his body: the

20 Robin Neillands, *Grant: The Man Who Won the Civil War* (New York: Cold Spring Press, 2004), 15.

21 Richard Goldhurst, *Many are the Hearts: The agony and triumph of Ulysses S. Grant* (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1975), xix.

22 Ibid.

23 Bruce Catton, *Grant Takes Command* (New York: Book of the Month Club, 1994), 492.

24 Neillands, 17.

laurel, the sword, and the scroll. The laurel paints Grant as the conquering hero, the individual who, more than anyone else is responsible for Union victory. The sword demonstrates the means by which Grant has accomplished victory. It is important that the sword is *on top* of the other objects because the symbolism serves to say that first Grant had to pick up the sword, use it well and subdue his enemies before recognition, the laurel, was his.

The scroll, in between the sword and laurel, embodies the essence of militaristic nationalism and secular faith. It is crucial that the words read “let us have peace”, and nothing more. For someone to say “let us have peace” implies the individualistic agency to actually bring this about. The laurel, the scroll, and the sword work in tandem to promote Grant’s militaristic achievements. Grant deserves the laurel because he is the conquering hero, the man who defeated the South. He defeated them with the sword. Victory would not come easy, if at all, had Grant not taken up his duty to preserve the nation. When success was attained, Grant desired peace. Grant has the power to do this, the card implies; the power to say “let us have peace” and have it because he already demonstrated the battlefield ability to win the war.

These three objects, set over pristine portrait of Grant, sum up the whole heart of American militaristic nationalism. It is about masculine assertiveness, about picking up your sword and wining the fight. He who does this deserves the recognition, the laurel elevating individual achievement, the

pedestal set high. But what makes militaristic nationalism so American, the card implies, is that peace is the fundamental goal. At the fight's conclusion, no matter how bitter, a true American hero like Grant will desire only peace.

The sword and laurel's relationship to the scroll well illustrates the transition of militarism into nationalism.

The first two objects are strictly militaristic—a weapon and a wreath denoting success; but what makes a nation is reconciliation and that, according to historian David Blight, is the Reconstruction Era's lasting legacy, albeit tainted by white supremacy.²⁵ Grant is credited, in the card's representation, with engendering a productive, pro-nation reconciliation. Just as he, individually, won the war and deserves the credit, he merits even more respect for only saying “let us have peace” at war's conclusion. That is the essence of the card; Grant representing all the “right” American values of masculine martiality and individualistic military genius while tempering these with a commitment to peace and unity. Americans who beheld the card see the conspicuous militarism of Grant yet are called to remember that “true Americans” only use force for higher means. The military root of American nationalism is always for peace, a hard won peace that unified Americans to spread their Grant-like values to the world.

The secular faith is the means by which Americans could spread their militaristic and nationalistic values to the world. The theme of secular faith has a long history in

²⁵ See David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002).

America. Hans Kohn argued that nationalism is always a secular faith, substituting national holidays for religious feast days, reciting anthems instead of prayers, and giving borderline adulation to national heroes usually reserved for God.²⁶ Long before Grant, John Winthrop was claiming America as a place apart, a “city on a hill,” providentially fashioned to be an example to all nations. American attachment to exceptionalist rhetoric is congenital. It is not sufficient to include Grant in the pantheon of American legends based exclusively on military merit. He has to possess something extra, a commitment to higher goals.

“Let us have peace,” the words written on the scroll, is precisely that something extra. Grant’s unquestioned commitment to peace, to unification, rounds him out as the true American hero. With this, he can now rightly be honored as an American model, someone to emulate in skill and character. A secular faith cannot operate if the followers believe a leader’s righteousness is not genuine. Grant’s commitment to peace, highlighted on the tobacco card, made the connection between his military greatness and his moral fiber. The men and women of 1911, only a little more than a decade removed from the vast land gains of the Spanish American War, the annexation of Hawaii, and American involvement in China, could look at Grant’s card and take comfort; American militaristic nationalism, now taking imperial forms, was good at heart. Sure, it was intense, at times maybe brutish. Behind all the masculine martiality was

²⁶ See Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: MacMillan Pub. Co., 1961).

a commitment to benevolence.

Grant's physical appearance also contributes to the seamless flow of militarism into nationalism within a secular faith justifying imperialism. Simply put, Grant looks good. There is no war weariness in his face; nor are there any moles, wrinkles, or signs of aging. Even though his grey hair betrays his age, he looks young at heart; still vital, capable of giving the people of 1911 an encore of his Civil War performance.

The militaristic nationalism of the Grant card reached many people due to the wide purchase of cigars and cigarettes. It is important to mention how people might have compared the card to other objects. Saints' cards, or Catholic prayer cards, and sports figure cards lend themselves well to comparison. Sports figure cards share much in common with the message of the Grant tobacco card. They portray their subject as a hero; only in a favorable light and as a means of inspiration. The masculine predominance of baseball tobacco cards resonates with the Grant card. In both cases, people who have the cards are supposed to see masculine virility unrefined, physical champions of the battlefield or the playing field, true American heroes who embody courage, skill, and success.

Good examples of baseball cards similar to Grant's tobacco card would be the previously mentioned Honus Wagner 1909 T 206. The Wagner card bears many similarities to the Grant tobacco card. Both men are in full dress, the uniforms spotlessly clean; anomalous for soldiers and

sportsmen. Grant and Wagner each wear a confident look on their face, almost triumphant, and their hair is well combed and free of blemish. While Wagner's front jersey reads "Pittsburgh," it is clear he is an ambassador for all of baseball, a sporting gentleman, who, like the Grant card implies, has the baseball talent—a corollary to Grant's military skill—to win on the field without relinquishing his composure and purpose.

Baseball tobacco cards were unfaithful to the rigors of baseball. Like the Grant card that obscures the strains of military life, sports cards exude a message of confidence, of purpose and triumph, which overrides realism. The many people who opened cigar boxes to find Grant, Wagner, and other assorted—Babe Ruth or Ty Cobb—cards received the same message: these men were heroes, physical men who won their fame on fields, possessed of gentlemanly ideals worthy of emulation. However, unlike Wagner, Grant's connection to the more serious business of war meant that the martial greatness he represented impacted, even subtly, American conceptions of a glorious past and exceptionalist future.

Comparing Catholic prayer cards to the Grant tobacco card lends understanding to how Grant became, in some ways, a symbol of American nationalistic secular faith. Prayer cards and tobacco cards are not the same thing. This point cannot be overstated. Devout Catholics use devotional cards in petitionary fashion, praying for a specific saint's

intercession with God; St. Christopher for safe travels, St. Blaise for maladies of the throat, Sts. Lucy and Harvey for eye troubles. No one literally prayed for Grant's intercession; however, it displays how Grant was perceived in this secular religion.

The similarity, then, between the Grant card and prayer cards is not spiritual but visual. Catholics who have a favorite saint, keeping his or her prayer card close at hand, develop a type of friendship with that person. The same effect can be said of the Grant card. People who saved the card as a souvenir, or boys who traded them like baseball cards, developed a fondness for Grant out of constant visibility; whether the Grant card was on a house mantle, used as a bookmark, or tucked into a jacket, its presence was constant, a quantity increased by the wide consumption of tobacco and easy access to the cards.

There is similarity in message between some Catholic prayer cards and the Grant card. The best example is Blessed Emperor Karl of Austria. In various portrayals, Blessed Karl, the last Hapsburg Emperor, is in full military dress similar to Grant. His uniform is replete with medals, his hair and mustache well-trimmed, and his demeanor calm and confident. Like Grant, the man who said "let us have peace," Blessed Karl is primarily remembered for his desire for a peaceful end to the Great War. The message is the same: a confident and able military man committed to peace. But were saints cards are supposed to point beholders

towards God, the Grant tobacco card directs attention to American nationalism; not a religious faith, but rather a pseudo-religious secular faith, connecting people to a proud militaristic tradition and giving cause for the continuation of that tradition into the future.

The usefulness of material culture lies within the field's unpacking vast meaning and depth from seemingly innocuous objects, here Grant's tobacco card. The card, like all objects, is not just a card. Rather, it served as a lived reburial for Grant, removing blemishes to honor him as a singular military hero within America's militaristic, nationalistic tradition. The wide accessibility of tobacco cards, and their similarity to both athletic and religious cards, ensured that Grant's militaristic nationalism was widely disseminated and helped build a foundation of American exceptionalism that honored the past while aiming to inspire the future.

As many historians have shown, Walter McDougall among the most recent that the militaristic and nationalistic values embodied in the Grant card, the overt expression of American exceptionalism, defined the United States' twentieth century outlook.²⁷ This approach to the world began with Theodore Roosevelt's turn of the century imperialistic ventures, continued via Woodrow Wilson's

27 For viewpoints both pro and con on militaristic and nationalistic American exceptionalism during the twentieth century, please see McDougall's *Promised Land, Crusader State*; William Appleton Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); Lloyd Ambrosius, *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002); Joseph S. Nye, *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

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League of Nations charter and the founding of the United Nations, drove Cold War policy and has continued in recent, twenty-first century Middle Eastern excursions. American nationalistic and martial exceptionalism, writ small, can be read into the tiny, 3.5 by 2.25 inch, 1911 Grant tobacco card. Only material culture analysis, the willingness to go beyond documentary analysis, can find these connections. Whether a scholar is analyzing a tobacco card, cloth spinning, folk art or foodways, material culture allows the historian to go beyond documentary evidence. In this untapped and uncharted ground beyond the written record, often lies a better understanding of the past.

Communication Breakdown: The Eisenhower Administration, Anthony Eden, and the Suez Crisis

David Justice

Following the Second World War (WWII), the world believed the United States and Great Britain had formed a bond that would dominate for decades. Yet not all was golden between the U.S. and Great Britain as they moved into 1956. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, attempted to gain influence in the Middle East and avoid a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union; while British Prime Minister Anthony Eden struggled to keep the once great British Empire from completely crumbling in his hands. While both nations had interest in new Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser and Middle Eastern oil, they had opposing ideas on how to handle the situation. Eisenhower, Dulles, and Eden tried on three separate occasions to keep peace between Britain and Egypt, but all three times the U.S. left Britain in a terrible position. These letdowns caused Eden to become enraged with the U.S. and drove him into collusion with the French and Israelis, who were planning a violent attack of Egypt. After learning of British involvement in the attacks, Eisenhower felt betrayed by, supposedly, his closest ally, and commanded the United Nations-led intervention. Miscommunication and bitterness between Eisenhower, Eden,

and Dulles unintentionally concluded in the Suez Crisis.

In order to understand how the Anglo-American alliance deteriorated, it is important to look at what both leaders wanted before the crisis. President Eisenhower's biggest goal while in office was to keep the U.S. from entering another war. After firsthand experience in WWII and watching the Korean War play out, Eisenhower wanted the U.S. to stay peaceful, and his biggest obstruction in all of this was the Soviet Union. Eisenhower feared that the Soviet Union would launch nuclear weapons, leading the U.S. to launch their own nuclear weapons, and ending in total destruction and fallout. After viewing NSC 5602/1, which showed what would happen during nuclear fallout between the Soviets and America, Eisenhower wrote in his diary:

[T]he United States experienced practically total economic collapse, which could not be restored to any kind of operative conditions under six months to a year. Members of the federal government were wiped out and a new government had to be improvised by the states. Casualties were enormous. It was calculated that something on the order of 65 percent of the population would require some kind of medical care and, in most instances, no opportunity whatsoever to get it. ... While these things were going on, the damage inflicted by us against the Soviets was roughly three times greater. The picture of total destruction of the areas of lethal fallout, of serious fallout, and of at least some damage from fallout, was appalling. Under such an attack it would be completely impossible for Russia to carry a war on further.¹

1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Eisenhower Diaries*, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (New York: WW Norton, 1981), 311-12.

This led him to try and keep the U.S. from entering any kind of nuclear war with the Soviets.²

The worst case scenario for Eisenhower and Dulles was for the Soviet Union to move into the Middle East and influence the Arab nations to join their cause. While the U.S. had some diplomacy with the Arab nations, Eisenhower and Dulles felt they needed to strengthen their relations. They devised one path, at the insistence of Eisenhower's pastor Edward L.R. Elson, which attempted to make a connection through religion. From the beginning of his administration, Eisenhower "made a deliberate effort to reach out to the Islamic world" in case a problem such as this ever arose.³ Eisenhower's administration believed the U.S. could persuade the Arab nations to connect with them because of a shared belief in God, and fight against the Godless communists to keep them from spreading their views. Elson helped in more ways than just convincing Eisenhower, he was highly thought of in the Arab nations.⁴ He worked in the Middle East on several occasions, and Eisenhower felt his relationship with him would earn respect amongst the Arab nations. With both of these goals, Anthony Eden and British interests was nowhere to be found on the American radar.

While Eisenhower worried about war, the Arab nations, and the Soviets, Eden had other issues to worry

² Before reading NSC 5602/1, Eisenhower and his administration had no problem threatening any country with the use of nuclear weapons. See Documents 1 and 2 of Chapter 8, "Dwight D. Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev, and Nuclear Arms," in *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Volume II: Since 1914, 7th edition*.

³ William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 290.

⁴ Ibid.

over. Eden's popularity was not a high point before the crisis, especially with the press who called him a "ditherer;" but Eden could only worry about one issue, the crumbling British Empire.⁵ The empire was "disintegrating at an accelerated pace" following WWII, and "the process was far from over."⁶ Eden was born into the "empire when England was supreme around the globe," which was ten days before Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, "a high point of the British empire."⁷ He had only known the greatness of the British Empire, and witnessed how two destructive wars and a global rise of nationalism were putting the empire in jeopardy.⁸ Eden hoped that if the British Empire did fall apart, it would not happen during his tenure as prime minister. Yet, there was a definite rise in resentment among the British about the sudden ascension of America around the world. As British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd said, "The Americans were, on the face of it, loyal and dependable allies but underneath there was ... a pleased smile, only half concealed, at seeing us go down."⁹

Regardless of where they stood on the scale of global power, both Britain and the U.S. agreed on two issues, but disagreed on how to handle these issues. The first was the sudden rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. While the U.S. attempted to gain influence in the Middle East, Nasser

5 "Sir A. Eden 'A Ditherer'" *Times* (London), 10 October 1955.

6 Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower takes American into the Middle East* (New York: Linden Press, 1981), 18.

7 *Ibid.*

8 *Ibid.*, 19.

9 Quoted in *Ibid.*

rose to power and preached for Arab nations to unite. He wanted Egypt “in the forefront of the effort to create a global ‘third force’ that would be independent of the two Cold War blocs.”¹⁰ Eisenhower and Dulles felt that in order to continue gaining ground in the Middle East; they must support Nasser, even if his motives were against theirs. They also attempted to persuade Nasser to join their side because of a recent weapons deal that had “caught Washington by surprise.”¹¹ The last thing Eisenhower and Dulles needed was for Nasser to fall into the arms of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Eden and Britain wanted to remove Nasser from power. The Egyptians already resented the presence of British troops, and Nasser led the charge to remove them from the region.¹² Eden’s worst fear was for Nasser to nationalize the Suez Canal, which would be detrimental to not only the empire but Britain itself.

Oil security was the second issue the U.S. and Britain cared about, but could not come together on how to resolve the situation. If Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Eden felt Egypt would be prejudice by not allowing British ships to use the canal to transport oil.¹³ Eden could not let this happen to British industries, which relied heavily upon oil from the Middle East to keep their businesses running.¹⁴ He felt he had to remove Nasser before any of these events were to transpire.

10 Jean Edward Smith, *Eisenhower: In War and Peace* (New York: Random House, 2012), 687.

11 *Ibid.*, 689.

12 Neff, 69.

13 David Carlton, “Suez Crisis (1956)” in *Twentieth Century Britain: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Fred M. Leventhal (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 521-22.

14 *Ibid.*

The U.S., on the other hand, was interested in the oil of the Middle East, but they were nowhere near as interested as the British. While the U.S. was not dependent upon the Middle East to supply them with oil, “American oil companies already had a substantial and increasing share in the area’s oil production.”¹⁵ Ultimately, Eisenhower’s main interest in Middle Eastern oil revolved around the Soviet Union. If they were to become involved, possibly by influence of Nasser and his Arab nation following, they would have control over oil that was being used to assist in “economic recovery of Western Europe,” something Eisenhower attempted to avoid.¹⁶

In the midst of discussion of these issues, an underlining tension existed between the two nations involving decolonization. The U.S. was “staking out its own self-interested position in the world, at times unavoidably at odds with Britain,” which helped hasten the decolonization process.¹⁷ On October 1, 1956, John Foster Dulles delivered a speech to the press regarding British colonialism, saying that the U.S. “cannot be expected to identify itself 100 percent ... with the colonial powers” involved with the Suez Crisis.¹⁸ Eden knew many Americans, including Eisenhower, shared Dulles’s opinions regarding British colonialism. In his memoirs, Eden wondered if the U.S. and the Eisenhower

15 M.A. Fitzsimons, “The Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy” in *The Review of Politics* 19, No. 4 (October 1957): 429.

16 Ibid.

17 Neff, 19.

18 Anthony Eden, *Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 556.

administration would have acted any differently if the tables were turned, and the citizens of Panama led an uprising and threatened to nationalize the Panama Canal.¹⁹ With the tensions between the two nations beginning to rise, it only took a few incidents to sour Anglo-American relations. The drama involving the Baghdad Pact, the building of the Aswan Dam, and the misleading correspondence of the first London Conference eventually led Eden to feel exasperated, and exclude the Americans from his plans involving the Suez Canal.

In the early months of 1956, the U.S. and Britain were on the same page involving a pact to keep the Soviet Union from entering the Middle East. Eventually titled the Baghdad Pact, this agreement initially involved the U.S., Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. Dulles decided to send the pact to Egypt in the hopes of getting Nasser to join their side. However, Nasser “balked at joining the pact, which he saw as an effort to perpetuate Western colonialism.”²⁰ Once Dulles learned of Nasser’s opinion, he removed the U.S. from the pact and was “prepared to give it ‘moral support.’”²¹ This left Eden and Britain as the only western power involved and made Britain’s already unstable relations with Nasser and Egypt even worse. Eden was incensed at Dulles for the predicament he had placed Britain in, and for not explaining the U.S.’ sudden withdrawal from the pact in a face to face meeting. As Eden wrote in his memoirs, “In recent years the

19 Ibid., 557.

20 Smith, 687.

21 Eden, 374.

United States has sometimes failed to put its weight behind its friends in the hope of being popular with their foes. The practical consequences of this uncertain diplomacy are illustrated by United States treatment of the Baghdad Pact.”²² What angered Eden even more was how the U.S. portrayed their role in the pact to representatives in Cairo, as if they had not been involved from the beginning.²³

The dealings of the Aswan Dam began a year before the actual Suez Crisis. In September of 1955, “Nasser formally announced the acquisition of Soviet arms from Czechoslovakia.”²⁴ Following this acquisition, rumors circulated that Nasser was negotiating for the Russians to fund the building of the Aswan High Dam.²⁵ At this point, Eisenhower and Dulles knew that if they wanted to remain friendly with the Arab nations and keep the Soviets out of the Middle East, they would have to outbid the Soviets in Egypt. They approached Britain and the World Bank in order to finance the construction of the dam and secretly tried to work a deal with “Egypt and Israel to come to terms with each other and live in peace.”²⁶ As Eisenhower wrote in his diary, Nasser immediately did two things that made him and Dulles question the deal:

(1) They sent back to us a whole list of conditions that

22 Ibid., 374-75.

23 Ibid., 375.

24 Smith, 689.

25 The Aswan High Dam was to be built further up the Nile from the original Aswan Dam. This new dam would control floods, provide water for irrigation, and generate electricity for Egypt’s rising industrialization.

26 Neff, 123.

would have to be met before they would go along with this plan, and some of these conditions were unacceptable. (2) They began to build up their military forces by taking over equipment provided by the Soviets, and they went to such an extent that we did not believe they would have a sufficient balance of resources left to do their part in building the dam. We lost interest and said nothing more about the matter.²⁷

Unfortunately, Eisenhower and Dulles did not consult Eden about ending the deal, misleading him for several weeks. On July 19, 1956, Dulles let the Egyptian ambassador know the deal was off and the loan from the World Bank expired, which was the first Eden heard of this. As Eden wrote, "We were sorry that the matter was carried through so abruptly because it gave our two countries no chance to concert either timing or methods."²⁸ One week later, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in order to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam.

Anthony Eden's worst nightmare came true, and it arrived, inadvertently, at the hands of Eisenhower and Dulles. Members of both British and American governments pushed for Eden to approach the Security Council of the United Nations to have sanctions brought on Nasser, but he felt it would be useless. As Eden wrote in his memoirs, "The precedents were discouraging. ... The Russians, who were the armers and backers of Colonel Nasser, had the power of veto in the Council and would not hesitate to use it."²⁹

27 Eisenhower, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 330.

28 Eden, 470.

29 *Ibid.*, 475.

Almost a month after the nationalization occurred, both Eisenhower and Dulles approached Eden to hold a conference in London with representatives of country members of the 1888 Convention to discuss how Nasser had violated the treaty.³⁰ The Eisenhower administration was not aware Eden was moving towards collusion “born of a marriage between [his] anti-Nasser policy and the unwritten anti-Nasser alliance of France and Israel.”³¹ After the nationalization, the U.S. questioned their relations with Nasser, and Eden hoped that with the conference, they would join his side and together remove Nasser. When the conference began in late August 1956, a solution for international operation of the canal was pronounced; and was sent to Nasser, who chose not to attend the conference. The committee officially sent Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, to “put the demand for an international authority to Nasser—not to negotiate, simply to demand.”³² Throughout the London Conference, Dulles gave Eden the impression that Eisenhower and the U.S. would “be prepared to use force if all else failed.”³³ Eden had very high hopes, based on the impressions he got from Dulles, because he knew that the Menzies Mission was doomed from the start.

30 The 1888 Convention, also called the Convention of Constantinople, was a treaty regarding passage through the Suez Canal. At the time, it guaranteed passage of all ships through the canal during wartime and peacetime. It was signed by the royal figures of the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, as well as the Emperor of the Ottoman Empire and the President of France. The countries that sent representatives to the London Conference consisted of: Australia, Britain, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Persia, Portugal, Sweden, and the United States. See Neff, *Warriors at Suez*, 296.

31 Kenneth Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 433.

32 Erskine B. Childers, *The Road to Suez: A Study of Western-Arab Relations* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962), 218.

33 Winthrop W. Aldrich, “The Suez Crisis: A Footnote to History.” *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3 (April 1967): 543.

A week after the conference, President Eisenhower began a correspondence with Prime Minister Eden to discuss the Nasser issue. Unfortunately for Eden, it was not what he wanted to hear. As Eisenhower wrote on September 2,

I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our views on this situation diverge. As to the use of force or the threat of force at this juncture. ... Even now military preparations and civilian evacuation exposed to public view seem to be solidifying support for Nasser which has been shaky in many import quarters. I regard it as indispensable that if we are to proceed solidly together to the solution of this problem, public opinion in our several countries must be overwhelming in its support. ... I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means. The use of force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy.³⁴

Eden responded by explaining parallels between Nasser and Hitler's tactics in WWII. Also, Eden hoped to "bring the Americans into line by parading the Communist bogey," and detailing Soviet involvement with Egypt.³⁵ He sent the following retort on September 6, one day before Menzies would be rejected by Nasser:

Similarly the seizure of the Suez Canal is, we are convinced, the opening gambit in a planned campaign designed by Nasser to expel all Western influence and interest from Arab countries. He believes that if he can get away with this, and if he can successfully defy eighteen nations, his prestige in Arabia will be so great that he will be able to mount revolutions of

³⁴ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Presidency: The Middle Way*, vol. 17 of *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower*, eds. Louis Galambos and Daun Van EE (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1996), 2264.

³⁵ Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez* (New York: Clarkson N. Potter, Inc., 1967), 69.

young officers in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. ... These new governments will in effect be Egyptian satellites if not Russian ones.³⁶

Eden hoped this would be enough to persuade Eisenhower that Nasser would plunge the world into war and back whatever Britain's next plans were. Eisenhower sent a response the day after Menzies failed to convert Nasser:

The use of military force against Egypt under present circumstances might have consequences even more serious than causing the Arabs to support Nasser. It might cause a serious misunderstanding between our two countries because I must say frankly that there is as yet no public opinion in this country which is prepared to support such a move, and the most significant public opinion that there is seems to think that the United Nations was formed to prevent this very thing.³⁷

With the combination of the Baghdad Pact, Aswan Dam, the failure of the London Conference, and the subsequent correspondence with Eisenhower, Eden felt he had enough motives to abandon the U.S. and move into collusion with France and Israel.

The new alliance had already devised a plan to deal with Egypt. The strategy involved Israel instigating a fight on the Suez Canal, leading Nasser to retaliate, and Britain and France entering the fight to protect their assets. With this new association, Eden wanted to keep Eisenhower and Dulles out of the loop. As Anthony Nutting, the Minister of State for

³⁶ Eden, 519-520.

³⁷ Eisenhower, *The Middle Way*, 2275.

Foreign Affairs, articulated Eden took “the most elaborate precautions” in order to keep his allies, especially the U.S., from learning of his new association.³⁸ As the Crisis exploded in late October, the British government was appalled at Eden’s decision and asked why the Americans were not involved. Eden’s response on October 31 explains why the U.S. had no involvement with the Crisis:

It is obvious truth that safety of transit through the canal, though clearly of concern to the United States, is for them not a matter of survival as it is to us and, indeed, to all Europe, and many other lands. ... Of course that is true. We must all accept it, and we should not complain about it, but it is equally true that throughout all these months this fact has inevitably influenced the attitude of the United States to these problems, as compared to that of ourselves and France.

If anyone says that on account we should have held up action until agreement could be reached with the United States as to what to do, I can only say that this would have been to ignore what everyone here and in the United States knows to have been different approaches to some of these vital Middle East questions. They know it. We know it. Of course, we deplore it, but I do not think that it can carry with it this corollary, that we must in all circumstances secure agreement from our American ally before we can act ourselves in what we know to be our own vital interests.³⁹

However, what Eden had not thought of nor prepared for was the “prompt and thoroughgoing [of] an American effort to halt the attack before it had succeeded.”⁴⁰

38 Nutting, 110.

39 Eden, 595-596.

40 Leon D. Epstein, *British Politics in the Suez Crisis* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), 36.

While the collusion formed behind their backs, Dulles heard rumors regarding British secret action on the Suez Canal. These rumors worried the U.S., and forced Dulles to call for a second London Conference, where he formed the Suez Canal Users Association (SCUA). Similar to the first London Conference, the SCUA hoped to motivate users of the Suez Canal to remove Nasser's hand and reclaim control of the canal. Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet saw this new union as a "Trojan Horse:" send a ship through the canal, let it be denied by Nasser, charge Egypt with violating the 1888 convention, and take violent actions.⁴¹ After realizing that Eden took his plan and twisted it in a different direction, Dulles took to the press to mention that the SCUA would not condone any use of force whatsoever.⁴² After reading the transcript of Dulles' comments, Eden was angered and flung the paper at Nutting, who happened to be at 10 Downing Street when Eden received the transcript.⁴³ The Americans had blocked Eden again from his plans for the Suez Canal.

On October 29, Israeli forces began the invasion of Egypt, and the following day Britain and France issued ultimatums to Egypt and Israel to cease fighting at once. When the demands were not answered, Britain and France began bombing. Eisenhower—who was on the final stretch of his reelection campaign and dealing with a revolution against the Soviet Union in Hungary—learned of Israel's invasion and knew it was only a matter of time before his closest

41 Childers, 223-224.

42 Neff, 320.

43 Nutting, 70.

ally began to impose his will on Nasser. In a conversation with Dulles, Eisenhower shouted, “Foster, you tell them, Goddamnit, that we’re going to apply sanctions, we’re going to the United Nations, we’re going to do everything that there is so we can stop this thing.”⁴⁴ The U.S. officially spearheaded the United Nations intervention in Egypt when Dulles submitted the cease-fire resolutions on November 1.⁴⁵

The three nations ignored the cease-fire, and Eisenhower realized he needed something more and decided oil was the proper way to go. On the same day Dulles submitted the cease-fire proposal, a Syrian Army destroyed pipelines and pumping stations carrying Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean.⁴⁶ Eisenhower understood that Britain would be desperate for oil because of this loss, and elected to cut them off from American oil. After speaking with Defense Mobilization Director Arthur Flemming, he decided that “those who began this operation should be left to work out their own oil problems—to boil in their own oil.”⁴⁷ Britain was in a bind, as Nutting explained, “In the previous two months a run on the pound in the world’s financial markets threatened seriously to deplete Britain’s dollar reserves. Without credits from the United States, we should therefore be unable to buy the oil we needed.”⁴⁸ Having to begin rationing oil for the first time since WWII, Eden accepted the cease-fire and removed British troops from Egypt. Once this

44 Quoted in Smith, 697.

45 Ibid., 698.

46 Ibid.

47 Quoted in Ibid., 697.

48 Nutting, 133.

happened, Eisenhower began to sell oil to Britain.⁴⁹

Following the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis, Eisenhower and the U.S. capitalized on their aspirations for the Middle East from before the crisis. After Britain and France removed themselves, they left a power vacuum in the region and Eisenhower seized the position.⁵⁰ Eisenhower wrote three measures and ways to appease both Egypt and Israel in order to expel Soviet influence from the area:

Measures to be taken under these elements would be: (1) rapid restoration of pipeline and canal operation. This might have to be done almost wholly by American technical groups, but I should think that we might also mobilize some people from Germany and Italy. This work should begin instantly. (2) Push negotiations under the United Nations so as to prevent renewed outbreak of difficulty; and (3) provide to the area, wherever necessary, surplus foods, and so on, to prevent suffering. ... We must make certain that every weak country understand what can be in store for it once it falls under the domination of the Soviets. ... For example, we can provide Egypt with an agreed upon amount of arms—sufficient to maintain internal order and a reasonable defense of its borders, in return for an agreement that it will never accept any Soviet offer. ... We could make some kind of arms agreement—particularly maintenance and training—with Israel of exactly the same type we would make with Egypt.⁵¹

These measures and ideas gave credence to a doctrine he was working on to be presented to the U.S. Congress a few months later. The Eisenhower Doctrine stated that any country in need of economic or military assistance following

49 Ibid., 156.

50 Childers, 306.

51 Eisenhower, *Eisenhower Diaries*, 334.

the attack from another nation could approach the U.S. for help. Eisenhower also kept his desire to connect religiously with the Arab nations alive through the doctrine. Months after the conception of the doctrine, Eisenhower gave an address at the dedication of the new Islamic Center in Washington, where he called for “the peaceful progress of all men under one God,” essentially saying that regardless of religious differences, we can be allies.⁵²

While Eisenhower turned the Suez Crisis into a success for the U.S., Eden took a beating in Britain. Public opinion of the Prime Minister was already rocky, and during the Suez Crisis opinions plummeted. Many members of Parliament and newspapers called for the resignation of Eden.⁵³ They received their wish a few months after the crisis; Eden announced his resignation suddenly in early January. Eden said, in great sorrow, that “the life at Westminster in these days is a strenuous one, for which I clearly have not the present health.”⁵⁴ He left in “ill-health aggravated by the bitter national controversy and the dissensions in his own party arising from the Government’s decision on armed intervention in Egypt.”⁵⁵ Anglo-American relations remained strained after the resignation of Eden; however, in February of 1957, Eisenhower allowed “informal talks” between himself and new Secretary of State for Defense, Duncan Sandys, the first talks between America and Britain “after the strained

52 Inboden, 291.

53 “Prime Minister Must Resign” *Times* (London), 5 November, 1956.

54 “Sir A. Eden to Resign as M.P.” *Times* (London), 12 January, 1957.

55 “Successor Not Yet Chosen” *Times* (London), 10 January, 1957.

atmosphere of the Suez Crisis.”⁵⁶

The underlying theme of Anglo-American relations during the Suez Crisis was betrayal, and the supposed indestructible bond between the U.S. and Britain was strained. Both leaders had different desires for how to handle the growing issues in the Middle East, which led them to misrepresent and miscommunicate their goals. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles had distorted their interests to Prime Minister Eden on more than one occasion, which led Eden to keep the collusion with France and Israel a secret from the U.S. Both leaders felt the other had betrayed their trust by false representation of their true intentions with the Middle East. The Suez Crisis was inadvertently born and grew out of miscommunication and resentment between Eisenhower, Dulles, and Eden.

56 “Evidence of Renewed Warmth and Confidence” *Times* (London), 4 February, 1957.

Reaction and Prediction: The American Response to the Death of Joseph Stalin

John Clinton Harris

At 6:30 PM, March 1, 1953, Joseph Stalin suffered a cerebral hemorrhage in his Kuntsevo Dacha. The night before, he had been awake with his inner circle, drinking until four in the morning, an awesome figure at the pinnacle of his power; twelve hours later, he was lying prostrate on his floor, unable to move or communicate. So terrified were the guards of the “Man of Steel” that they waited over four hours before they discovered his helpless condition. Five hours passed after the guards called two of Stalin’s most powerful advisers, Lavrenti Beria and Georgi Malenkov, before they finally arrived. After appraising Stalin’s condition, Beria told the guards, “The Boss is obviously sleeping peacefully. ... Don’t bother us, don’t cause a panic, and don’t disturb Comrade Stalin!”¹ The actions of Beria and Malenkov, as well as their colleagues Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin, over the next few hours are lost to history, but Simon Sebag Montefiore speculates that “the Four had those hours to divide power. The decision to do nothing suited everyone. Beria and Malenkov ... were legally in charge until a full meeting of the Politburo and then of the Central Committee. If Stalin

¹ Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2000), 640.

were dying, they needed time to tie up power. Possibly for the same reasons, it was in the interests of Khrushchev and Bulganin to delay medical help until they had protected their position.”² Fear and power would prove to be the chief motivations of the men closest to Stalin as he lay dying; only after they were reasonably certain that he would not survive did they allow him medical attention.³

By the time Joseph Stalin died on March 5, 1953, the four men had largely determined how the succession of power would take place—although this was by no means an arrangement satisfactory to all involved. From the start, Beria and Malenkov controlled the process, though Beria was unsuitable to assume Stalin’s position due to his Georgian nationality as well as his reputation for atrocity as the head of Stalin’s secret police. The evidence suggests that Beria and Malenkov had probably already come to an understanding that Beria would reconsolidate his power over the police forces if he backed Malenkov as head of state; before the Red Czar was even gone, the plan was already moving into action. Montefiore describes the scene:

An official meeting of the whole regime, three hundred senior officials, was set for that evening. Now the magnates gathered informally ... to form the new government. Beria and his ‘billygoat’ Malenkov had prearranged the ‘collective leadership,’ taking turns proposing the appointments. ... Khrushchev remained one of the senior Secretaries but he was excluded from the government. Beria was dominant, reuniting the MVD and MGB while remaining First Deputy Premier.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid., 636-640.

Malenkov succeeded to both Stalin's posts of Premier and Secretary.⁴

Such is the legacy of an inhuman dictator; there would be few eulogies for Comrade Stalin from those who knew him, inside or outside of the Soviet Union. In the United States, there were certainly very few tears shed for the man Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had affectionately nicknamed "Uncle Joe;" both the new President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and the media scrambled for scant information, struggling to make sense of the new era of leadership in the Soviet Union and how a new Soviet government would affect the American people.

The newly elected Eisenhower had been in office fewer than fifty days, had no rapport with Stalin in a presidential capacity, and his prior experiences with him had certainly not borne any affectionate nicknames. Eisenhower's 1945 visit to the Soviet Union had not left him with a positive impression of Stalin, whom he described anecdotally in his memoirs:

We watched a Soviet picture on the capture of Berlin, featuring my old friend Marshal Zhukov with ranks of medals glittering on his best dress uniform. At the movie Stalin sat between Zhukov and me. At one point, I leaned over and said to our interpreter, who was seated directly behind Stalin, "Tell Marshal Zhukov that if he ever loses his job in the Soviet Union he can, on the evidence of this picture, surely get one in Hollywood." Stalin listened to the translation in silence. "Marshal Zhukov," he informed me in a flat tone, "will never be without a job in the Soviet Union." Now, more than seven years later, I doubted whether much that was productive could come out of a meeting

⁴ Ibid, 647.

with such a man.⁵

Before President Eisenhower was informed of Stalin's likely imminent demise, he had—despite his personal reservations regarding the likelihood of success—responded to a journalist's question as to whether or not he would meet accept Stalin's overtures for a meeting. The President responded that he would “meet anybody, anywhere, where I thought there was the slightest chance of doing any good, as long as it was in keeping with what the American people expect of their Chief Executive.”⁶ Clearly, Eisenhower did not like the idea of interacting with Stalin, but was willing to accept it as a necessary evil.

A week after his public statement about a meeting with Stalin, the dictator fell mortally ill. An awkward vigil now surrounded the expiring dictator. Eisenhower's first remark to his staff after learning of Stalin's condition was not one of sympathy for the Red Czar, but a simple inquiry as to the most practical political response to his likely death. With the aid of C.D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President and chief adviser on psychological strategy, the following press statement was released before lunchtime:

At this moment in history when multitudes of Russians are anxiously concerned because of the illness of the Soviet ruler the thoughts of all the American people go out to all the people of the U.S.S.R.—the men and women, the boys and girls—in the villages,

⁵ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change: The White House Years 1953-1956* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1963), 143.

⁶ *Ibid.*

cities, farms, and factories of their homeland.

They are the children of the same God who is the Father of all peoples everywhere. And like all peoples, Russia's millions share our longing for a friendly and peaceful world.

Regardless of the identity of government personalities the prayer of us Americans continues to be that the Almighty will watch over the people of that vast country and bring them, in His wisdom, opportunity to live their lives in a world where all men and women dwell in peace and companionship.⁷

According to Robert J. Donovan, "The statement, in effect, was an appeal to the new rulers of Russia, whoever they might be, to keep the peace."⁸ More noteworthy however, was the explicit lack of sympathy for the Soviet ruler himself. After learning of Stalin's death, Eisenhower issued a message directly to those government personalities, "The Government of the United States tenders its official condolences to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the death of Generalissimo Josef Stalin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union."⁹ Again, Eisenhower's remarks were directed at the living; he had purposefully omitted any formal declaration of sympathy to Stalin. The following day, the President discussed the new situation with his cabinet. Secretary Lodge asserted that the Soviet Union's United Nations officials were uneasy, and advised a careful approach on the part of the United States. The President also took the opportunity to chastise the State Department for what

⁷ Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York: New York Herald Tribune Inc., 1956), 41.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

appeared to be no cohesive plan for what to do in the event of Stalin's death. Stalin's legend had loomed so large for so long that even his greatest ideological foe had not been able to imagine a world without him.¹⁰

For many opponents of communism, including the President, the death of Stalin was seen as fortuitous. In a letter dated March 10, 1953 to financier Bernard Mannes Baruch, Eisenhower advanced the idea that with Stalin no longer standing in the way of allowing independent inspectors into the Soviet Union, a legitimate nuclear disarmament program might be possible, "An opportune moment not only by reason of Stalin's death, but because we here have been earnestly seeking for a dramatic approach to this whole question of peace and disarmament."¹¹ In Cable 6047 written on March 11, 1953 to Winston Churchill, Eisenhower replied to a question from the English Prime Minister over how the West should approach this new Soviet government. Like his public press releases, there is no mention of sympathy for Stalin, or even condolences to Churchill, who had known the Generalissimo throughout the tumultuous World War II years. Eisenhower's purposeful lack of sympathy in his communique to the Russian people, and their government, was not merely careful diplomacy; the President obviously felt that a deceased Stalin was no great loss.¹²

Eisenhower was correct in his alarm at the lack of

¹⁰ Ibid, 41-42.

¹¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The Presidency: The Middle Way*, vol. 14 of *The Papers Of Dwight David Eisenhower*, eds. Louis Galambos and Daun Van EE (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1996), 90.

¹² Ibid, 90-93.

information within the State Department for interaction with a post-Stalinist Soviet Union; in effect, this lack of hard intelligence and strategic planning resulted in executive paralysis. Without being able to examine probable outcomes, the President had few viable options. It is not surprising that the Eisenhower administration's attempts to take advantage of the situation, without the benefit of professional predictive insights—either from the State Department or within the White House itself—produced few useful results. Avoiding action based on vague predictions and adopting a “wait and see” posture was perhaps the wiser course as President Eisenhower could not afford to be wrong, as could the myriad predictive voices in the press.

One of the first national periodicals to cover the death of Stalin was the *New York Times*. On March 6, 1953, the headline screamed “STALIN DIES AFTER 29-YEAR RULE; HIS SUCCESSOR NOT ANNOUNCED; U.S. WATCHFUL, EISENHOWER SAYS.”¹³ Harry Schwartz began his article with a dire forecast for the Soviet government, “Premier Stalin’s death may result in an explosive resolution of the major tensions now repressed in the Soviet Union.”¹⁴ Schwartz based that assessment on the wording of propaganda found in *Pravda*, the state run Soviet newspaper, in particular the phrases “monolithic unity,” “vigilance,” and “unity;” Schwartz believed these phrases indicated weakness in the legitimacy of the new Soviet government

¹³ “Stalin Dies After 29-Year Rule,” *New York Times*, March 6, 1953.

¹⁴ Harry Schwartz, “Soviet Fear of an Eruption Discerned in Call for Unity,” *New York Times*, March 6, 1953.

and that such terms were being bandied about in order to shore up the succession.¹⁵ The following day, the *Times* posted an equally loud headline announcing the official successor, Georgi Malenkov.¹⁶ The front page article by Harrison E. Salisbury differs greatly from the previous day's prediction by Schwartz, and may indicate that the *Times* was already revising its predictions as more information came out of the U.S.S.R.. Thus, Salisbury described Malenkov and his newly formed inner circle:

Standing beside him [Malenkov] in the chief and most responsible posts of Government and party in this reorganized structure are four veteran Soviet leaders and co-workers of Stalin- Lavrenti P. Beria, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Nikolai A. Bulganin and Lazar M. Kaganovich. Those four became the First Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers and with Mr. Malenkov constitute its Presidium.... The chief impression given by the Government both in tonight's announcement and in the proclamation of Stalin's death was one of firmness and the highest political vigilance, a sense of rallying together of party and government forces to withstand any threats from within or without. The Government was acting with the greatest resolution and with marked vigor. Mr. Malenkov lost no time in demonstrating his will and determination to prove a worthy custodian of the policies of monolithic unity and steel resolution that marked the leadership of Stalin.¹⁷

Although much of his report contained terms used by the new Soviet Government, such as "monolithic unity," Salisbury clearly felt that the issue of succession was settled, which

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "Malenkov is named new Soviet Premier," *New York Times*, March 7, 1953.

¹⁷ "Four to Help Rule," *New York Times*, March 7, 1953.

would therefore make further predictions on the internal Soviet turmoil unnecessary as well as incorrect. However, many of his fellow newspapermen, like Harry Schwartz, did not share that view.

On the same day as Salisbury's article, the *New York Times* printed the editorial reaction from many of the nation's leading newspapers, which ranged from venerate eulogy to tasteless gloating, especially among politically oriented publications. The *Daily Worker* announced, "Humanity has lost the greatest man of our time. ... As humanity bids him farewell, his vision of peace, democracy, socialism and finally communism will grow brighter with generations."¹⁸ On the opposite side of the political spectrum, The *Chicago Tribune* trumpeted, "For a dozen years and more, Stalin's death has been eagerly awaited by all decent men everywhere, including Russia. Now that it has happened, rejoicing will be tempered only by the thought that Malenkov, his successor, will prove to be another such brute, possibly even worse degraded."¹⁹

There were also predictive responses among the editorials, ranging from the hopeful to the pessimistic. The *Chattanooga Times* was sanguine, "However violent the aftermath of Stalin's passing may be in Russia and however bloody the period of transition may be, Russia may have leaders who can understand the Western mentality. With such

18 "Greatest Man of Our Time," *Daily Worker*, March 6, 1953, quoted in "Excerpts from U.S. Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin," *New York Times*, March 7, 1953.

19 "Rejoicing is Tempered," *Chicago Tribune*, March 6, 1953, quoted in "Excerpts from U.S. Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin," *New York Times*, March 7, 1953.

people we might eventually deal.”²⁰ The *Seattle Times* was far more negative, “It would be the sheerest wishful thinking to believe that Stalin’s departure from the scene will halt the Red design to communize the world.”²¹ The *Hartford Courant* issued a moderate assessment of the future for post-Stalin U.S.-Soviet relations, “The interregnum in Moscow that has already begun may grant us temporary relaxation in the cold war. But we know that the great struggle of the twentieth century still goes on, and will go on, as relentlessly as ever.”²² Media opinion varied in terms of both subjectivity and intensity, from *Hartford Courant*’s careful moderation to the *Seattle Times*’s hyperbole.

The national news magazines did not publish Stalin’s death until March 16, in concert with their weekly news cycle; their reactions were uniformly unsympathetic. *Time*, in its cover story within the National Affairs column remarked, “Joseph Stalin was liquidated last week by the common fate of all men. The event was so big that only the simplest words could form his epitaph: he was the most powerful man of his time—the most feared and hated.”²³ *Newsweek* commented, “The Russian people somehow found it in their hearts to pray for Stalin, to pray in dim, neglected churches for a soul the great man had been quite sure he did not possess.”²⁴ Edward

20 “An Optimistic View,” *Chattanooga Times*, March 6, 1953, quoted in “Excerpts from U.S. Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin,” *New York Times*, March 7, 1953.

21 “Warns on Wishful Thinking,” *Seattle Times*, March 6, 1953, quoted in “Excerpts from U.S. Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin,” *New York Times*, March 7, 1953.

22 “Cold War Unaffected,” *Hartford Courant*, March 6, 1953, quoted in “Excerpts from U.S. Editorials Commenting on the Death of Stalin,” *New York Times*, March 7, 1953.

23 “National Affairs,” *Time*, March 16, 1953, 29.

24 “World Watching for First Move by New Red Chiefs,” *Newsweek*, March 16, 1953, 21.

Crankshaw, contributing to *Life*, observed, "Stalin lay dying in the palace of the czars, prostrate and unconscious, the real and also the symbolic center of a fantastic web of plots and counterplots reaching out from the anterooms of the Kremlin to the remotest corners of his empire. ... This was in the Russian tradition of the harsh and arbitrary despotism which fears the light of day."²⁵ Perhaps due to a larger readership aggregate with more diverse opinion, as well as the greater amount of time the newsmagazines had to appraise the ramifications of Stalin's death, the opinions of *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *Life* are far more in concert than those published by the dailies almost a week earlier, in terms of both politics and intensity.

Americans were far more concerned with the outcome of the Red succession than with the pomp and grandiosity of Stalin's state funeral. Even before the *New York Times* knew that Stalin had finally died, the paper printed an Associated Press article with predictions from two former Ambassadors to Moscow, General Walter Bedell Smith and William C. Bullitt. General Smith predicted a triumvirate arrangement, with power divided between Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria. Bullitt, whose opinion was taken to augment Gen. Smith's assessment, believed that a triumvirate arrangement was possible, but would be a temporary arrangement at best, and that the U.S.S.R. would "tread softly" during this uncertainty; Bullitt did, however, agree with Gen. Smith on who would

25 Edward Crankshaw, "False God Dies, Crisis is Born," *Life*, March 16, 1953, 20.

constitute such a triumvirate.²⁶ The following day, in a front page article of the *New York Times* predicting the rise of Malenkov to Stalin's position, Schwartz observed that "the fact that Moscow has announced that Nikita S. Khrushchev will head the committee preparing Stalin's funeral also seems significant. Mr. Khrushchev's rise to a central leading position in recent years has coincided with the similar and greater rise of Mr. Malenkov's fortunes in the same period."²⁷ Schwartz's article is unique in that it not only named Khrushchev, a figure who did not rate mention in the vast majority of post-Stalin forecasts, but does not reference any other Soviet political figure other than Malenkov.²⁸

Writing for *Newsweek* in a column entitled, "Human Nature, Rex," Raymond Moley asserted that the U.S.S.R. would almost certainly become a victim of its own size; without a Stalin, it would spin apart like a broken centrifuge. For Moley, the worry was not what the new leaders will do next, or even who they will be; he saw the imminent breakup of the Soviet Union, writing, "Surely we must not count on a more peaceful world. The convulsions of this sick giant will be extremely perilous. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that we are witnessing the beginning of the end."²⁹ Moley, unlike many of his colleagues, underestimated the strength of the totalitarian system Stalin had spent his life perfecting. There were other prognostications to be found in

26 "3-Man Rule Predicted By Smith," *New York Times*, March 5, 1953.

27 "Soviet Fear of an Eruption Discerned in Call for Unity," *New York Times*, March 6, 1953.

28 Ibid.

29 Raymond Moley, "Human Nature, Rex," *Newsweek*, March 16, 1953, 108.

Newsweek, the most important of which may have been the admonition, "Watch the Soviet Army. Watch Marshal Georgi Zhukov." This warning came from an interview with Marshal Tito, Communist boss of Yugoslavia, who was quoted as saying, "Malenkov can never rally the Communist Party or the Soviet people. He has no bark. Molotov has no backing. Beria is a simple thug. Watch for Marshal Zhukov and the army to lead a struggle against the politicians."³⁰ Despite this potential coup forecast from someone who knew the Soviet government intimately through bitter experience, *Newsweek* would in the same article suggest that no internal political power struggle appeared imminent and that President Eisenhower should invite Malenkov to the same meeting that Stalin had tried to initiate.³¹

An opposite fear, held by *Time*, was that the new dictator might inadvertently create World War III by trying to consolidate his power at home through hard line policies towards the West. According to the article, Malenkov would "until he establishes himself in divinity ... feel compelled to act with such rigidity as to get himself into disastrous situations."³² *Time* did not believe that a political power scramble was imminent, despite the acknowledgement of its possibility; however, Marshal Zhukov and the Red Army were recognized as a potentially destabilizing force. In a prediction that contained more American flavor than Russian, *Time* summarized the possibility of a political endgame in the

30 "Significance: Zhukov, Red Army Gain in Influence," *Newsweek*, March 16, 1953, 23.

31 Ibid.

32 "Death In The Kremlin," *Time*, March 16, 1953, 35.

Soviet Union circumspectly, “Russia’s top leaders probably now have the feeling that they must hang together lest they hang separately. That feeling could last for months or years.”³³ It would only be months before *Time’s* predicted era of good feelings would dissipate into *coup d’état* led by a man who had almost completely escaped the notice of the American press in the wake of Stalin’s death.

Within the same year of Stalin’s departure, the little known Khrushchev, with the help and muscle of Marshal Zhukov, began his climb to the pinnacle of Soviet power. His chief rival, despite Malenkov’s position, was undoubtedly the very dangerous Beria, a man who undoubtedly had his own bloody designs on power. Khrushchev struck first, and had Beria arrested in a dramatic move supported by the rest of the Presidium, including Beria’s former ally Malenkov. The ambitious spymaster was taken completely by surprise, and exclaimed, “What’s going on, Nikita? Why are you searching for fleas in my trousers?”³⁴ It was at this point that Malenkov gave the signal to Zhukov, who had dismissed all of Beria’s internal security guards and replaced them with Red Army soldiers, to arrest the secret policeman. Beria was taken into custody, tried, and executed six months later; his executioners had him stripped, tied to a wall, and, finally, gagged, to quiet the racket he made as he begged for his life. It was a fitting end for Stalin’s butcher.³⁵

After destroying Beria, Khrushchev quickly became the

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Montefiore, 652.

³⁵ Ibid, 650-52.

most powerful member of the Presidium, although it would take him some time to fully consolidate his power. Malenkov was replaced as Premier by Bulganin, Minister of War and Marshal Zhukov's boss, as a reward for the army's role in the destruction of Beria. However, in 1957, the remaining four of the original post-Stalin inner circle, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Bulganin, attempted to overthrow Khrushchev. In response, Khrushchev appealed to the entire Central Committee, whom he had flown in on Zhukov's planes, and won the day; he successfully accused his would-be accusers, again with the help of Zhukov, and the original four were politically exiled to politically meaningless jobs for the rest of their careers. Khrushchev was now, like Stalin, Premier and First Secretary; but still he did not feel secure. Despite having rewarded Marshal Zhukov with the Defense Ministry for his crucial support, Khrushchev feared his power and popularity, exactly as Stalin had. Marshal Zhukov, Soviet war hero and the last major rival for power from the Stalin era, was unceremoniously fired for "Bonapartism."³⁶

As Khrushchev took power, Eisenhower was little more than a bystander, even from the vantage point of the White House. *Newsweek* summed up the paralysis created by the information void in the Eisenhower administration rather well, "The men in the White House were just as bewildered as the man in the street.... Over and over again, proposals ran head-on into the same brick wall- lack of

36 Ibid, 652-53.

knowledge about the political situation inside Russia."³⁷ The lack of information, state department plans, or significant diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union made it very difficult for the President to influence the outcome of the Soviet succession in any meaningful way. It is not surprising that President Eisenhower called for better planning within the State Department after learning of this rather incredible shortcoming; after all, reporters for the *New York Times* and *Newsweek* had enough information to at least print the names of the two men who would prove to be the most crucial to determining the outcome of the succession question, Khrushchev and Zhukov.

The visceral American reaction, as demonstrated by the major printed media, to the death of Joseph Stalin was predictable. Not only had Stalin been a barbaric monster, he was also the leading purveyor of an ideology essentially opposed to the American way of life; for that reason he rightfully earned the distrust, fear, and hatred of the American people. But Stalin was also reclusive and shadowy micromanager of the flow of information within his empire, despite the larger than life cultish image he had created of himself. For a man who had murdered millions, Stalin was quite enigmatic; not only to his own people, but to Americans as well. This mysterious nature, a trait his followers cultivated, perhaps served well at home within the vicious political system that Stalin had created, but

³⁷ "Cold War, Ike, and Malenkov: 'Watch and Wait' Is the Key," *Newsweek*, March 16, 1953, 34.

resulted in a dangerously tension in Western perceptions and actions in the face of Soviet political uncertainty. Many Americans, including Eisenhower himself, were every bit as wary of the devil they did not know as they devil that they had known. This unknowable nature of the immediate post-Stalin government not only prevented positive diplomatic steps towards peace, but created the potential for disaster through miscalculation. It is a credit to the leadership of the relatively novice President Eisenhower that, in the absence of reliable information and planning, he took the cautious path, choosing neither serious diplomacy nor active exploitation until the fog surrounding the Kremlin dissipated on its own accord.

136 Articles

THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND DESEGREGATION

Religion in the African American Community of the Shoals: A Speech Delivered at the University of North Alabama's Desegregation Conference Sept. 13, 2013

Kristen Tippet Briggs

Webster's dictionary provides this definition of religion: "the service and worship of God or the supernatural; commitment or devotion to religious faith or observance; a personal set or institutionalized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices; a cause, principle, or system of beliefs held to with ardor and faith." Religion can mean a variety of things to different people. But, what did it mean to the African American community during the late 1950s and 1960s? For many of them, religion meant relying on God, having faith, and using the church as a meeting place. It was also a place where they could be encouraged and uplifted. The roots of what many in the community believed stretch all the way back to the beginnings of slavery in the Deep South. It was from these very roots that African Americans from all over Alabama drew strength so that they could fight against segregation in order to win back their dignity and honor. During the fall semester of last year, my classmates and I had the honor and privilege to conduct oral history interviews

1 Webster's Dictionary, s.v. "Religion."

with Reverend Otis Smith, Huston Cobb, Reverend B.J. Bonner and others who provided us with detailed accounts of their lives, their educational background, what it was like to live through segregation, and how religion played a major factor in their lives. Those who challenged inequality and segregation often looked above for answers and help, seeking the faith they desperately needed to help them through their many struggles.

To understand the influence of religion on the Civil Rights movement and in the lives of the African American community in northwest Alabama, we need to understand how religion aided the slave communities in the South during much of the 1800s. We all know that during the 1800s, slavery was widespread throughout this region and cotton was king. In order to reap the profits, having enough slaves to work the fields and make the planter classes' lives as comfortable as possible was a must. In order to deal with the abuse and degradation, slaves needed a place to turn and needed someone to lean on who understood how they were feeling and to whom they could go during their distress. Religion was a way for some early slaves to cope with their position within the "peculiar institution." By looking to God and placing their faith in him, they had hope that while they may never find peace on earth they were sure to find it in heaven as a reward for their toils on earth.

While white slave owners and ministers were explaining to their families and congregations how the

scriptures upheld their livelihood, blacks were using it for an entirely different purpose. White southerners pulled scriptures from the Bible out of context in order to justify slavery. Many held firmly to the belief that while the Bible said that every soul was equal according to God, that belief was only applicable to the spiritual realm and not the social realm. Most white southerners believed churches should be in the business of saving sinners, not involving themselves with the world outside of it—meaning the institution of slavery. White southerners also took charge of teaching their slaves as well as restricting what was taught to them by outside black ministers. Many made their slaves attend church with white ministers while black ministers often had to operate underground as they were often viewed as threatening. White masters imposed these restrictions in order to ensure that their slaves were only being taught things that solidified the institution of slavery. Any teaching that contradicted this idea threatened the entire institution of slavery. In his article, “Black American Religion-From Slavery to Segregation,” Dr. Kenneth Johnson provides some insight into the religious doctrine taught to slaves by their white owners: “The religious doctrines taught the slaves and the church practices were controlled by whites; the doctrine and church practices were never anti-slavery in tone and never suggested that the slaves should be free.” To make things a bit more peculiar within this strange institution, white churches in northwest

2 Kenneth Johnson, “Black American Religion-From Slavery to Segregation,” in *The Journal of Muscle Shoals History* 6 (1978), 49.

Alabama did welcome slaves into their churches, but as Dr. Johnson makes clear, blacks had to sit in special sections away from whites. Some churches, such as the Presbyterian Church in Tuscumbia, admitted slaves into their membership as early as the 1840s.

Despite all the restrictions and the twisted way the scriptures were presented to them, slaves held firmly to their belief that their God would indeed save them and help them out of their seemingly endless torture. God was their deliverer, and just as he delivered Moses and his people out of Egypt and in turn guided them to the Promised Land, he would also lift them out of their bondage and set aside the greatest reward possible. Though they may have to toil here in despair and agony for a while longer, the reward, they believed, would be worth it in the end.

It was this belief that brought African American slaves together for worship and was also the reason they held so tightly to scripture. What I have always found intriguing and inspiring was how the cruel institution of slavery managed to bring a group of people closer together instead of ripping them apart. Religion was a common thread shared by all. Despite their terrible circumstances, many in slave communities had a seemingly unwavering faith in God and the scriptures. They carried the hopes founded upon religion into the fields, into the big house, and after emancipation into schools. Several of the oral history interviews conducted by

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

the University of North Alabama's Public History program mention how churches in the area had schools in or near the church building so that black children denied adequate schooling due to segregation could go to school and get a proper education. After the Civil War and emancipation, creating churches and schools became more and more common. Dr. Johnson credits the Civil War and emancipation with laying "the foundation for a new order."⁵ He states that in this new order "blacks continued to accept the Christian doctrine and continued affiliation with the same churches or organized new churches similar to those they had known as slaves. Blacks did reject white control of their religious life."⁶ By creating their own churches after emancipation as well as their own schools and belief system, African Americans pulled themselves together and created their own world—one that no one could compete with. The churches they formed after the war would come to serve as the very foundation for the movement that would occur almost one hundred years later—a movement that changed the lives of African Americans forever.

Their faith and devotion to God was one of the most important lessons that former slaves passed down to their children and grandchildren. Religion and the concept of church was a lasting legacy. This legacy trickled down to the generation living during the 1950s and 1960s when the Civil Rights Movement and the push for desegregation began.

5 Ibid., 51.

6 Ibid., 54.

As in the years before, a common strife brought the African American community together where yet again religion was found to be right in the middle of it all. Wayne Flynt gives a splendid explanation about why African Americans clung to religion so tightly in his book *Alabama in the Twentieth Century*. Religion, he says, “preserved the dignity of countless Alabama blacks and allowed them to make sense of their cosmic predicament during the reign of Jim Crow. And such religion would ultimately become a powerful weapon for physical as well as for spiritual liberation.”⁷ Religion was something trustworthy, unchanging, and reliable thus making it a crucial element that was at the very core of their fight for freedom and human rights.

I believe Dr. Flynt does the best job describing the importance of the church to the African American community during their struggle with segregation: “Religion represented another critical aspect of black identity. Despite class differences between individual congregations, the black church was a central community institution, providing affirmation of blackness, alternative forms of worship, leadership opportunities for women, political and economic leadership for the black community, and essentially defining life for most African Americans.”⁸ This statement was proven time and time again in most of our oral history interviews. Those of us who interviewed African Americans

for the project found that most of them mentioned church

⁷ Wayne Flynt, *Alabama in the Twentieth Century* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2004), 332.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 331.

or religion in some shape, form, or fashion. Religion and the church in particular, did define their lives. Religion was a part of their childhood and was a concept their parents had instilled in them. One of my classmates had the opportunity to interview a gentleman by the name of Huston Cobb. During the interview, Mr. Cobb was asked to tell when he first learned about Pearl Harbor: “Well it was a Sunday. We had a radio but we didn’t have it on Sunday because we had to go to church. That’s a must, you had to go to church.”⁹ His answer gives us insight into how religion was a central part of his childhood and what Sunday mornings were generally like in his childhood home. I had the honor of interviewing Reverend Otis Smith who preaches at the First Baptist Church in Tuscumbia, Alabama. Throughout the interview, Reverend Smith described his childhood, his years in military service, how he was called into the ministry, and the road to becoming a preacher.¹⁰ When he described his childhood education, he explained to me that his parents always knew his teachers.¹¹ They socialized with them and went to church with them.¹² Everyone knew everyone and church was the common meeting ground. Coming together and worshipping God in church was one way to, as Reverend Smith stated early on in the interview, bond with one another and face the challenges that lay ahead.¹³

For some, going to church was the only way to stay

9 Huston Cobb, interview by Jonathon Watts, Leighton, AL., November 16, 2012.

10 Reverend Otis Smith, interview by author, Tuscumbia, AL., November 1, 2012.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

abreast with the latest news concerning the Civil Rights Movement. Some rural congregations had no access to newspapers or black radio stations. As Dr. Flynt points out “churches became strategic communication networks and the key to organizing a mass movement.”¹⁴ It was in the churches that black preachers could reach the African American community and fill them in on what was happening in the world around them. It was here in one location that the word could be spread concerning marches or sit-ins that would be taking place within the days to come while also encouraging their members to not give up even if the present times seemed unbearable. Ministers more than likely taught their parishioners to meet discrimination with love, to always be peaceable, and imitate Jesus in all that they did. It is also likely that ministers and preachers asked their members to be patient just as Moses and his people were. There is no doubt that leaders of the movement saw how united they were on this particular front and in turn utilized that strength to their advantage. Churches were indeed the best places to coordinate. Ministers like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Fred Shuttlesworth, and those whose names we do not know were imperative to the movement and kept it going. These were the very men who helped mobilize the people and encouraged them, assuring them that no matter what kind of horrible treatment they may be face in their day to day walks of life, they had a place to turn and that God was indeed on their side.

If I asked you to describe in one word what helped black churches and their members most during their struggle to win their rights and freedoms during the 1960s, what do you think you would say? Think about it for a moment. Some of you might say that they had hope, drive, passion, or courage. I propose that not only did they have those things but that they also had zeal. Their zeal for their faith, for Christ, for eventual liberation helped them to overcome so many of the obstacles and roadblocks that were set before them. What else beside a zeal for their cause could help them endure police brutality, dog attacks, fire hoses, and verbal abuse? The very roots of that zeal were religion-based. Churches were attacked and bombed by the Ku Klux Klan and other radical members of the white race because they knew that at the heart of so many African Americans during the Civil Rights Movement was the concept of religion. How else can one explain the deliberate attack on churches and the horrific tragedies like that experienced on September 15, 1963 at the 16th Street Baptist Church? Imagine being the parent of one of those four young girls killed inside a church because of racial hatred. The only way to explain how a community made it through tragedies such as this is that they had faith and conviction; things taught to them since their childhood that helped ease the pain and allowed them to move forward no matter what difficulties they faced.

Today, many people of that particular generation recall what it was like to live in a time marked with tension and

hatred. The oral history interviews my classmates and I did only scratch the surface. It was wonderful to see how some of the people who lived through that time remained faithful and are continuing to pass on their faith to their children and grandchildren. Some, like Reverend Smith and Reverend B.J. Bonner, heeded the call to become ministers and are sharing their zeal for God with others. In an interview with Mr. Arthur Graves, one of my classmates was privileged to hear him tell how when he first enlisted in the service his mother gave him a small copy of the Bible or Testament.¹⁵ He states that “in that Testament she marked the 91st number of Songs”.¹⁶ Part of that Psalm reads as follows: “He who dwells in the shelter of the Most High will abide in the shadow of the Almighty. I will say to the Lord, ‘My refuge and my fortress, my God, in whom I trust!’ For it is He who delivers you from the snare of the trapper and from the deadly pestilence. He will cover you with his pinions, and under his wings you may seek refuge; his faithfulness is a shield and bulwark.”¹⁷ In Mr. Graves’ case, religion came in the form of this Testament from his mother as a way of saying keep the faith, stay strong in God, come what may. She had no doubt already learned that lesson.

Religion lived at the very heart of the African American community during slavery, during the Civil Rights Movement, and it still lives on today. Religion, for them, was a daily walk with God. During the Civil Rights Movement

¹⁵ Arthur Graves, interview by Tess Evans, November 7, 2012.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ps. 91 (New American Standard Version).

it meant carrying God wherever they went and taking it one day at a time. Religion meant giving it all over to God who was their Savior and deliverer. The zeal many of their ancestors had in the 1800s lives on today though such figures as Reverend Smith, Arthur Graves, and Reverend Bonner. In so many black congregations there is still a strong, powerful zeal for God and for their belief system. They will not soon forget how religion played such a critical role in helping them overcome. God did indeed deliver the grandmothers and grandfathers and the mothers and fathers of today's generation. I leave you with this quote from one of our interviews with Reverend Bonner who I believe does a better job than I ever could describing God's role in the African American community both past and present. When asked what the word Missionary Baptist meant, he responded: "Well the word missionary pretty much defines us, because we are a body who believes in going, not just going for the sake of mission but also carrying the message of Jesus Christ. You see that's our core belief."¹⁸

18 Reverend B.J. Bonner, interview by Kevin Bailey, Russellville, AL, November 5, 2012.

Work in the Lives of the African American Community of the Shoals

Wesley Garmon

The Oral History Project that was completed by University of North Alabama students as part of the Public History program yielded many interesting stories about the daily work lives of North Alabamians. Of particular interest were the stories of African Americans in the area who overcame the obstacles of racism and segregation to create successful and fulfilling careers. These individuals worked diligently to create more opportunities for themselves and their families by becoming skilled tradesmen, educators, and military personnel. This progress is exemplified in the personal recollections of Louise Hyler, Otis Smith, Arthur Graves, and Huston Cobb Jr. Their memories will be used to paint a picture of what it was like to live and work in North Alabama during the era of desegregation.

For years after Reconstruction, many African American families in the South provided for their families by working the land. However, the experiences of families in North Alabama were not limited to the conventional sharecropping experience. In fact, several families owned many acres of land. Huston Cobb Jr., born in 1925, stated that his maternal grandfather owned fifty-two acres of land near Leighton, Alabama. His paternal grandfather owned forty-two acres

and rented forty-six additional acres nearby. When asked if the farming on his family land followed the sharecropping method, Mr. Cobb responded by saying, "We didn't do that. It was for folks that didn't have their own. If you didn't own your own land you did that. I didn't even know how sharecropping worked until after I came out of the service."¹ Louise Hyler's father was also able to avoid sharecropping. After having served and been disabled in World War I, he returned to farming in the Barton area of Colbert County. Due to his injuries, he would rent land that his family owned and hire out workers to tend the crops. In contrast to African Americans in southern Alabama, who were predominantly restricted to sharecropping, these families illustrate that many African Americans in North Alabama were able to earn a livelihood by working and owning their own land. Since these families owned their own land, they were able to avoid the vicious cycle of debt that afflicted sharecropping families. Though these families were not rich, they were better able to provide for their families' material and educational needs.

Not only were they able to provide for their own families, but people like Louise Hyler's family also provided employment opportunities for others. During the cotton harvest, Hyler kept the records while workers came from Tuscumbia to work on the farms harvesting crops. All the farm work was done by horse and hand. It was difficult, but Hyler indicated that she enjoyed it by stating,

1 Huston Cobb Jr., interview by Jonathan Watts, November 16, 2012.

Twelve hundred pounds was the amount he would take the cotton to the gin [in Tuscumbia] for a bale of cotton. Now during the corn time I did help a little bit with that, but with sugar cane, they had boards they make for the purpose and you go up and down the rows, strip all the leaves off first, and then the people come behind you and cut it down, then they'd pile it up in piles, and they would take it to the mill where they made the syrup. And that was a lot of fun.²

These families grew many types of crops such as cotton, corn, and sweet potatoes alongside other garden crops. Also, many raised animals such as cows, goats, and hogs. While many African Americans remained in agricultural jobs for their entire lives, opportunities soon arose for their children and families to work in places beyond the farm.

Many African Americans were able to obtain jobs in several different professions besides farming, despite facing oppressive discrimination in the workplace. Arthur Graves's father was a fireman on the Southern Railroad. Since there was no possibility of becoming a conductor or engineer, this was considered to be a good job for an African American. Despite this blatant inequality in job opportunities, Arthur Graves remembered his father's experience fondly by recalling that,

We would be riding in the car and he'd be sitting on the back seat and he'd tell you how fast you were going within two or three miles. And we used to laugh about it; I said daddy, how you do that. And he just smiled, but he finally explained to us how it was done. You see, on the old railroads, the lines of communication were _____ landlines, telephone poles. But you drive down the

2 Louise Hyler, interview by Hannah Goode-Garmon, November 5, 2012.

road; all those poles were the same distance apart. And he would count in his mind, "One, two, three, four." As you passed this pole, he'd start counting and see where he was when you passed the second pole. And he would convert time and distance to miles per hour by how fast you were going from one pole to the next. But being a fireman on the railroad, they had to figure their time and distance on how fast they were going from one pole to the next.³

Men with such obvious intelligence and skill were routinely overlooked in their professions simply because of the color of their skin.

Perhaps no other organization in North Alabama created more employment opportunities for African Americans away from the farm as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Despite discriminatory policies elsewhere, ninety percent of all African Americans who were hired by TVA worked at Wilson Dam, Joe Wheeler Dam, or Pickwick Landing Dam. The black population in the Muscle Shoals–Wheeler Dam area was approximately twenty-five percent at the time of TVA's takeover of the project. Black employment ranged from between 16.2 to 20.1 percent with an average of 18.2 percent at these sites.⁴ Many activists argued that the percentages should have been higher and that black employees were still discriminated against. However, this still amounted to a large number of employed African Americans who would have otherwise have been limited to agricultural or other menial labor jobs.

³ Arthur Graves, interview by Tess Evans, November 7, 2012.

⁴ Nancy L. Grant, *TVA and Black Americans: Planning for the Status Quo* (Temple University Press: Philadelphia, 1990), 49.

While TVA did hire and employ many African Americans, it must be said that they also sought to conform to the social patterns of a racially segregated society. These practices are illustrated in the fact that African Americans were entirely prevented from working on many TVA projects, such as the Norris Dam in eastern Tennessee, because many white residents did not want to live and work alongside African Americans. The actions of the middle level officials and line supervisors, who were responsible for hiring, ensured that TVA employment practices remained consistently discriminatory.⁵

Huston Cobb Sr. went to work in 1934 for the Tennessee Valley Authority building Wheeler Dam. He worked at TVA for over thirty years. Initially, Cobb Sr. ran jack hammers, then as a bricklayer, before finally moving to the general work force. After seeing how hard his father worked, Huston Cobb Jr. had little desire to work for TVA. However, after exiting the military at the conclusion of World War II and marrying in 1947, he eventually applied. He explained that veterans were given preference in hiring and that this helped him to gain employment. He began by working on the railroads for eight to ten months. Later he moved to the furnish building where they made phosphorus. He would stay in this position for twenty-five years, eventually becoming a foreman. Unfortunately, the phosphorus operation was shut down and Cobb was moved to the ammonia branch and received a pay cut. Cobb explained the

⁵ Ibid.

difficulties that this caused, stating, “They shut down the phosphorus area and transferred all of us to the ammonia branch. And then I got cut back \$8,000. You got to learn how to live all over again. In the foreman business I’m making \$10,000 more than my peers, more than my operators. So I lived one year like a white man. Only time I had enough money to go on vacations and do whatever I wanted to do. But they shut that down and moved me down there where I had never been and with other folks and people above me.”⁶ Cobb would not allow himself to be deterred by this setback.

Huston Cobb Jr. was determined to learn all that he could about a new forty-six million dollar coal gasification plant that was being built in Houston, Texas. He and other workers were given the opportunity to go work in the new plant but Cobb stated that he was not going to go as an operator. He was determined to be a foreman again. Cobb attended classes given by TVA and Brown & Rooks engineers in order to learn how to operate the plant and its components. Due to his hard work and determination, he earned his way back to the foreman position. He was one of four foremen who worked at the site and the only African American of the four. He later became a supervisor with four foremen and fifty workers under his authority. He stayed in this position until retirement.

Although he was able to move up the ladder at TVA, Cobb remembered that it was not always an equal workplace. While speaking about segregation at TVA, Cobb stated that,

⁶ Cobb, interview.

“They just made two bathrooms, two water fountains, and if they had just one water fountain they had two spigots. This one over here was for us with a sign on it. One day I made a mistake and drank from the white one. The guard looks at me and I just said I was sorry. But we had a place that we ate in ... you went in there and ordered and then went to a hole about like a fireplace and she had your stuff. Then we integrated, we went around there and I have never been so surprised in all of my life. There was a steam table, for the white workers, which we had never seen. I didn’t know anything about a steam table or anything like that working out TVA all those years until they integrated.”⁷ Huston Cobb Jr. and many other African Americans would have to endure these segregated conditions until 1962 when TVA fully integrated.

The military also offered an opportunity for many African American men to expand their career options. The Reverend Otis Smith, Arthur Graves, Huston Cobb Jr., and many other African American men were called on to serve their country at a time when they were treated as second class citizens. However, according to the recollections of many of the subjects in this project, the military offered greater equality than the civilian job market. Smith—who served in the Army—stated that, “Basically, when I was in, you did your job, you got your rank. The ones who were the hardest on me were my own black superiors. I was planning on making a career of the military at that time and I had platoons under me. But from the segregated standpoint, you

⁷ Ibid.

just didn't feel that."⁸ Both Cobb Jr. and Graves, who served in the Navy and the Air Force respectively, shared a similar account of their time in the military. Graves, who reached the rank of Second Lieutenant, admitted that it was difficult at times because, "You had two things against you, performance and color, so it wasn't easy, but you know some people made it on time. I did not experience that as such, because I was promoted right on time every time."⁹ Most importantly, the military gave these young men the opportunity to earn skills and experience that they could not receive in other areas. Even though they were often drafted into these positions, they were able to rise farther in the military than they could have in the civilian world. Graves explained this phenomenon by saying, "Well in the circumstances, the military was the best thing for me at that particular time because there were no black policemen, there were no black lawyers; employment, other than in the post office, was very limited for blacks, so the military at that particular time was the best thing for me, and that's why I chose to stay with it."¹⁰

Military service enabled these young men—and many more African Americans in the region—to discover the large cities of the North, other parts of the country, and the world. Many encountered unimagined experiences for the first time that broadened their horizons. Some of these soldiers made the decision to never return to the farm. Instead many attended college or moved up North. Several former

⁸ Reverend Otis Smith, interview by Kristen Tippet Briggs, November 1, 2012.

⁹ Graves, interview.

¹⁰ Ibid.

soldiers in other oral history projects have stated that what changed the most for them during their military service was that they learned that a black man could aspire to more than plowing a field or harvesting crops. Unfortunately, these men often returned to communities that were still in the grips of Jim Crow. However, after having experienced so much they would never be able to accept the status quo. It would be this generation, often led by former servicemen that would stand up and fight for their Civil Rights.

The participants in this oral history project exemplify the hard work and perseverance of so many African Americans who sought to be treated equally and judged not by the color of their skin but by the quality of their hard work. North Alabama may not have witnessed the outbursts of violence that marred the Civil Rights Movement in other areas, but these stories are stark reminders that the area was not free of racism. The systematic segregation and discrimination of the Shoals area may have been quieter, but it was no less degrading, no less unequal, and no less wrong. These names may not be some of the most famous names of the Civil Rights Movement, but their stories are just as important as any others and deserve to be told and appreciated.

Education in the Lives of the African American Community of the Shoals

Hannah Goode-Garmon

Education is a fundamental right. It is as important as food, shelter, and safety. However, in the past it was not offered to all children equally. The educational system in the Shoals before and during the era of desegregation failed to offer children of color the same opportunities that whites enjoyed. Instead, the black community had to rely on churches, unequal training schools, and black only institutions for learning. The stories of Huston Cobb Jr., Arthur Graves, and Louise Hyler illustrate the obstacles that had to be overcome in order to gain an education during this time. Their stories offer hope and an example of how a determination to learn can overcome the most trying of circumstances.

A black student in the state of Alabama had very limited options as to where they could attend school. They might be part of the segregated school system of Alabama and attend schools like Cherokee High School or G.W. Trenholm High School in Tuscumbia, Alabama. According to Vivian and Curtis Morris, "African American communities provided a good education for their children long before the 1954 Brown decision and school desegregation. African American citizens in Tuscumbia established the Osborne Academy in 1877. It was renamed Trenholm High School in

1921 and closed in 1969. Trenholm High was one of the valued segregated schools that provided a good education for African American children both before and after Brown.”¹ These children might also be part of a community that had a school that was connected to a church like in Russellville, Alabama. Or the most likely answer was that they would attend at some point in their educational career a Rosenwald School. In 1912, Booker T. Washington approached philanthropist Julius Rosenwald about his concept to build rural schools desperately needed for African American children across the segregated south. That partnership sparked an initiative that eventually created more than 5,300 schools, vocational shops and teacher’s homes across fifteen states in the South and Southwest from 1912-1932. This type of education was prevalent all over the South, especially in rural areas like Colbert and parts of Lauderdale counties.²

The subjects of the oral history project conducted by University of North Alabama (UNA) students paint a clear picture of the education that the African American community of the Shoals faced. Arthur Graves, who was born in Tuscumbia, Alabama, experienced the era of desegregation in North Alabama firsthand. G.W. Trenholm in Tuscumbia and other valued segregated African American schools often lacked two important factors: an adequate physical plant and

1 Vivian Gunn Morris and Curtis Morris, “Before Brown, After Brown: What Has Changed for African-American Children?” in *University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy* 16, no. 2, (August 2005), 224.

2 “Rosenwald Schools Initiative,” National Trust for Historic Preservation, <http://www.preservationnation.org/travel-and-sites/sites/southern-region/rosenwald-schools/#.UovTIMQqj40>.

adequate supplies and equipment. Mr. Graves remembers vividly what it was like to be treated differently because of the color of his skin and attending segregated schools where students were forced to use hand-me-down books, desks, and chairs from white schools. The school that he attended did not have use of a library, any laboratories, or counselors. The only heat that his segregated school had come from a small heater in the middle of the class room. The football equipment that he and his teammates used was from the also white high school and was so worn out that his pants split.³

Houston Cobb Jr. shared a similar experience at his segregated school in Leighton, Alabama. His school was set up as a training school so that they could receive state funding. He stated that being in a “training school” meant that “you get all the hand-me-down buses and things. I’ve never ridden in a bus with seats in it. It just had a bench up and down the sides and one in middle.”⁴ Despite all of these harsh conditions, these men were determined to learn. Mr. Graves later joined the Air Force in 1945 and was trained as a pilot. He served overseas in France and, after the conclusion of his service, returned to the U.S. Upon his retirement from the Air Force, Graves accepted an academic position at the University of North Alabama. After retiring from UNA, Mr. Graves purchased the oldest African American-owned-and-operated funeral home in Northwest Alabama. Mr. Graves saved this business from bankruptcy and is currently the

3 Arthur Graves, interview by Tess Evans, November 7, 2012.

4 Houston Cobb Jr., interview by Jonathan Watts, November 16, 2012.

funeral home's director. Huston Cobb Jr. served in the Navy and later was a foreman for TVA. He also went on to serve on the Board of Trustees at UNA for over a decade.⁵ The stories communicated by these men illustrate that no matter how difficult an individual's educational background may be, a person's desire to learn and achieve can overcome any obstacles.

These men not only faced segregation at school, they also faced it in their everyday lives. Arthur Graves stated that he had to "sit in the balcony at the theater, there weren't any cafes that you could go to, most of the cafes had a window in the front of it and you'd go there and knock on the window and they'd come and serve you through the window, but my parents wouldn't allow us to do that."⁶ Mr. Cobb remembers having "two bathrooms and two water fountains and if they had just one water fountain they had two spigots."⁷ The inequality witnessed in the education system permeated all aspects of life.

Due to the fact that many black schools faced substandard conditions, much of the education came from the home or church. Mr. Graves' parents made sure that his education continued outside of the classroom. According to Mr. Graves, his father was not illiterate, but he could not read or write. His home received two daily newspapers, the *Commercial Appeal* that was delivered in the morning and *the Times Daily*—which at that time it was called the *TriCities*

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Graves, interview.

⁷ Cobb, interview.

Daily—in the evening. His family also had subscriptions to at least four magazines: *Time*, *Life*, the *Saturday Evening Post*, and *McCall's*. The high school did not give Mr. Graves access encyclopedias and dictionaries, but he was able to reap the reward of having these materials at home. Yet, he was exposed to reference books, newspapers, and magazines all because his father wanted his children to have more of an education than he had. Graves was later hired by UNA as the director of student teaching for the College of Education. In this position, he coordinated all student-teaching assignments for the university. He later became Assistant to the President and finished his time at UNA coaching golf as well as teaching politics, administration, and health.⁸ His educational experience shines a light on the non-traditional routes in the black school system.

Traditional schools were not the only way that some black students learned. The Missionary Baptist Church in Russellville, Alabama had a school that was connected to the church. Church based education played a very important role in the black community because it was often the best education available to them. The North Alabama Baptist Academy was founded in 1896 to primarily educate incoming preachers, but the teaching was confined mainly to academic subjects. The North Alabama Baptist Association solely carried the cost of this endeavor. Many young black men and women graduated from this high school department.

Education varied from every community and one particularly

⁸ Graves, interview.

interesting story is that of Louise Hyler.

Mrs. Hyler was born in Colbert County in the town of Barton in 1925. Hyler attended a Rosenwald school from grades one through eight. There was no high school in the Barton community at that time which meant that children had to go to school in Tuscumbia, Alabama. Many of them boarded with a white family and worked in the home to earn their keep. Due to these obstacles many black students struggled to attend school after the eighth grade. This burden was eased after Cherokee High School was founded. The now Cherokee Middle School was originally Cherokee High School and designated the segregated school for black children. It was an original Rosenwald School. At that time the segregated school for white children was named Cherokee Vocational High School.

Hyler would graduate from the new high school in April of 1944. After high school, Hyler attended Alabama State. She could not attend any other state university because they were still segregated. The University of Alabama and Auburn University would not become integrated until nearly twenty years later. Unfortunately during her time at Alabama State University, Louise's father became very ill. Due to this, she was unable to return for what would have been her third year. One of her teachers suggested that she attend the annual Colbert County Board of Education meeting at the beginning of the school year in order to find out whether there might be a job available. The superintendent stood and asked if there

was anybody in attendance who needed a job. According to Louise “they didn’t worry about how you were qualified, I put my hand up and I got hired in Colbert County that’s where I got my first job and I taught there for five years.”⁹ She continued summer school at Alabama State where she earned a degree in Early Childhood Education.

The first certificate that Hyler received was a “D” certificate, and by her third year she received her “C” certificate. Each time she received a different certificate she was able to earn a little bit more money. In 1953, she got married and went back to school for an entire year and finally graduated with her college degree. At this time, the NAACP had already begun the fight in the Supreme Court to desegregate elementary and secondary schools, under the familiar name of *Brown v. the Board of Education*. With the prospect of integrated schools looming large, Louise, still desiring to teach, felt that in order to be competitive, she needed to further her education and obtain an MA degree. Her opportunities to obtain her degree in the south were very limited and so she wrote to New York University (NYU) and also to Columbia University. Columbia would have required her to make take six to eight more credit hours before they would accept her. NYU did not require her make up classes, and so she decided to attend NYU for a year and earned a master’s degree in Later Childhood Education.

When she came back home, a small number of superintendents did not like the fact that she went to New

⁹ Louise Hyler, interview by author, November 5, 2012.

York to attend to school, despite the fact that she only did it because she could not attend the University of Alabama due to legal segregation. Despite the stigma of attending a northern university, she was generally more qualified than many of her white colleagues. She stated that most of the teachers “didn’t need to have much [education]; some of them had never even had a course in how to teach reading.”¹⁰ At this time, Hyler finally got a job teaching in Tuscumbia. After the desegregation of Alabama’s public school system, Hyler was asked to teach at R.E. Thompson, which had been a white’s only school. She had never been around white people like some the girls that worked in white homes, because her father had not allowed her to do that. She stated that she “had never thought of people being that different,” so in 1966 she began teaching at an integrated school.¹¹

Unlike some black teachers that went into the white schools, she never wanted to quit, she stated that “I wouldn’t have quit anyways. Because I wouldn’t have let something like that stop me from the career I wanted to do.”¹² She did not have a difficult time at R.E. Thompson, even though some of the parents were initially afraid. She understood that if parents were afraid of people of color, then that was all the children understood. She stated that “you know we learn what we live and that’s all they had lived all those years.”¹³ She was not upset because they felt that way. She recalls that

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

“it was my responsibility to change the picture. And some of them were really sad and didn’t want their child to come to my room.”¹⁴ Some parents were very unhappy, but most of them did not show it. Hyler believed that it was because most parents thought that if they did not act right that she might take it out on their child; the parents did not realize that she would have never done that. It was a learning process for both Hyler and the parents of the children she taught. This process is displayed in one of Hyler’s recollections,

One lady, her child came—they put the list on the door when it got time, she saw her child’s name on my door she went to the office, the principle came and told me about it later, but he wouldn’t move any kid because if you start doing that you’ve got a whole big mess. And so the next year, this was a little girl, the next year she had a little boy and she went to the office and asked Mr. Chapel if he would put him in my room, he did put him in there and she was one of my best parents. And then I had this other lady she acted real nice, but she was scared to death. By the end of the year—we had an individualized program at the time and she—on her the state test that they give them in the fifth grade class; her child scored the highest grade possible. The mother came to thank me and she just cried and cried. I think because she was so afraid that her child was going to go backwards, so you see, that’s what I had to break down.¹⁵

Mrs. Hyler faced enormous challenges and had to break down the barriers between the two races. This was not easily done, but by treating people with respect and dignity she was able to show people that she was not any “different” from

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

them.

Arthur Graves, Huston Cobb Jr., and Louise Hyler are just a few examples of what men and women faced in breaking down the racial barriers before and during desegregation. They may not have had new books, equipment, or transportation, but they made the best of what they had. We can all learn a valuable lesson about our own education from these individuals. We see that no matter what is thrown our way, no matter what odds may be against us, an education is one of the most important things in life. We must all strive to overcome the obstacles that are set before us and to never let anything deter us for our paths. The stories of Graves, Cobb, and Hyler should never be and will never be forgotten because they will live on through the process of this oral history project.

BOOK REVIEWS

Baxell, Richard. *Unlikely Warriors: The British in the Spanish Civil War and the Struggle against Fascism*. London: Aurum Press, 2012.

Richard Baxell's monograph, *Unlikely Warriors: The British in the Spanish Civil War and the Struggle against Fascism*, utilizes an abundance of oral history and personal testimony to tell the story of British involvement in the Spanish Civil War, from its foundation in the poverty and depression experience by the working classes during the 1930s through the end of the Second World War. The aim of Baxell's study is "to place the Spanish Civil War within the context of the volunteers' lives, rather than the other way round" (9). However, because the book is dominated by the War, Baxell falls short of his goal; and the War, rather than the volunteers' lives, remains the focus. Nevertheless, this study contributes greatly to the limited research on the British fighters in the Spanish Civil War and also includes information on medical volunteers, reporters, and the involvement of British political parties.

Baxell's work follows typical British volunteers from their hunger marches in Britain through their journey to France and nighttime passage through the Pyrenees into Catalonia. Baxell attempts to place the volunteers' wartime experience in context by beginning his examination with their lives in Britain during the 1930s, including the overwhelming unemployment that allowed the working classes time to read Communist political pamphlets and solidify their own positions. Unemployment also allowed many workers the time to participate in political protests in Britain, and while defending Jews in the East End of London from the Fascists, these workers began using slogans taken from Republican Spain, highlight the first direct influence of Spanish events on their lives. Baxell initially generalizes this progression to almost every volunteer, although he later specifies that other parties, such as the Independent Labour Party, also sent volunteers and including a chapter dedicated to the small minority of soldiers who volunteered on the Nationalist side.

Baxell excels in the compilation of primary sources that offer insight into the soldiers' lives once they arrive in Spain. He uses interviews and memoirs to illustrate key battles, such as the Battle of Jarama, the Battle of Brunete, the Aragon offensive, and the Battle of the Ebro; and he includes details typically excluded from military studies, such as the writing of letters of condolence to families of soldiers who died in battle. Furthermore, Baxell does not shy away from negative stories about the British Battalion. He mentions British soldiers who desert the army and British soldiers who volunteered as spies for the Communist party against the POUM during the May Days in Barcelona. His treatment of George Orwell is decidedly fair, stating that Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* is significant but that it also jaded opinions of Britons who only read Orwell's account. Rather than the traditional hero-worship, Baxell includes unfavorable opinions of Orwell by his comrades.

Beyond Republican volunteers, his chapter on Nationalist volunteers shows similarities between the experiences of both sides, including lack of training, inexperience with weapons, and dislike of the Spanish diet, pointing out only that the Nationalist forces were more brutal than the Republicans when it came to intensity of training and discipline.

Beyond soldiers, Baxell also includes chapters on medical volunteers and reporters. The majority of medical volunteers served Republican Spain, and only one nurse and zero doctors helped the Nationalist forces, although Baxell includes the Scottish Ambulance Unit on the side of the Republicans even while denouncing them for helping Nationalist sympathizers escape Republican zones and British deserters escape Spain. The main focus on the chapter, however, is the Spanish Medical Aid Committee: a loose organization of approximately 150 doctors and nurses and 82 ambulances. Doctors who volunteered in the SMAC were often novices who came to Spain to gain experience quickly while nurses typically arrived with humanitarian aims rather than political agendas. Baxell follows the British Medical Unit, a subset of the SMAC, as they assisted the British Battalion, travelling from Barcelona to Madrid, tending the wounded at Jarama, Brunete, Aragon, and finally, the Ebro offensive. As with his coverage of soldiers and medical volunteers, Baxell includes information on reporters writing on both sides of the conflict. Reporters on the Nationalist side who failed to write about the justice behind the Nationalist cause were quickly removed, aiding the interpretation that newspaper reports were more propaganda than objective information. This opinion carried over to the other side as well with the Nationalists decrying the Republican news coverage of the Guernica bombing as propaganda while they simultaneously maintained that the Germans did not bomb Guernica.

Baxell concludes his monograph with the return of the volunteers to Britain, highlighting their heroes' welcome juxtaposed with their inability to find work and the resentment of many families who felt abandoned by these soldiers. Many soldiers who went to Spain as Communists returned disillusioned, and others quickly joined them when Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Hitler. Despite the widespread desire to continue their fight against fascism in the Second World War, the British policy restricting admission of International Brigadiers into the armed forces due to the fear that they had been subjected to Communist indoctrination during the Spanish Civil War prevented this desire from reaching fruition for many veterans. Baxell's view of the Second World War as an extension of the Spanish Civil War, as well as the worldwide conflict that the Republican soldiers fought in Spain to prevent, further highlights his failure to set the War in the context of the lives of the volunteers rather than merely focusing on the volunteers' lives while fighting in the Spanish Civil War.

Overall, Baxell's use of extensive oral history woven into an

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eloquent narrative creates a compelling story about the British Battalion of the International Brigades, but, as a historical account, aging soldiers' faded memories can lead to problems of vagueness or exaggeration and even fabrication when relied on as historical fact. Even the chapter on prisoners-of-war held by Nationalist forces is biased as it only incorporates accounts from soldiers who survived. Perhaps the value of Baxell's book lies more in the emerging field of history and memory than as a reliable account of the events surrounded the Spanish Civil War. Taken in this manner, *Unlikely Warriors* becomes a symbol of how soldiers and volunteers perceived the Spanish Civil War during the 1930s as well as a lasting testimony to how it has been remembered ever since.

Kerrie Holloway

Symonds, Craig L. *The Civil War at Sea*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Craig L. Symonds is a retired professor of American history and currently resides as the Chairman of the history department of the United States Naval Academy. He was educated at the University of California at Los Angeles and the University of Florida. He is the author of eight books on the Civil War and is highly qualified to write on the subject matter. The author's background enhances his credibility as a scholar.¹ Symonds's *The Civil War at Sea* examines the development of warships in the Civil War. Northern and Southern navies alike designed ironclads and steam-powered ships for combat. Symonds focuses on the advantages and disadvantages of each side's ability to create warships, illustrates specific battles and charts the Northern blockade.

In the early-to-mid-nineteenth century, a transportation and communication revolution invaded America and boosted railroad production, canal construction, and the U.S. Navy's ship building capabilities. In 1843, the USS *Princeton*, the world's first propeller-driven steam warship was constructed by the U.S. Navy. However, this did not necessarily advance the U.S. Navy's merit. They were still inferior to the power of Great Britain (4-5). Symonds nevertheless believes the U.S. Navy was more prepared for war in 1861 because of the construction of twenty-four propeller-driven steamers armed with advanced naval ordinance (8). Lawrence Lee Hewitt concurs that the abundance of northern resources served as a catalyst to fight a naval war and eventually cut off Confederate supply routes.² The Confederacy sought to fight the war on land and feared that "extensive naval preparations in time to meet the dangers that threaten us are impracticable." Those U.S. Navy members who committed themselves to the Confederacy following secession implied the best defense was constructing small flotillas that would "serve as auxiliaries to forts" (16). The South took advantage of the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, Virginia and the Bellona Gun Foundry on the James River. The Bellona Gun Foundry produced over a thousand heavy guns for the Confederacy. The Naval Gun Foundry at Selma, Alabama became another source for naval guns as well (18). The North's naval efforts are better organized, better funded and more successful because the North receives heavy support from congress (33). Symonds uses the battle of the *Monitor* and *Merrimack* to show the advancement of the U.S. Navy. Despite immense damage, the Union's *Monitor* prevailed, allowing their Navy to remain in control of Hampton Roads, Virginia (32). Symonds provides a persuasive argument regarding how the North

1 Antigoni Ladd, "The Smithsonian Associates," *Civil War Studies*, civilwarstudies.org/articles/Vol_4/ten-at-gettysburg.shtm.

2 Lawrence Lee Hewitt, "Review of *The Civil War at Sea*," *America's Civil War* 25, no. 6 (2013), 69.

was better prepared for such a naval war, not only from this example, but how the Union obeyed Lincoln's plan for a southern blockade, as discussed below.

According to Symonds, the Union's strategy was to seal off the entire southern coast to trade and prevent the entrance and exit of vessels (42). Therefore, the South was not able to import the supplies the Confederacy desperately needed. Due to the Union blockade, the profit of southern cotton exports fell 90 percent (70). Perhaps the most destructive product of the blockade was the collapse of the southern railroad system. Raimondo Luraghi claims that this was "The most deadly cause of the dearth that starved soldiers on the front line" (69). A slow asphyxiation of cotton sales and railroad destruction led to the Union occupation of southern ports and the eventual surrender of Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia (72).

For the latter half of the work, Symonds discusses the importance of the capture of rivers and harbors for both North and South. During the war, rivers were important because they allowed for the movement of troops and supplies. Union gunboats, which were faster and better equipped vessels than the Confederate counterparts, guarded transport ships and controlled much of the Mississippi River (109-110). This was not an easy task, according to Symonds, and the Confederacy, despite limitations, was able to produce two gunboats to attempt the defense of Charleston Harbor at Fort Sumter and Mobile (153). On August 17, 1863, Union naval forces began a bombardment of Battery Wagner and Fort Sumter. The Confederate Navy was not able to defend itself, which allowed the Union to take control of the forts. The only challenge they would face was the *H. L. Hunley*, a Confederate submarine. Symonds delves into only one battle between the *H. L. Hunley* and the USS *Housatonic*, in which the *Hunley* sank the *Housatonic* outside of Charleston Harbor (176). Symonds does not illustrate fully the importance of the *H. L. Hunley's* role in the Confederate Navy. With the coming Union occupation of Mobile Bay in 1864, the Confederacy's river war efforts are stifled and focus transferred back to ground battles in the western theater (192). The work struggles to convey its place in Civil War historiography. Symond's creates a chronological synopsis of water wars with no clear relation to the Civil War as a whole. As historian Stephen W. Sears points out, Symond's description of Confederate commerce raiders such as the CSS *Florida*, *Alabama*, and the *Shenandoah*, fails to prove their effect on the war.³ However, the book is friendly to those without knowledge of the Civil War.

Tess Evans

3 Stephen W. Sears, "Review of The Civil War at Sea," *Naval History* 24, no. 1 (2010), 68.

Howe, Daniel Walker. *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. xviii, 855pp.

As the subtitle suggests, Daniel Walker Howe's *What Hath God Wrought* is a work that examines the rapid transformation of the United States of America from 1815 to 1848. At 855 pages, it is a comprehensive narrative that encompasses virtually every facet of history imaginable: political, legal, diplomatic, military, technological, economic, social, and cultural. Though Howe asserts that his narrative has no thesis, the book contains at the very least an interpretive framework in which people, events, and places are threaded together by an overarching theme (849). The author rejects the notion advanced by other historians—most notably Charles G. Sellers—that this time period is defined by a “market revolution” by referencing more recent scholarship that counters that a market economy had already been in existence since the colonial era. Rather, Howe argues that it was a “communications revolution”—often coupled with the transportation revolution—that distinguished the period under examination from any other in American history. This premise of a communications revolution thus provides the overarching theme present throughout the work.

The very dates 1815 and 1848—the conclusions of the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War respectively—are specifically chosen to emphasize the dizzying evolution that communications underwent over the course of three decades. In early 1815, the Battle of New Orleans was needlessly fought because the participants on this side of the Atlantic were oblivious of the fact that diplomats representing the United States and Great Britain had already signed the Treaty of Ghent, thus bringing the war to an end in the twilight of 1814. Howe contrasts this chronic dilemma against his dramatic narration of the first message sent via electric telegraph by Professor Samuel F. B. Morse in Washington D.C. to his associate in Baltimore in 1844. Acutely aware that his invention was going to revolutionize not only the speed of communications but even divorce communications from the necessity of transportation, Morse sent his profoundly metaphysical statement, “What Hath God Wrought” (1). In illuminating just how momentous this event truly was, Howe observed that “Neither Alexander the Great nor Benjamin Franklin ... two thousand years later knew anything faster than a galloping horse. Now, instant long-distance communication became a practical reality” (1). Indeed, the author asserts that the establishment and operation of the early telegraph lines kept the Polk administration and American public informed of developments once war broke out against Mexico

(2).

While the electric telegraph was arguably the most advanced development in the communications revolution, it was by no means the only significant one. Howe is at his finest when examining the expansion of the nation's postal service with all its far-reaching consequences. The expansion of the postal system provides a unique example of the complementary nature of the transportation and communications revolutions. Howe observes:

Not only did improved transportation benefit communication, but the communication system helped improve transportation. Even without a central plan, the post office pushed for improvements in transportation facilities and patronized them financially when they came. The same stagecoaches that carried passengers along the turnpikes also carried the mail, and the postmaster general constantly pressed the stages to improve their service (226).

While the newspaper boom of the era was in some measure the product of recent modernization in printing and papermaking—yet another factor of the communications revolution that Howe examines—it was the burgeoning postal system that facilitated the spread of information by delivering newspapers throughout the nation. Nor was this limited to newspapers alone. Magazines, books, and other printed material were delivered by the postal service, allowing readers to become more knowledgeable about the world in which they lived.

Howe convincingly demonstrates throughout his work that the communications revolution truly did transform society. The proliferation of political newspapers and periodicals both informed the voters and promoted their involvement. This is especially evident in Howe's examination of America's second party system. Faster communications revolutionized the world of trade and commerce as well. Perhaps most notable is the boost that reform movements received from the communications revolution. Howe argues that it is no coincidence that the antislavery movement became more prominent in the 1830s. Supporters of this movement were also taking advantage of the new printing technology to get the word out. Howe even astutely notes a global consequence of the communications revolution that undoubtedly benefited the abolitionist movement: "In a world where people communicated and traveled, the continued existence of slavery in the United States when many other countries had abolished it came to seem anomalous and embarrassing" (647). These are but a few examples of the transformation of American society facilitated by improved communications.

Despite its great insight, *What Hath God Wrought* is not without

its flaws. Regrettably, the most notable shortcoming of this book is the lack of any adequate examination of the advantage in communications that the United States held over Mexico during the Mexican-American War or how such a cutting edge influenced the outcome of the conflict. While the chapter pertaining to this war addresses how the technological superiority of the U.S. military and the chronic political instability of the Mexican government proved to be decisive factors in America's favor, little is said about the disparity between each nation's communications system. Given Howe's assertion that the telegraph kept America well informed during the war (as previously noted) along with his statement that Mexico's inefficient communication system left its northern territories vulnerable to an ever expanding United States, it is not unreasonable for the reader to expect a detailed discussion on the specific role of the telegraph and its influence on the course of events (21). However, little is said on the subject. Howe merely states that the war served as a catalyst for extending the telegraph system to facilitate the federal government's need for the latest news from the front (748).

Daniel Walker Howe's *What Hath God Wrought* is a superb work of scholarship on the early national period, despite minor flaws, and is highly recommended for several reasons. Undoubtedly, his novel interpretation of a communications revolution as the main force behind the transformation of the early American republic is welcome because it will continue to spark healthy debate among historians. Such debates often sharpen the intellectual tools of the trade, thus making better historians out of the discipline's professionals. However, the scholar is by no means the only one who stands to benefit from reading Howe's work. Because of its eloquent narrative prose, any general reader unfamiliar with the time period now has access to a comprehensive wealth of information contained in a single volume. Howe is to be applauded for attempting to educate not only the scholar but also the general public. His refreshingly balanced opinion that, "History is made both from the bottom up and from the top down, and historians must take account of both in telling their stories," serves as a reminder that all areas of history are valuable and must be examined in relation to each other for a more complete understanding of the past (843). In light of all these considerations, it is only fitting that Howe's *What Hath God Wrought* belongs in the same series as James McPherson's renowned *Battle Cry of Freedom*.

A. Blake Denton

Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight Against Civil Rights, 1938-1965. By Keith M. Finley. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008. Pp. ix-340. Acknowledgments, introduction, note on sources, bibliography, index. \$40.00.

The Civil Rights Movement of the twentieth century is a critical period in American history and a significant amount of historical assessment has been published on this monumental struggle. Scholastic contributions usually focus on the African American community's fight for equality and the leaders who were responsible for the achievements of legal and political equality. Other histories analyze specific events, places, or people connected to the conflict. There are very few detailed historic studies devoted to white opposition to civil rights. Keith Finley's *Delaying the Dream: Southern Senators and the Fight against Civil Rights, 1938-1965*, winner of the D.B. Hardeman Prize, is an impressive contribution. Finley adds a fresh perspective to the ever expanding literature on this socially and politically important era in history.

Finley argues that white southern senators, instead of employing outright obstruction, strategically delayed the struggle for racial equality for nearly three decades. Finley begins in 1938 when southern senators sought to block an anti-lynching bill. He continues tracing the ingenious tactics utilized by these senators to delay civil rights legislations, and the study ends with the inevitable legal defeat of Jim Crow, signified by the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

As the author explores the southern senators delaying efforts, an evolving pattern of deliberate obstruction emerges. Finley states that their "long-term tactical objective thus shifted from preventing to postponing the assault against segregation" (7). These men realized they would ultimately fail at preserving their southern way of life. Southern senators based their arguments against equality on constitutional interpretation rather than racism, while using northern senators' seeming disinterest in southern civil rights to their advantage. Before World War II, they were victorious in preventing certain measures such as the anti-lynching bill and the anti-poll tax bill. Finley illustrates that when southern senators were faced with bills that began to directly threaten segregation they "realized that defeat represented the only possible outcome of their resistance," so they began planning for covert strategic tactics. (7).

These senators limited the use of overt racism and appealed to their northern colleagues as public support for civil rights grew. Such approaches included the constitutional defense of segregation, the perpetuation of the myth that a peaceful existence was alive in

the Jim Crow South, and the distribution of the idea that both blacks and whites celebrated segregation. Dixie's senators succeeded with strategic delay at the federal level, but failed at controlling local racial agitators and racial tensions. Thirty years of filibustering led to the rise of an impactful and influential grassroots protest movement in the southern region, while attracting more northern support. After a series of white violent responses to peaceful black protest in the 1950s and 1960s, northern legislators, as Finley states, "could no longer accept southern claims of the racial tranquility created by Jim Crow" (14). Finley explores the change in attitudes among southern senators towards the end of the fight. A few sought compromises, while many fought for their precious southern way of life to the very end.

A book this thoroughly detailed could run the risk of becoming dry, but Finley does a superb job at keeping readers engaged. This is done by the addition of concise biographies and lively anecdotes of each southern senator as he introduces them. Finley exposes Richard Russell's racism when the senator "unveiled a program to evenly distribute the nation's black population, then so heavily concentrated in the South, throughout the country" (130). Russell believed that "Northerners should pass judgment on the South only after they had experienced the difficulties of living with a sizable black population" (130). Another character analysis Finley illuminates is that of Lyndon B. Johnson. The author states that the "man who became an outspoken civil rights supporter as president began his Senate career espousing a diametrically opposed position" (111). These descriptions are relevant in order to fully understand the voting patterns, ideologies, and personalities of each man.

Delaying the Dream presents a well-researched and convincing argument. Finley illuminates the ideology of white opposition to civil rights legislation, their extreme methods and tactics, and the racial attitudes of white southerners during the mid-twentieth century by drawing from senators' papers, the *Congressional Record*, and a wealth of secondary sources. In the conclusion, Finley expands his study by reflecting on how northern opinion turned against the black community once black violence crossed the Mason-Dixon Line, just as southern senators had predicted. In a closing argument, Finley states that as a result of continued racial unrest, Richard Nixon won the presidential election with the message of law, order, and constitutionalism pursued by southerners in their three decade opposition against civil rights. Thus, the southern view of politics had ironically become the American view. Finley's work is a must read for serious scholars of political history and those interested in social movements in the American South during the twentieth century.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Meringolo, Denise D. *Museums, Monuments and National Parks: Toward a New Genealogy of Public History*. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 2012. 207 pp.

Many mark the 1970s as the decade of the birth of the field of public history. The term “public history” was coined by Robert Kelley in 1975. The next year Kelley and others at UC Santa Barbara launched the first public history program in the country. The program helped historians apply the skills they learned in graduate school to a variety of fields outside academia, which was suffering from a severe job crisis in the 1970s. This “new” field quickly became problematic as those already working within the areas that fell under the new label of public history (historic preservation, archival and museum administration, collections management, etc.) found themselves and their work questioned and marginalized as they lacked formal training in the new academic field. However, this simplified explanation of the birth of public history does not satisfy most public historians. Meringolo, in a well-executed work, argues that the field was in fact born much earlier than the 1970s, in part in the offices of historians employed by the federal government, with additional roots in the work of early Smithsonian scientists and archeologists at the early National Parks and Monuments. Meringolo’s belief that public history is not just a branch of traditional academic history, but a field its own right shapes the rich and complicated history of the field beginning in the mid nineteenth century and leading up to WWII as “federal workers began to conceptualize the protection of landscapes and artifacts as valuable public work.” (xxix).

In Part I, Meringolo begins by looking at the slow process by which the federal government began to sponsor research in the pre-Civil War era. The Federal government, reluctant to over-extend its authority in states or to build up a scientific and educational bureaucracy, funded few projects. Those they did fund were scientific in nature and were seen as aiding economic growth and development, such as geological surveys to determine the safest locations for railroad lines in the West. During and after the Civil War, the government increased its involvement in funding research and education. As a result of the Morrill Act of 1862, American education began to undergo an important shift increasingly towards to a research-based curriculum. The number of scientific expeditions began to increase as well as government funds available to researchers. One such expedition led to the creation of the first national park, Yellowstone, in 1872. Recognized for its unique landscape and its value to science, Yellowstone became the model for other national parks.

In Part II, Meringolo examines how the federal government became increasingly interested in preserving archeological resources, which lead to the Antiquities Act of 1906 and the creation of the Park Service in 1916. While problematic in many ways, the Antiquities Act

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helped to usher in a new era where prehistoric and historic resources began to enjoy federal protection, at least in theory. In practice, controlling access to sites was difficult and it took trained archeologists/Park Service rangers like Jesse Nusbam at Mesa Verde to protect sites and artifacts from looters and to develop interpretive programs that helped to educate visitors. By the 1920s a new problem emerged for the Park Service. While the numbers of visitors to National Parks continued to grow yearly, leading to increased demand for staff and infrastructure, the Park Service's goal of managing a "truly national landscape" was going unfulfilled (85). In 1925, Arcadia National Park in Maine was the only National Park east of the Mississippi, and justifying the creation of eastern parks was difficult. Meringolo argues that during the nineteenth century western parks were created based in their "scenic but otherwise useless landscapes" and their potential for scientific research (87). To create eastern parks, the Park Service turned away from science and looked to history as a justification, which became a "tool of development" and allowed the Park Service to transform "vernacular landscapes and local traditions into components of national heritage"(86). During the Depression, such a focus on history and interpretation in the parks increased, as historians took jobs working with the CCC on site development projects and the development of new museum programs. They also joined the ranks of national monument superintendents and rangers in greater numbers.

By Part III of Meringolo's work, which examines audience, authority and offers her concluding thoughts, the debts the field of public history has to science, to the federal government's role in protecting historic sites, to the Park Service and to the expanded role of the federal government during the Depression, are quite clear. As Meringolo argues, public history clearly has an evolution and a story of its own and is truly different from traditional academic history. It has its own issues, its own responsibilities to the public and to itself. A valuable book for practicing public historians and students alike, *Museums, Monuments and National Parks*, helps to ground public history's methodologies and rich history in a much more realistic and complex narrative than is traditionally told.

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Blood on the Hills: A History of Violence in Appalachia. Edited by Bruce E. Stewart (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2012. Pp. 412. Illustrations, index. Cloth. \$55.00.)

From *Guy Rivers*, William Gilmore Simms's 1834 novel, to the FX television series *Justified*, Appalachia has been portrayed as a region uniquely prone to violence and disorder. Over the years, various explanations have been proffered—most of them trite and lazy nods to genetic factors or cultural determinism. *Blood on the Hills* brings together thirteen essays by established scholars and talented young historians alike, almost all of which do an excellent job of at once depicting specific violent episodes and exposing the superficiality of outmoded explanations.

As is to be expected in collections of this sort, not all the contributions are outstanding. Katherine Ledford's examination of eyewitness accounts of Appalachian life quickly goes off the rails by rejecting the veracity of eight separate travelers without producing a shred of evidence that such "reports" (scare quotes hers) are suspect. Likewise, T.R.C. Hutton's "Assassins and Feudists" is a rambling attempt to link the 1900 William Goebel assassination to violence in eastern Kentucky, all in order to argue what anyone with a passing knowledge of the event already knows—that politics played a crucial role in Appalachian violence.

Yet these two are the exceptions in an otherwise remarkable collection of essays. Among the highlights is Mary Ella Engel's extraordinarily well-rendered account of an 1879 murder of a Mormon missionary in northern Georgia that places the killing within the context not of religious prejudice per se but of the Mormons' disruption of Appalachian kinship networks. Likewise, Durwood Dunn renders a superb and harrowing account of an eastern Tennessee minister run out of his pulpit for protesting the torture of two slaves at the hands of a couple of "respectable" elites.

The essays range back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a time before the stereotypes of a violent Appalachia became commonplace. Kevin Barksdale offers a concise and informative account of the short-lived State of Franklin and the "near-perpetual violence" (46) of its four-year pseudo-existence. Kathryn Shively Meier examines Pennsylvania's Wyoming Valley in the late eighteenth century and finds the violence there to be a result of both political quarrels and interracial conflict born of land encroachment. In southern Appalachia, unruly and violent young Cherokee warriors, Tyler Boulware argues, were a chronic problem for tribal leaders, but one they skillfully used as a lever in negotiations with European-Americans. John Inscoc examines lawlessness in the early nineteenth century boomtowns of the north Georgia goldfields by analyzing one of the very first popular depictions of

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Appalachian violence, Simms's *Guy Rivers*.

Bruce Stewart charts the creation of the moonshiner myth in late nineteenth century periodicals, revealing that the stereotype was peddled in the service of rationalizing Victorian era efforts to forcibly drag uncouth mountaineers into the modern world—an effort that necessarily entailed the acceptance of an exploitative industrial order. Richard Starnes vividly depicts the 1933 murder of Thomas Price, a wealthy and well-connected railroad man, and the subsequent efforts of mountain people themselves to counter the violent stereotype of their region. Paul Rakes and Kenneth Bailey, meanwhile, skillfully catalog the extraordinary violence of West Virginian coal towns. The harrowing racial dimensions of mountain violence are dissected by separate and outstanding essays by Rand Dotson—who renders an account of the Roanoke, Virginia riot of 1893—and Kevin Young, who examines racial lynching of Broadus Mitchell in western North Carolina in the 1920s.

So what, in the aggregate, are we to make of these essays? Bruce Stewart, in his introduction to the collection, argues that they “debunk the myth of violent Appalachia” (18)—by which the reader must assume he means a *uniquely* violent Appalachia, for if the collection does anything, it quite clearly demonstrates that violence was fairly endemic to mountain life: a North Georgian gang shoots a Mormon missionary two dozen times in the head and neck; a respected member of an east Tennessee community whips an elderly slave 300 times with a carpenter’s handsaw; dozens upon dozens of mountaineers are shot in cold blood, many without any discernable reason.

But were such levels of violence atypical of America as a whole? Here, this admirable collection falls short, for the case that “violence in Appalachia was not exceptional” (6) remains not so much unproven, but essentially unargued; little context or comparative evidence is presented that would enable such a claim to be evaluated.

In large part, the problem is one of historiographical context—or, more accurately, the lack of one. Seldom mentioned in the collection are the important studies of Richard Maxwell Brown, Richard Hofstadter, Richard Slotkin, David Courtwright, Randolph Roth, and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, all of which argue that, although American levels of violence were—and are—exceptionally high, the rate of violence has

not been uniform through space or time.¹ Two crucial determinants identified by these scholars are concentrations of young, single men and the government's ability to exert and extend its authority. The first explanation, best elaborated by Courtwright, receives support from Paul Rakes and Kenneth Bailey, who find far greater levels of violence in the coal camps of West Virginia—known for their “abundance of liquor and testosterone” (319)—than elsewhere in the state. But given that the gender imbalance of the West Virginia coal towns was not typical of Appalachia as a whole, a second, Weberian explanation may be more appropriate: the crucial variable in the ebb and flow of violence in America's history has hinged upon the ability of the nation-state to secure a “monopoly on violence”—and thereby restrict or punish non-sanctioned violence. Richard Hofstadter gave voice to such a position decades ago:

The story of our diminished violence . . . has been in good part the story of the submergence and defeat of arbitrary, bigoted, self-satisfied local forces by the advancing cosmopolitan sentiment of a larger, somewhat more neutrally minded state, or, better, national public. It has been marked by the replacement of small-town vigilantes by state authorities or national troops . . . the supremacy of national laws and standards over state and municipal laws and practices.²

Similarly, Randolph Roth has recently maintained that the two most important factors influencing American murder rates are levels of trust in government and a belief in the honesty of elected officials. As he elaborates, “if no government can establish uncontested authority and impose law and order, if political elites are deeply divided and there is no continuity of power or orderly succession, men can . . . take up arms on behalf of particular political factions or racial groups and kill without

1 Richard M. Brown's works include *The South Carolina Regulators: The Story of the First American Vigilante Movement* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press), 1963; *Strain of Violence: Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); and *No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in American History and Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Richard Hofstadter views are summarized in his introduction to Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, *American Violence: A Documentary History* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1970). Richard Slotkin has produced a remarkably influential trilogy of works on the mythology of American violence: *Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860* (Wesleyan University Press, 1973); *The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the Age of Industrialization, 1800-1890* (New York: Atheneum, 1985); *Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America* (New York: Atheneum, 1992). David Courtwright, *Violent Land: Single Men and Social Disorder from the Frontier to the Inner City* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) Randolph Roth, *American Homicide* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, *This Violent Empire: The Birth of an American National Identity* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

2 Hofstadter, *American Vipolence*, 28.

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restraint.”³ This, it seems, could serve as a fairly accurate summary of the book at hand.

Given the sheer physical challenge presented by the Appalachian mountain range, one doesn’t have to be Fernand Braudel to wonder how this geographic reality both impeded the ability of state and federal authorities to assert their power in the region and gave marauders opportunity to prey on the civilian populations—people who in turn were forced to defend themselves by violent means.

None of this should be read as an argument against Stewart’s contention that Appalachia was—and is—“a society very much American,” (6) or a dissent from the laudable and necessary desire of the essayists to correct the still-lingering notion that the region is a land inhabited by a not-quite-American “Other.” Yet, like recent trends in the writing of Southern history, the effort to minimize the differences between nation and section may obscure as much as it clarifies. What does it really tell us to assert: Appalachia is violent; America is violent; therefore Appalachia is just America writ small? Indeed, if regional peculiarities are myths, why is there a distinct field to begin with? At which point do we strip place of any explanatory power?

Such questions are not meant to impugn the overall quality of the essays—on the contrary, their excellence is a testament to the wealth of young talent in the field, as well as the continuing relevance of more established scholars. But although the canvases are skillfully executed, perhaps we should reconsider the manner in which they are framed.

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3 Roth, *American Homicide*, 17, 28-29.