Man in the Glass Box

Hannah Arendt’s Interpretation of Adolf Eichmann and Repurposing of Holocaust Memory

By: Kyle Alvey, Marshall University

I: Broadcasting the Eichmann Affair 

The extradition, trial, and execution of Adolf Eichmann by the state of Israel beginning in 1960 represented a shift in how the Holocaust was understood, discussed, and ultimately remembered.[1] Survivors of the Holocaust, upon becoming a diaspora, had been encouraged to move on from their collective traumas and burdens. With the birth of Israel, life turned to rebuilding instead of obsession over past horrors. There were many moving parts of the Eichmann affair, nearly all of them awash in controversy. Eichmann’s kidnapping and extradition were questioned from a legal standpoint. On the subject of Americans’ reactions, Peter Novick wrote, “The reaction of Americans to the Israeli announcement was mixed. All expressed pleasure that the criminal had been captured and would be called to account. But a great many were distressed about the manner in which Eichmann had been apprehended, and rejected Israel’s claim to jurisdiction.”[2]

The right of Israel to house the court that would decide his fate was also questioned, though an agreement with Argentina cleared all international concerns, despite a vocal push to have the trial occur in Germany. As a social controversy storm, the Eichmann trial became one of the first ever televised and global media sensations. Novick wrote:

The Eichmann trial, along with the controversies over Arendt’s book and Hochhuth’s play, effectively broke fifteen years of near silence on the Holocaust in American public discourse. As part of this process, there emerged in American culture a distinct thing called ‘the Holocaust’—an event in its own right, not simply a subdivision of Nazi barbarism. There was a shift in focus to Jewish victims rather than German perpetrators that made its discussion more palatable in the continuing cold war climate.[3]

By making a sensational news story that stayed relevant, the Israelis were able to keep their claims of the Holocaust alive. This enabled them to manipulate Western interests, pressuring the United States and other allies to back zionist claims. 

In the pages that follow, I argue that one of the largest controversies, regarding the reportage by writer and journalist Hannah Arendt, is a nonissue that was used to fan the flames of popular interests. Rather, critics and proponents debating the Holocaust and its aftermath decades after the Nazi regime was a success on the account of powerful people.  The Eichmann Affair ensured the evolution of Holocaust memory into a new era, one in which Israel could exist as an ethnic Jewish state. Norman Finkelstein, painting a grim depiction of people capitalizing on the Eichmann Affair, wrote, “A more coherent, if less charitable, explanation is that American Jewish elites remembered the Nazi holocaust before June 1967 only when it was politically expedient. Israel, their new patron, had capitalized on the Nazi holocaust during the Eichmann trial.”[4]    

Hannah Arendt would perhaps later regret her choice of words when creating the subtitle of her book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil.[5] The word ‘banality’ is at the heart of the resulting criticism and controversy, which would affect the opinion of Arendt for the rest of her writing career. To clarify, the term ‘nonissue,’ I mean to say that there were more pressing concerns than Hannah Arendt’s perception of Adolf Eichmann regarding the trial and treatment of Holocaust memory. It is not to say that the problems associated with Arendt’s interpretation of Eichmann as he sat in his glass box at the trial were not worthy of a contemporary discussion. In a time of finger-pointing and blaming, ensconced by the paranoia caused by McCarthyism and the genuine threat of Soviet Communism, Arendt’s main argument is largely overshadowed by the word ‘banality.’ From a technical standpoint, she was not putting blame on Jewish leaders alone or exonerating Adolf Eichmann of his crimes, though her description of the trial raised questions on both fronts. Rather, because of the journalistic nature of her writing, Hannah Arendt was doing her job; reporting on the Eichmann trial through direct observations of her time witnessing the trial. She was giving an honest look at Eichmann’s behaviors and language in the courtroom. Her completed book certainly contains more nuance than a standard New York Times article, but at its heart, the job of the piece of writing is the same. I believe the word ‘Report’ which she purposefully used has been historically overlooked. She was writing what she saw and felt, but her critics perhaps scrutinized her ideas too deeply with little purpose other than to affect Arendt’s reputation and credibility. 

The main point of this essay is not to serve as an apologist for Hannah Arendt. She was, after all, an experienced journalist and a Holocaust survivor herself. She perhaps should have been far more precise and careful with her choice of phrases, from the visible high point of the subtitle to the densest sections in her text. Arendt also took months and years to craft her finished book, after publishing the events within the Israeli courtroom she witnessed and supplementing with the court transcript. For these reasons, saying a part of the killing machine that led to the death of six million European Jews is banal is both impersonal and obtuse. But the resulting controversy that followed her in the aftermath of her publication was likewise unfair and wrong. Instead of tearing open these wounds which others have already done, I wish to contextualize Arendt’s place in the courtroom. Just like the prosecution, world audiences that could see the trial by television, and everyone else who connected to the affair, Hannah Arendt was a carefully placed tool in a carefully planned repurposing of the memory of the Holocaust. Just as Adolf Eichmann was contained within a glass cage, so too were the rest of the participants. They were the particles within a snow globe which was about to be shaken.

The Nuremberg Trials came swiftly on the heels of WWII, meting out justice to twenty-two of the most important surviving Nazi leaders from 1945 to 1946 from the authority of an international military tribunal. Just as rapidly as they had started after the war, the trials ended, with ten executions, a suicide, seven life sentences, and three acquittals. For contemporary records, these trials symbolized the end of the Nazi regime and the genocides it had inflicted on the world. Life could now be expected to continue in any way that it could, with many survivors choosing to relocate instead of returning to their European country that had just enacted a legal ethnic cleansing. Some survivors of the Holocaust found themselves as strangers in the new state of Israel, having to rebuild their lives from nothing. Others went to the United States, staying and creating communities in cities like New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago. There were also other people attempting to leave the havoc of war-torn Germany behind, though for drastically different reasons.

Multiple Nazis, at both high and low levels of their bureaucratic hierarchy, were able to escape the persecution of the Nuremberg Trials by taking on new identities and fleeing the area. Some were caught quickly, some slowly, and some perhaps not at all. Major perpetrators, like Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich died before facing justice. One man, representing the complexities of the Nazi bureaucracy by being later known as “the Architect of the Final Solution” and yet also a worker with self-described lowly secretarial and transportation duties, stands out now more than his nefarious colleagues. Adolf Eichmann, by both direct and indirect design, effectively changed the perception of the Holocaust, recreating it as a global phenomenon that would later be represented by a museum on the National Mall of America, a place that is in no clear way connected to the events of 1939 to 1945.[6] Eichmann’s trial would serve as a major turning point in how the memory of the Holocaust was understood and used for personal gain, be it at the individual or national level.

Once the Nuremberg Trials were over, the affairs of the state of Israel and the problem of massive refugee numbers faded into the background as the Cold War and the Red Scare dominated American politics. To this point in connection to the Eichmann trial, Novick wrote:

Two other lines of press commentary—sometimes made separately, sometimes joined—were far more troublesome: that the trial would benefit the Soviets and that it illustrated the difference between Christian forgiveness and ‘Jewish vengefulness.’ The Wall Street Journal wrote that the trial not only risked reviving anti-German feeling, which could only benefit the Communists, but that it was pervaded by ‘an atmosphere of Old Testament retribution.’[7]

Conversations around dinner tables were now about the threats of Communist spies in America and a seemingly inevitable nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. In 1960, an opportunity arose to redefine the Holocaust for a contemporary world. Modern rhetoric still pulls on the existential threat of repeating the Holocaust that seems to always be overhead, which has continued the Israeli-Palestine conflict.

Donald Bloxham wrote about the tone shift caused by the Eichmann Affair:

In a polemical way the Eichmann trial had raised the particular issues of the Allied failure to bomb Auschwitz as well as the possibility of negotiating with the Nazis over Hungarian Jewry in 1944. In similar tone, books such as those by Arthur Morse and to a lesser extent David Wyman in the United States and Andrew Sharf in Britain attempted to shatter the illusion that nothing was known or that nothing could have been done. The mood of complacency marked by Reitlinger gave way to one of accusation.[8]

With a degree of novelty, the trial could now change the future by obsessing over the past. It would go on to pull open old wounds and bring to light unknown atrocities, while also wreaking havoc for many of the individuals involved in the trial, including Hannah Arendt.

II: Historiography on Arendt and Eichmann

Hannah Arendt's coverage of the Adolf Eichmann trial in 1961 remains a pivotal moment in the study of political philosophy, ethics, and the nature of evil. Her reports, later compiled into the book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, generated significant debate and established a rich historiographical tradition.[9] Arendt, a Jewish émigré from Germany, was tasked with covering the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a key architect of the Holocaust. Arendt’s observations were striking not only for their content but also for their philosophical implications. She introduced the concept of the "banality of evil," suggesting that Eichmann was not a monstrous figure but rather an ordinary bureaucrat who participated in horrific acts without critical reflection.[10] This notion challenged existing narratives that portrayed perpetrators of the Holocaust as fanatical ideologues, proposing instead that moral failure can arise from thoughtlessness and conformity.

Upon its publication, Eichmann in Jerusalem elicited a polarized response. Critics argued that Arendt's portrayal of Eichmann minimized the horrors of the Holocaust and risked absolving him of moral culpability. Jewish intellectuals and survivors felt that her arguments betrayed the depth of human suffering experienced during the Nazi regime. In particular, her comments regarding the Jewish councils and their roles in the deportations sparked outrage, as many perceived her analysis as unjustly placing blame on the victims for their collaboration. Despite the criticisms, Arendt’s work also garnered praise for its daring philosophical insights. Scholars began to recognize her arguments as crucial for understanding modern totalitarianism. Arendt's concept of the banality of evil opened new avenues for examining how ordinary people can become complicit in atrocious acts under certain political conditions. This prompted a re-evaluation of moral agency and the responsibility of individuals within systems of oppression.

Michael Morgan wrote in Auschwitz and After extensively on the discussion surrounding Arendt’s claims:

This exchange between Abel and Bell suggests that the most important issue concerning the intellectual debate over Arendt’s book on Eichmann was not whether they supported it or criticized it. Indeed, no general answer on that matter is forthcoming. Abel was critical, as was Podhoretz, who charged Arendt with applying a double standard to Jews and everyone else. Dwight Macdonald and Bruno Bettelheim produced laudatory reviews. Marie Syrkin and Gershom Scholem were severely critical, while Bell was mixed. The real issue lies elsewhere. It is that the debate raised to consciousness a whole set of convictions about universal principles and the particularity of historical situation. In a sense Arendt’s strategy was to confront the death camps through the mediation of theory and preconception.[11]

Over the decades, Arendt's analysis has been reassessed through various historiographical lenses. The 1980s and 1990s saw a surge of interest in the psychology of perpetrators, influenced in part by the emerging field of Holocaust studies. Scholars, like Christopher Browning and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, explored the motivations and beliefs of ordinary Germans who participated in the Holocaust. Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners argued for a uniquely German willingness to embrace anti-Semitic ideology, positioning this as a counterpoint to Arendt's notion of thoughtless bureaucracy.[12]

Morgan also focused on how understanding the Holocaust in the wake of the Eichmann trial changed for Jews, when he wrote:

With the war in June 1967, Israel and Auschwitz took center stage, one an image of hope and one of suffering and pain. Some understood the war and the threat in terms of Auschwitz. Others responded to the war by interpreting Israel and Israeli military success in terms of the suffering in the death camps. To some, a focus on the Holocaust became central of their Judaism; others resisted, or at least wanted to resist, allowing something so negative to dominate their religious identity.[13]

He would also go on to add in reflection that, “The Six Day War allowed a release of tension, of repressed emotion, or stimulated a dormant sense of threat. To many, it fixed the Holocaust in the center of Jewish consciousness as a sign of the value of survival.”[14] Morgan clearly demonstrated the significance for European Jews of the change in perception of the Holocaust.

Moreover, feminist and postcolonial critiques emerged, highlighting the intersections of gender, race, and power in discussions of evil. These perspectives have expanded Arendt’s framework, emphasizing that the banality of evil is not confined to the Holocaust but can be seen in various global contexts where systemic violence and oppression prevail. Today, Arendt’s reflections resonate with contemporary discussions about authoritarianism, moral complicity, and the nature of evil in political discourse. The rise of populism and the erosion of democratic norms in various countries evoke Arendt's warnings about the dangers of uncritical obedience and the potential for ordinary individuals to perpetrate or condone acts of brutality.

Scholars increasingly draw parallels between Eichmann's bureaucratic mentality and modern-day governance, emphasizing the need for ethical reflection in positions of power. Arendt’s work serves as a cautionary tale about the implications of disengagement from moral responsibility, urging vigilance against the dehumanization and normalization of violence in society.

III: Hannah Arendt and Raul Hilberg 

Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem and Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews represent two seminal contributions to the study of the Holocaust, yet they approach their subject matter from distinct angles.[15] While Arendt's work is often celebrated for its philosophical insights into the nature of evil and the human condition, Hilberg’s meticulous historical analysis offers a comprehensive account of the bureaucratic machinery that facilitated the genocide. In the glaring connections to Hannah Arendt’s book, Hilberg wrote:

The subtitle of Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem is A Report on the Banality of Evil. That subsidiary title has the rare distinction of being recalled more clearly than the main one….She did not discern the pathways that Eichmann had found in the thicket of the German administrative machine for his unprecedented actions. She did not grasp the dimensions of his deed. There was no ‘banality’ in this ‘evil.’ The second divergence between her conceptions and mine concerned the role of the Jewish leaders in what she plainly labeled the destruction of their own people. It had been known before, she said, but now it had been exposed ‘in all of its pathetic and sordid detail’ in what she called my ‘standard work.’ The whole truth, she said in a sentence that was quoted over and over, was that if the Jewish people had been unorganized and leaderless there would have been chaos and misery, but not between four and a half million and six million dead.[16]

Raul Hilberg is widely regarded as a pioneering figure in Holocaust studies, and his push back of Arendt’s use of his work is telling. His magnum opus, The Destruction of the European Jews, published in 1961, is a systematic examination of the logistics and mechanisms behind the Holocaust. Hilberg meticulously documented the roles of various actors—from the Nazi regime to local collaborators—in the orchestration of genocide. He introduced the concept of a bureaucratic process driven by the interplay of government agencies, which contributed to the systematic annihilation of the Jewish population. His emphasis on documentation and detailed archival research provided a foundation for understanding the Holocaust as a complex interplay of political, social, and bureaucratic forces.

In contrast, Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem focused on the trial of Adolf Eichmann, a key figure in the implementation of the Final Solution. Arendt’s report suggested that Eichmann was not a fanatical monster but rather an ordinary bureaucrat who failed to critically engage with his actions. This philosophical exploration shifted the discourse from a purely historical account to a profound inquiry into the nature of morality, responsibility, and human agency in the face of systemic violence.

Donald Bloxham analyzed Arendt’s perception of Eichmann:

Arendt was wrong about Eichmann the person. He was far from commonplace and unimaginative in his roles as solver of the Jewish question, and his staff were more than a small cog in a big machine. From 1938, in the days when the ‘final solution’ meant emigration, he had been instrumental in creating the ‘Vienna model’ of production-line expatriation and expropriation of Jews…In this capacity he was not hidebound by a set of official procedures, but rather had to innovate policy and practice towards the ultimate goal. As Lozowocki has recently shown, in findings corroborated elsewhere, the Eichmann staff performed all of these functions with elan, commitment and overt antisemitism.[17]

Arendt’s engagement with Hilberg’s work was not merely an academic footnote, but a meaningful dialogue that shaped her arguments. In her analysis of Eichmann, she drew on Hilberg’s meticulous documentation of the bureaucratic process, using it to illustrate how ordinary individuals could become complicit in horrific acts through unthinking adherence to rules and orders.[18] Hilberg’s detailed accounts of the logistical aspects of the Holocaust provided a backdrop against which Arendt could explore the moral and philosophical implications of Eichmann's actions.

However, Arendt diverged from Hilberg in critical ways. While Hilberg emphasized the structured processes that led to the Holocaust, Arendt focused on the psychological and ethical dimensions of Eichmann’s behavior. She posited that Eichmann’s failure to think critically about his actions rendered him a representative of a disturbing phenomenon: the capacity for ordinary people to commit evil when submerged in a bureaucratic system devoid of moral scrutiny. Arendt’s interpretations sparked significant debate, particularly concerning her treatment of Jewish complicity, which some interpreted as an oversimplification of the complexities of the Holocaust. Critics argued that her application of Hilberg’s bureaucratic analysis risked reducing the victims’ experiences to mere footnotes in a larger philosophical argument. Nonetheless, her reliance on Hilberg’s research underscored the necessity of understanding the Holocaust not only as a historical event, but also as a moral and philosophical crisis.

The interplay between Arendt and Hilberg has had a lasting impact on Holocaust studies and historiography. Hilberg’s focus on the mechanics of genocide continues to inform historians and scholars, while Arendt’s philosophical approach encourages ongoing reflection on the moral implications of human actions within oppressive systems. Together, they illustrate the multifaceted nature of the Holocaust, prompting scholars to engage with both the historical realities and the ethical dilemmas that emerge from such profound human tragedy.

In contemporary discussions, Arendt’s ideas, particularly the “banality of evil,” remain relevant as societies grapple with issues of complicity, authority, and moral responsibility in the face of systemic injustice. Hilberg’s rigorous documentation serves as a reminder of the importance of empirical research in understanding such complexities.

IV: The Architect of the Final Solution 

Eichmann was born in 1906 in Germany and joined the Nazi Party in 1932. His bureaucratic career flourished as he became a key figure in the SS, primarily responsible for organizing the logistics of deporting Jews to extermination camps. He was appointed to the Jewish Affairs department of the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) and later became the chief of the Jewish Department (IV B4). In this capacity, Eichmann played a crucial role in planning and executing the mass transportation of Jews from various European countries to camps such as Auschwitz, Treblinka, and Sobibor. Richard Rhodes wrote in his exploration of the SS:

The history of the Einsatzgruppen supports a few general observations. The fundamental reason the Holocaust became possible—a reason that links it to other mass-killing regimes and other genocides—was that social, economic, and political breakdown brought disorder that allowed Hitler and his criminal subordinates, a surprising number of them actual murderers, to parasitize and dominate the government of Germany, sweeping aside checks and balances (the essence of stable government) that would have limited their absolute power, co-opting the police, co-opting the bureaucracy, the military and the judiciary.[19]

As a part of this corrupted system, Eichmann’s logistical skills were instrumental in the systematic deportation of millions of Jews. He coordinated trains, schedules, and the collection of victims from occupied territories. His bureaucratic mindset and efficiency facilitated the Nazi regime's genocidal machinery. Eichmann often claimed that he was merely following orders and performing his duties as a civil servant, yet the scale and nature of his actions indicate a deeper complicity in the Holocaust.[20] Eichmann’s involvement deepened significantly with the implementation of the Final Solution, the Nazi plan to annihilate the Jewish population. He attended key meetings, such as the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, where high-ranking officials discussed the logistics of mass murder. Although he was not the main architect of the plan, his administrative role made him a vital cog in the machinery of genocide. He oversaw the deportation of Jews from Germany and Austria and later from occupied countries, ensuring that they were sent to extermination camps. On the topic of Adolf Eichmann’s rise in the Nazi bureaucracy, Ian Kershaw wrote:

‘Working towards the Führer’ may be taken in a literal, direct sense with reference to party functionaries, in the way it was meant in the extract cited. In the case of the SS, the ideological executive of the ‘Führer’s will,’ the tasks associated with ‘working towards the Führer’ offered endless scope for barbarous initiatives, and with them institutional expansion, power, prestige and enrichment. The career of Adolf Eichmann, rising from a menial role in the a key policy area to the manager of the ‘Final Solution’, offers a classic example.[21]

Eichmann’s contributions were not limited to transportation; he also participated in discussions about the fate of Jews in various regions.[22] His documentation and reports reflect a chilling bureaucratic detachment, revealing a focus on efficiency over morality. Eichmann often referred to the “resettlement” of Jews, a euphemism that masked the reality of mass murder. His ability to distance himself from the atrocities he facilitated has been a focal point in understanding his character and motivations.[23] Hannah Arendt famously characterized Eichmann as embodying the “banality of evil” during his trial in Jerusalem. She argued that Eichmann was not a fanatical ideologue, but rather an ordinary bureaucrat who demonstrated an alarming lack of critical thought and moral engagement. This perspective suggests that his actions were not motivated by deep-seated hatred but by a profound conformity to authority and a desire to fulfill his professional obligations.[24]

This notion of the banality of evil has sparked significant debate among historians and scholars. While some agree with Arendt’s analysis, others argue that Eichmann’s enthusiasm for his role and his willingness to embrace Nazi ideology indicate a more complex and sinister character. Eichmann’s numerous statements during the trial revealed a self-justifying mentality, wherein he attempted to portray himself as a mere pawn in a vast political system, despite the evidence of his active participation in the Holocaust. Eichmann’s capture in Argentina in 1960 and subsequent trial in Jerusalem in 1961 marked a significant moment in Holocaust historiography. The trial served not only as a platform for confronting Eichmann’s actions but also as a means of educating the world about the Holocaust. It revealed the extent of his involvement and the mechanisms of the Nazi regime, while also raising critical questions about justice, accountability, and the nature of evil.

The trial’s proceedings highlighted the moral implications of Eichmann’s bureaucratic mentality and the broader societal complicity in the Holocaust. Ian Kershaw wrote, “Eichmann’s testimony in Israel in 1960 was also at times inaccurate. He claimed to remember vividly Heydrich communicating to him two or three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union that ‘the Führer has ordered the physical extermination of the Jews.’”[25] Eichmann’s memory underscored the dangers of unthinking obedience to authority and the potential for ordinary individuals to become perpetrators of unimaginable atrocities.[26]

His trial represented a shift in how the Holocaust was regarded as an event involving European Jews to a spectrum of destruction focused on European Jews. The purposes behind this were not clear until The Six Day War, when Israel showed itself to be capable in protesting the growth of the Arab world. The success in this conflict gave the United States and other important backers the confidence to throw their support behind Israel. While he may indeed be regarded as the Architect of the Final Solution, the trial and execution of Adolf Eichmann enshrined Israel’s place in the changing 20th century world and beyond.

V: Controlling Holocaust Memory 

The Holocaust stands as one of the most significant and tragic events in human history, deeply impacting Jewish identity and collective memory. In Israel, the memory of the Holocaust has been meticulously shaped and controlled by various institutions, reflecting the nation’s unique historical, political, and cultural context. Education plays a crucial role in shaping collective memory, and in Israel, the Holocaust is a central component of the national curriculum. The Israeli Ministry of Education mandates that Holocaust education begins in elementary school and continues through high school. This systematic approach aims to instill a sense of historical awareness and responsibility among young Israelis.[27]

The curriculum emphasizes the experiences of Jewish victims, the horrors of genocide, and the importance of remembrance. However, the way the Holocaust is taught often reflects the broader narrative of Jewish victimhood and resilience, reinforcing a sense of collective identity rooted in trauma. This educational focus serves multiple purposes: it honors the memory of the victims, fosters a connection to Jewish history, and fortifies the legitimacy of the state of Israel as a sanctuary for Jews following centuries of persecution.

Critics, such as Jean Améry, Primo Levi, and Zygunt Bauman have argued that this focus can lead to a narrow understanding of the Holocaust, one that oversimplifies the complexity of the event and sidelines other narratives, such as those of non-Jewish victims. Moreover, the emphasis on victimization may obscure the broader implications of the Holocaust, including lessons about tolerance and the prevention of future genocides.

Commemoration is another significant aspect of Holocaust memory in Israel. Yad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem, plays a pivotal role in preserving and disseminating Holocaust memory. As a national institution, Yad Vashem conducts research, curates exhibitions, and provides educational programs aimed at promoting awareness of the Holocaust and its implications.[28] The annual observance of Yom HaShoah, Holocaust Remembrance Day, serves as a national moment of reflection, during which sirens sound, and citizens pause to remember the victims. Ceremonies, readings, and discussions across the country reinforce the collective mourning and remembrance of the Holocaust. These practices are carefully orchestrated by the state, ensuring that the memory of the Holocaust remains a central element of Israeli national identity.

However, the control over commemorative practices raises questions about whose stories are prioritized. The emphasis on Jewish suffering can sometimes overshadow the experiences of other groups, such as Roma, LGBTQ+ individuals, and Soviet prisoners of war, who also suffered during the Holocaust. This selectivity can lead to a homogenized narrative that simplifies the complexities of the past.[29]

The Holocaust has also become a critical component of Israeli political discourse. Leaders often invoke the memory of the Holocaust to justify policies, particularly regarding security and foreign relations. The trauma of the Holocaust is used to underscore the necessity of a strong Israel, presenting the state as a bulwark against anti-Semitism and existential threats. This politicization of Holocaust memory can manifest in various ways, including the framing of conflicts with Palestinians. Some Israeli officials have drawn parallels between historical Jewish persecution and the contemporary situation of Israeli security, thereby positioning the state as a victim in a hostile environment. This rhetoric can serve to rally domestic support but may also inhibit meaningful dialogue regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as it simplifies complex geopolitical issues into narratives of victimhood and survival.

While the control of Holocaust memory in Israel serves to unify and strengthen national identity, it also faces significant challenges. As generations pass and the direct testimonies of survivors diminish, the risk of memory distortion or dilution increases. Younger Israelis may relate differently to the Holocaust, which raises concerns about the relevance and effectiveness of Holocaust education. Furthermore, the memory of the Holocaust can be weaponized in political discourse, leading to accusations of exploitation. Critics argue that the trauma of the Holocaust should not be instrumentalized for contemporary political gains. This tension between remembrance and political utility poses ongoing challenges for how the Holocaust is understood and commemorated in Israel.

The Eichmann affair undoubtedly served the Israeli agenda in their conflicts with the Arab world. While the British may have supported the rights of Israel early on, it took military successes to bring the United States in line with capitalist and zionist expansion in the Middle East. The execution and public trial of Adolf Eichmann allowed Ben Gurion and other leaders to remind the rest of the world that the Holocaust was a Jewish affair. While the reporting by Hannah Arendt, as well as her dependence on the writing of Raul Hilberg, would create a sea of controversy, all of it served the Israeli agenda. It kept memory of the Holocaust not only alive, but also perpetually part of the headlines. By controlling this use of Holocaust memory, the cycle of death and violence that stemmed from the Nazi regime has continued- to the detriment of all.

Photos from Left to Right:

1: Library of Congress, Adolf Eichmann during trial cross-examination, standing in booth in front of microphones between two officers in courtroom, Jerusalem, 1961, Photograph, Jerusalem, https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/89710805/.

2: Israel Government Press Office, Eichman on trial in Jerusalem (1961), April 5, 1961, 1,753 × 2,337 (pixels), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Adolf_Eichmann_at_Trial1961.jpg.

Notes

[1] For an extensive overview of how the Eichmann affair, from extradition to execution, occurred, watch this key documentary: Michaël Prazan, The Adolf Eichmann Trial. France: National Center for Jewish Film. 2011.

[2] Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, (New York: Mariner Books, 2000), 128.

[3] Ibid, 153.

[4] Norman G. Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (New York: Verso, 2015), 30.

[5] Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006).

[6] For a groundbreaking look at the role of the United States in keeping Holocaust memory alive through the creation of the USHMM, see: Edward T Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America’s Holocaust Museum, (New York: Viking Penguin, 1995).

[7] Novick, The Holocaust in American Life, 129. 

[8] Donald Bloxham and Tony Kushner. The Holocaust: Critical History Approaches, (Manchester: Manchester

University Press, 2005), 187.

[9] Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 2006.

[10] Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006).

[11] Michael L. Morgan, Beyond Auschwitz: Post-Holocaust Jewish Thought in America, (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2001), 26-27.

[12] Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, (New York: Knopf, 1996).

[13] Ibid, 60.

[14] Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners (New York: Knopf, 1996).

[15] Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews Third Edition, (Yale: Yale University Press, 2003).

[16] Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory: The Journey of a Holocaust Historian, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 148.

[17] Donald Bloxham and Tony Kushner, The Holocaust: Critical History Approaches, (Manchester: Manchester

University Press, 2005), 153.  

[18] Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006).

[19] Richard Rhodes, Masters of Death: The SS-Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust, (New York:

Vintage Books, 2002), 277.

[20] Donald Bloxham and Tony Kushner, The Holocaust: Critical History Approaches, (Manchester: Manchester

University Press, 2005), 153.

[21] Ian Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 42.

[22] Edward T. Linenthal, Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create America’s Holocaust Museum, (New York: Viking Penguin, 1995), 282 discussed how informed Eichmann was, to counter his claims that he was not giving orders. “The first mention of the two estimates of Jewish victims—5.7 million and six million—is found, according to the council’s senior historian, Sybil Milton, in the records of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. ‘The first published figures were based on extrapolations of prewar and postwar populations as well as on fragmentary information derived from captured German records evaluated and used by the Allied prosecution team at Nuremberg. American prosecutor Justice Robert Jackson used 5.7 million and the six-million figure attributed to Eichmann was used by the tribunal in 1946.’ ‘This 6 million figure,’ Milton wrote, ‘is based on an affidavit at Nuremberg, dated 26 November 1945, by SS Major (Sturmbahnführer) Dr. Wilhelm Höttl. Höttl has previously served as deputy director of the Security Service (SD) branch in Budapest. Höttl stated that Eichmann mentioned the 6 million figure to him in Budapest in late August 1944.’”

[23] Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. (New York: Penguin Classics, 2006).

[24] Ian Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, 67. “On 31 July 1941, Göring, who had been nominally in charge of coordinating the forced emigration of German Jews since the aftermath of the great pogrom of November 1938, commissioned Heydrich with undertaking the preparations for the ‘complete solution of the Jewish question within the German sphere of influence in Europe.’ All Göring did, in fact, was to sign a document drawn up in Heydrich’s office, almost certainly drafted by Eichmann.”

[25] Ian Kershaw, Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 261. 

[26] Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems in Perspective of Interpretation, (New York: Edward Arnold,

1993), 103.

[27] United States Central Intelligence Agency. Israel. [Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1967] Map. https://www.loc.gov/item/2001626225/.

[28] Yad Vashem - The World Holocaust Remembrance Center Israel. Israel, 2002. Web Archive. https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0035802/.

[29] Linenthal spends a considerable amount of time describing how conversations and occasional fights broke out in the designing process of the USHMM over the inclusion of non-Jewish victims of Nazi atrocities.